“Still in-synch?”

Are the UK and EA money sectors still sending consistent messages?

The key chart

**Trends in UK and EA broad money** (Source: BOE; ECB, CMMP)

The key message

The messages from the UK and euro area (EA) money sectors were remarkably consistent during the COVID-19 pandemic. Are they still sending consistent messages now?

Growth in broad money rose sharply in both regions during the pandemic, peaking in 1Q21. Growth in narrow money (M1), and overnight deposits with banks within this, was the main driver of broad money growth. UK and EA households (HHs) were increasing savings and delaying consumption – deflationary rather than inflationary forces. Note, in this context, that growth in private sector credit (key assets of banks) did not match the growth in broad money (key ST liabilities of banks). Indeed the gap between money growth and lending growth reached historically high levels in 1Q21. These were atypical money and credit cycles.

Broad money growth has slowed down to pre-pandemic levels now. UK and EA HHs are no longer hoarding cash. The demand for consumer credit has recovered with the largest quarterly flows since the recovery began in 2Q21. Consumer credit demand has returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK but has still to recover fully in the EA. Growth rates in money supply and private sector credit have also re-aligned as money and credit cycles have re-synched with each other. In the EA, lending growth exceeded money supply growth in June 2022 for the first time since October 2011. The contribution of productive COCO-based lending has also increased in both regions. In the EA, for example, NFC lending grew faster than mortgages in June 2022.

In short, the key signals that I have been following consistently since early 2021 are all sending broadly positive messages for the economic outlook in both the UK and EA. The money sectors are still sending consistent messages, albeit with slightly different areas of emphasis.

The UK is more geared towards a recovery in consumer credit and has benefited from a stronger recovery here. Overall credit growth is slowing in the UK, however. The EA has seen a more promising recovery in lending to NFC and credit growth is still accelerating (in nominal terms).

As highlighted in the previous two posts, rising inflation has overshadowed all of these positive developments in the EA and the UK, however. Credit growth is negative in real terms in both regions, and leading, coincident and lagging monetary indicators are slowing sharply and in a coordinated fashion.

The synchronisation in the messages from the UK and EA money sectors extends to both the good and the bad news. Plenty for optimists and pessimists to debate here…

Still in-synch?

The messages from the UK and euro area (EA) money sectors were remarkably consistent during the COVID-19 pandemic. Are they still sending consistent messages now?

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

**The impact of COVID-19 on UK and EA broad money growth** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Growth in broad money rose sharply in both regions to peak in 1Q21 (see chart above). In the UK, the YoY growth rate in M4ex rose from 7.5% in March 2020 to a peak of 15.4% in February 2021. In the EA, the growth rate in M3 rose from 7.5% in March 2020 to a peak of 12.5% one month earlier in January 12.5%.

**Narrow money as %age of broad money in the UK and EA** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Growth in narrow money (M1), and overnight deposits with banks within this, was the main driver of broad money growth. M1 currently accounts for 69% of UK M3 and 73% of EA M3, up from 48% and 51% respectively a decade earlier. This means that UK and EA households (HHs) were increasing savings and delaying consumption during the pandemic – deflationary rather than inflationary forces.

Put simply, money sitting idly in bank deposits contributes to neither growth nor inflation.

**The gap between UK and EA lending and money supply growth** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Note that the growth in broad money (bank’s ST liabilities) was not matched by growth in private sector credit (banks’ assets). Indeed the gap between growth in money and growth in lending reached historic highs in 1Q21. In short, the money and credit cycles had moved out-of-synch with each other, and to a record extent.

The recovery from COVID-19

Broad money growth has slowed down to pre-pandemic levels now (see chart above). In June 2022, growth in M4ex had slowed to 4.4% in the UK and growth in M3 had slowed to 5.7% in the EA. These represent the slowest rates of growth since January 2020 and February 2020 respectively.

**Monthly HH money flows as a multiple of pre-pandemic average flows** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

HHs are no longer hoarding cash. In the UK, monthly HH money flows fell to £1.5bn in June 2022, 0.3x the average pre-pandemic flow of £4.7bn. In the EA, monthly HH deposit flows fell to €8.5bn, again this is 0.3x the average pre-pandemic flow of €33bn (see chart above).

**Quarterly consumer credit flows** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The demand for consumer credit has recovered with the largest quarterly flows since the recovery began in 2Q21. At the peak of the crisis in 2Q20, UK and EA HHs repaid £13.2bn and €12.9bn in consumer credit respectively. More recently, we have seen five consecutive quarters of positive consumer credit flows (see chart above).

Consumer credit demand has returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK but has still to recover fully in the EA. In the 2Q22, UK consumer credit flows recovered to £4.2bn, above the pre-pandemic average of £3.6bn. EA consumer credit flows also recovered to €7.5bn, but they remain below the pre-pandemic average of €10.8bn.

**Annual growth rates in UK and EA consumer credit** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Annual growth rates in consumer credit have also recovered to post-pandemic highs, to 6.5% in the UK and 3.3% in the EA in June 2022. Note the relative gearing of the UK here (see chart above). Consumer credit growth slowed faster and recovered stronger in the UK than in the EA.

**Trends in the gap between UK and EA lending and money supply growth**
(Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Growth rates in money supply and private sector credit have also re-aligned as money and credit cycles have re-synched with each other (see chart above). In the EA, lending growth exceeded money supply growth in June 2022 for the first time since October 2011. In the UK, lending growth still lagged money supply growth by 2.1ppt in June 2022, but this is much narrower than the peak gap of 11.5ppt seen in February 2021.

**Trends in UK and EA bank lending by type** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The contribution of productive COCO-based lending has increased in both regions. In the EA, NFC lending grew faster (5.9%) than mortgages (5.3%) in June 2022. Less productive, mortgage lending remains resilient in the EA, but its growth is slowing in the UK (see chart above).

Conclusion

In short, the key signals that I have been following consistently since early 2021 are all sending broadly positive messages for the economic outlook in both the UK and EA. The UK has benefited from a stronger recovery in consumer credit. The EA has seen a more promising recovery in lending to NFC.

As highlighted in the previous two posts, rising inflation has overshadowed all of these positive developments, however (see “Accounting for inflation” and “Accounting for inflation – part 2”). Credit growth is negative in real terms in both the UK and EA, and leading, coincident and lagging monetary indicators are slowing sharply and in a coordinated fashion.

The synchronisation in the messages from the UK and EA money sectors extends to both the good and the bad news. Plenty for optimists and pessimists to debate here…

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Accounting for inflation – part 2”

Inflation also distorts the 2Q22 message from the UK money sector

The key chart

**Nominal and real growth rates in UK M4Lex** (Source: BoE; CMMP)

The key message

In my previous post, I explained how rising inflation distorts the 2Q22 messages from the euro area’s (EAs) money sector significantly. The same is true for the UK too.

Ignore inflation and the messages from the UK’s money sector are broadly positive for the economic outlook. The three key signals from the UK money sector that I have been following consistently since early 2021 are all sending broadly positive messages – UK HHs have stopped hoarding money, they are borrowing more to fund consumption, and money and credit cycles are re-synching. Growth rates in COCO-based consumer credit and NFC lending are also rising in the UK while the growth in FIRE-based mortgage lending is slowing. Does this sound familiar?

Rising inflation is over-taking these positive trends, however. Lending to private sector companies and households (M4Lex) is falling sharply in real terms (-6.5% YoY). Trends in real HH credit and real NFC credit are slowing sharply and in a coordinated fashion. This matters because these factors typically display coincident and lagging relationships with real GDP.

As in the EA, plenty of information for optimists and pessimists to debate here but with increasing ammunition for the pessimists…

Accounting for inflation – part 2

In the previous post, I explained how rising inflation distorts the 2Q22 messages from the euro area’s (EAs) money sector significantly. The same is true for the UK too.

The good news

Ignore inflation and the messages from the UK’s money sector are broadly positive for the economic outlook.

**Trends in monthly HH money flows** (Source: BoE; CMMP)

Monthly HH money flows have moderated slowly, reflecting lower levels of uncertainty. The monthly flow fell from £5.2bn in May 2022 to £1.5bn in June 2022. This is well below the average pre-pandemic flows of £4.6bn and the peak flow of £26bn recorded in May 2020 when HH uncertainty levels peaked at the height of the pandemic crisis (see chart above).

**Quarterly trends in HH money flows** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The quarterly HH money flow in 2Q22 was £12.2bn (see chart above). This compares with the average pre-pandemic flows of £11.7bn. The message here is the same – HHs in the UK are no longer hoarding cash in the form of bank deposits. This is reflected, in turn, in the slowdown in broad money growth (see below).

**Trends in monthly consumer credit flows** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The demand for credit has recovered. Monthly consumer credit flows rose to £1.8bn in June 2022 from £0.9bn in May 2022, well above the pre-pandemic average flows of £1bn. The YoY growth rate of 6.5% was the highest rate of growth since May 2019. Within this, the annual growth rate of credit card borrowing was 12.5% while other forms of consumer credit grew 4.1%. These were the highest rates of growth since November 2005 and March 2020 respectively.

**Quarterly trends in consumer credit** (Source: BoE; CMMP)

The quarterly flow of consumer credit rose from £3.1bn in 4Q21 and £3.6bn in 1Q21 to £4.2bn in 2Q22 (see chart above). The 2Q22 flow was the largest quarterly flow since 2Q18 and was above the pre-pandemic average of £3.6bn. There have now been five consecutive quarters of positive consumer credit flows, with current flows in-line or slightly above pre-pandemic levels.

**Growth trends in broad money (M4ex) and lending (M4Lex)** (Source: BoE; CMMP)

After the recent and unprecedented de-synchronisation of money and credit cycles, growth rates in UK money supply and private sector credit are converging (see chart above). The YoY growth rate in money (M4ex) slowed from 5.4% in May 2022 to 4.4% in June 2022. At the same time, the YoY growth rate in lending (M4Lex) fell from 3.9% to 2.3%. While the gap between the two growth rates widened slightly from 1.5ppt to 2.1ppt, it has narrowed considerably from its peak of 11.5ppt in February 2021.

**Growth trends in mortgages, consumer credit and NFC lending** (Source: BoE; CMMP)

Growth rates in COCO-based consumer credit and NFC lending are rising in the UK while the growth in FIRE-based mortgage lending is slowing (see chart above).

As described above, consumer credit is growing at the fastest rate since May 2019. NFC lending has also recovered to 2.0% YoY, marking five consecutive months of positive YoY growth.

Of course, mortgages remain the largest segment of UK private sector credit (89% of total HH credit and 61% of total PSC). The relative stability of mortgage demand has been a key feature of the messages from the UM money sector for some time. However, net borrowing of mortgage debt decreased from £8.0bn in May 2022 to £5.3bn in June 2022. The YoY growth rate also declined from 4.6% in May 2022 to 3.8% in June 2022, the slowest rate of growth since February 2021. Approvals for house purchases, an indicator of future borrowing, decreased to 63.700 in June 2022 from 65,700 in May. This is below the pre-pandemic average of 66,700.

The bad news

Take inflation into account and the messages are very different, however. Lending to private sector companies and HHs (M4Lex) slowed from 3.9% YoY in May 2022 to 2.3% YoY in June 2022 (see chart above). In real terms, M4Lex fell -6.5% YoY in June 2020, with all forms of lending declining in real terms.

**Growth trends (real terms) in HH and NFC credit** (Source: BoE; CMMP)

Furthermore, trends in real HH credit and real NFC credit are slowing sharply in a coordinated manner. This matters because these factors typically display coincident and lagging relationships with real GDP over time (see “Look beyond the yield curve” for more details).

Conclusion

The three key signals from the UK money sector that we have been following consistently since early 2021 are all sending broadly positive messages – UK HHs have stopped hoarding money, they are borrowing more to fund consumption, and money and credit cycles are re-synching. Growth rates in COCO-based consumer credit and NFC lending are also rising in the UK while the growth in FIRE-based mortgage lending is slowing.

Rising inflation is over-taking these positive trends, however. Lending to private sector companies and households (M4Lex) is falling sharply in real terms (-6.5% YoY) and traditional coincident and lagging monetary indicators have turned down sharply and in a coordinated fashion. Plenty of ammunition here for pessimists.

The format and presentation of this post mirrors that of the previous post deliberately. Why? Because the messages from the UK and EA money sectors have been very similar during the pandemic. The next post will compare and contrast these trends more closely.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Euro area re-synching – part 1”

EA money and credit cycles are re-synching

The key chart

**YoY growth rates in M3 and private sector credit and trends in excess liquidity**
(Source: ECB; CMMP)

The key message

Growth rates in euro area (EA) money supply and private sector credit continue to converge and re-align. This matters because the de-synchronisation of money and credit cycles over the past decade, which peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic, created major challenges for policy makers, banks and investors alike.

On a positive note, this reflects a combination of slowing (excess) money supply growth and rising demand for private sector credit. Recall that narrow money (M1), and within that overnight deposits, drove the expansion of broad money (M3) during the pandemic. The contribution of productive COCO-based lending is also increasing, led by a recovery in corporate credit. Importantly, COCO-based lending supports both production AND income formation.

That said, less-productive FIRE-based lending continues to be the more important driver of private sector credit in the EA, driven by resilient mortgage demand. FIRE-based lending, which accounts for more than half of the outstanding stock of credit, supports capital gains through higher asset prices but does not lead directly to income generation. This has negative implications for leverage, future growth, financial stability and income inequality.

In short, the message from the money sector here is broadly positive, albeit with the “hidden-risks” that are associated with higher levels of FIRE-based lending. In the second part of this analysis, I analyse money and credit trends in real terms to consider the implications here for the outlook for growth and business-cycle approaches to asset allocation. The conclusions here are less positive…

Euro area re-synching – part 1

Growth rates in EA money supply and private sector credit continue to converge and re-align (see key chart above). This matters because the de-synchronisation of these cycles over the past decade, which peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic, created major challenges for policy makers, banks and investors alike. The effectiveness of monetary policy, the dominant macro policy during this period, diminished dramatically as a result, and banks and investors had to deal with the consequences of excess liquidity for balance sheet management and the (mis-)pricing of both real and financial assets.

**What is driving the re-synching of money and credit cycles?** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

On a positive note, this reflects a combination of slowing (excess) money supply growth and rising demand for private sector credit (see chart above). Broad money (M3) growth has slowed from its January 2021 peak of 12.5% YoY to 6.0% YoY in April 2022. Growth in private sector credit has recovered from its May 2921 low of 2.7% YoY to 5.3% YoY, the highest nominal rate of growth since May 2020. The gap between the two growth rates (the green line in the chart above) has narrowed from 8ppt in January 2021 to 0.7ppt in April 2022, the narrowest gap since November 2018.

**Contribution (ppt) of COCO-based lending to total private sector credit** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The contribution of productive COCO-based lending is also increasing (see chart above), led by a recovery in corporate credit. COCO-based lending, which includes lending to corporates (NFCs) and household (HH) consumer credit, contributed 1.9ppt towards to total PSC growth of 4.9% YoY in April 2022. This compares with only 0.4ppt to the total PSC growth of 3.0% in August 2021.

Note that COCO-based lending supports both production and income formation. Loans to NFCs are used to finance production, which leads to sales revenues, wages paid, profits realised and economic expansions. So while an increase in NFC debt will increase debt in the economy, it also increases the income required to finance it. Consumer debt also supports productive enterprise since it drives demand for goods and services, helping NFCs to generate sales, profits and wages. It differs from NFC debt to the extent that HHs take on an additional liability since the debt does not generate income.

**Contributions (ppt) of FIRE-based and COCO-based lending to total private sector credit**
(Source: ECB; CMMP)

That said, less-productive FIRE-based lending continues to be the more important driver of private sector credit (see chart above), driven by resilient mortgage demand (see also chart below).

**What’s driving private sector credit demand?** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

FIRE-based lending, which accounts for more than half of the outstanding stock of credit, supports capital gains through higher asset prices but does not lead directly to income generation. Loans to NBFIs are used primarily to finance transactions in financial assets rather than to produce, sell or buy actual output. Such credit may lead to an increase in the price of financial assets but does not lead (directly) to income generation. Mortgage or real estate lending is used to finance transactions in pre-existing assets. It typically generates asset gains as opposed to income (at least directly). As noted in previous posts, the shift towards FIRE-based lending has negative implications for leverage, future growth, financial stability and income inequality.

In short, the message from the money sector here is broadly positive, albeit with the “hidden-risks” that are associated with higher levels of FIRE-based lending.

**YoY real growth trends in M1, household and corporate credit** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

In the second part of this analysis, I analyse money and credit trends in real terms to consider the implications here for the outlook for growth and business-cycle approaches to asset allocation. The conclusions here are less positive…

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“A desynchronised decade”

Created challenges for policy makers, banks and investors alike

The key chart

**Lending growth (% YoY) minus money growth for the UK and EA since 2012** (Source: BoE; ECB)

The key message

Money and credit cycles have been desynchronised for much of the past decade, creating major challenges for policy makers, banks and investors alike.

Growth in money supply has also exceeded growth in private sector credit in the euro area and for much of the period in the UK. The effectiveness of monetary policy, the dominant macro policy, has diminished dramatically as a result.

The gap between growth in money supply and private sector credit hit a historic high during the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently, however, these growth rates have converged as the build-up of excess savings has slowed and the demand for credit has recovered (at least in nominal terms).

This means that three key signals from the UK and EA money sectors have turned more positive: monthly HH money flows have fallen back below pre-pandemic levels; quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21 and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK; and the gap between money supply and private sector credit growth has narrowed.

Macro challenges remain, but the message from the UK and EA money sectors is less bearish than consensus investment narratives.

A desynchronised decade

**Growth rates (% YoY) in EA money and lending** (Source: ECB)

**Growth rates (% YoY) in UK money and lending** (Source: BoE)

Money and credit cycles have been desynchronised for much of the past decade. In typical cycles, monetary aggregates and their key counterparties, such as private sector credit, move together. Put simply, money supply indicates how much money is available for use by the private sector. Private sector credit indicates how much the private sector is borrowing. However, the two charts above show the extent to which, and the periods when, UK and EA money and credit cycles have diverged since March 2012.

**EA money flow minus credit flow (rolling quarters) since Mar 2012** (Source: ECB)

Growth in money supply has also exceeded growth in private sector credit in the euro area and for much of the period in the UK. The charts above (EA) and below (UK) illustrate trends in the gap between money and credit flows (rolling quarters) for both regions. The build-up of liquidity in both regions is clear to see. Increases in the supply of money have not been matched by equivalent increases in private sector demand for credit.

**UK money flow minus credit flow (rolling quarters) since Mar 2012** (Source: BoE)

The effectiveness of monetary policy, the dominant macro policy, has diminished dramatically as a result. Broadly speaking, monetary policy is effective if “central bank accommodation increase money and credit for the private sector to use” (Koo, 2015). Not only has credit growth lagged money supply growth, it has also been predominantly the “wrong type of credit” ie, less productive FIRE-based lending. As noted in previous posts, this has hidden risks in terms of leverage, future growth, financial stability and income inequality.

**Loan growth (% YoY) minus money growth** (Source: BoE; ECB)

The gaps between growth in money supply and private sector credit hit historic highs during the COVID-19 pandemic (see chart above). In the UK, loan growth exceeded money growth between August 2018 and December 2019. During the pandemic, however, the gap between money growth (15.4%) and credit growth (3.9%) widened to 11.5ppt in February 2021. In the EA, money growth (4.9%) exceeded credit growth (3.7%) by 1.2ppt at the end of 2019. The gap peaked at 8ppt in January 2021 – money growth of 12.5% versus credit growth of 4.5%.

**More recent YoY growth trends in UK and EA money and lending** (Source: BoE; ECB)

More recently, these growth rates have converged as the build-up of excess savings has slowed and credit demand has recovered (at least in nominal terms). At the end of 1Q22, money growth had slowed to 5.5% YoY in the UK while credit growth had risen to 3.7% YoY, a narrowing of the gap to only 1.8ppt. Similarly, in the EA, money growth at the end of 1Q22 had slowed to 6.3% YoY while credit growth was 4.7% YoY, a gap of 1.6ppt (see chart above).

Conclusion

What does this mean? Three key signals from the UK and EA money sectors have turned more positive: monthly HH money flows have fallen back below pre-pandemic levels; quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21 and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK; and the gap between money supply and private sector credit growth has narrowed.

Macro challenges remain, but the message from the UK and EA money sectors is less bearish than consensus investment narratives.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“If confidence is collapsing – part 2”

We might expect HHs to repay consumer credit again

The key chart

**Quarterly flows in UK (£bn) and EA (EURbn) consumer credit** (Source: BoE, ECB)

The key message

If confidence is collapsing, we might reasonably expect households to be repaying consumer credit again. Are they…?

During the COVID-19 pandemic, households (HHs) in the UK and the euro area (EA) repaid consumer credit in four of the five quarters between 1Q20 and 1Q21 (see key chart above). The message from the money sector over this period was that HHs were increasing savings and delaying consumption.

Quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21, however, and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK in 1Q22. Year-on-year growth rates have also recovered to their highest levels since February 2020 and March 2020 in the UK and the EA respectively. Before we get too excited, it is important to note that growth in consumer credit is negative in real terms (and EA HHs repaid €0.4bn of consumer credit in March 2022). So-called “faster indicators” also indicate that HHs in the UK are still delaying their spending on “delayable” good such as clothing and furniture indicating that the sustainability of consumption remains unproven still.

In short, the trends in two of the three key signals from the money sector remain positive, (if not that exciting). HHs in the UK and the EA have stopped hoarding cash and demand for consumer credit has remained positive. The recovery in the UK appears more advanced than in the EA, although current UK spending is concentrated towards work-related and staple items rather than delayable items.

The key message here is that while HH consumption patterns remain relatively subdued they are inconsistent with more extreme investment narratives.

Messages from the money sector were less optimistic than consensus investment narratives in 2H21 and less pessimistic than the current investment narrative now.

A positive for a macro-strategist currently “long cash”?

If confidence is collapsing – part 2

If confidence is collapsing, we might reasonably expect HH to be repaying consumer credit again. During the COVID-19 pandemic, HHs in the UK and the EA repaid consumer credit in four of the five quarters between 1Q20 and 1Q21 (see key chart above). Between 1Q18 and 4Q19, quarterly consumer credit flows averaged £3.6bn and €10.3bn in the UK and EA respectively. At the height of the pandemic (2Q20), UK and EA households repaid £13.2bn and €12.9bn respectively. The message from the money sector over this period was that HHs were increasing savings and delaying consumption.

Quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21, however, and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK in 1Q22 (see chart above). UK consumer credit flows totalled £3.6bn in 1Q22, up from £3.3bn in 4Q21 and exactly in line with the average pre-pandemic quarterly flows. EA consumer credit flows totalled €4.4bn, down from €6.5bn in 4Q21. In contrast to the UK, current EA flows remain well below the pre-pandemic average flows of €10.3bn and EA HHs repaid €0.4bn of consumer credit in March 2022. Recall that in lesson #5 in “Seven lessons from the money sector in 2020”, I argued that,

“the UK is likely to demonstrate a higher gearing to a return to normality than the EA.”

**YoY growth rates in consumer credit in the UK and EA** (Source: BoE; ECB)

Year-on-year growth rates have also recovered to their highest levels since February 2020 and March 2020 in the UK and the EA respectively. In March 2022, UK and EA consumer credit grew 5.2% YoY and 2.5% YoY respectively (see chart above). Note again the relatively high gearing of the UK to a recovery in consumer credit demand. Before we get too excited, however, it is important to note that YoY growth in consumer credit is negative in real terms in both regions.

**Credit and debit card payments on durable goods compared with pre-pandemic levels**
(Source: ONS)

So-called “faster indicators” also indicate that HHs in the UK are still delaying their spending on “delayable” good such as clothing and furniture indicating that the sustainability of consumption remains unproven still. According to the latest ONS data, credit and debit card spending remains 12% below its pre-pandemic level and 51% below its 2021 high (see graph above). This makes delayable spending the weakest segment in current UK spending (see graph below). Overall card spending is just above pre-pandemic highs, reflecting relatively strong “work-related” and “staples” spending. The latter two segments are 24% and 13% above pre-pandemic levels respectively.

**Credit and debit card spending versus pre-pandemic levels broken down by type** (Source: ONS)

Conclusion

The key message here is that while HH consumption patterns remain relatively subdued they are inconsistent with the more extreme investment narratives that have gained popularity recently. Messages from the money sector were less optimistic than consensus investment narratives in 2H21 and less pessimistic than the current investment narrative now. A positive for a macro-strategist currently “long cash”?

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed research that is available separately.

“It’s a record – (of sorts)”

But the mix of EA lending is still wrong

The key chart

**Trends in EA COCO-based lending in EURO bn** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The key message

The outstanding stock of loans that support production and income formation in the euro area (“COCO-based loans”) hit a record high in November 2021 of €5,524bn. Is this cause for celebration? No, not quite…

Remarkably, this new high occurred 155 months after the previous high, recorded back in January 2009 (€5,5517bn). Equally notable/concerning is the fact that the stock of less-productive loans that support capital gains through higher asset prices (“FIRE-based loans”) also hit a new record high of €6,091bn. This was €1,503bn above the corresponding January 2009 level of €4,588bn.

What this means is that nearly all of the aggregate growth in euro area lending since the GFC has been in the form of less-productive lending (that also now accounts for more than half of total outstanding loans). So not only is current lending relatively subdued in volume terms (and negative in real terms) it is also largely the wrong type. FIRE-based lending accounted for 2.7ppt of the total 3.7% growth in private sector lending in November 2021, for example.

Over the past two years, I have been highlighting the associated, “hidden risks” associated with unorthodox monetary policy and the negative implications they have for future growth, leverage, financial stability and income inequality. More recently, I also noted that the ECB has (finally) called for (macroprudential policy) measures to address them with specific reference to “real estate risk” at the end of the year.

It is too early to expect changes in the next few data releases (starting this week on 28 January 2022) but I will be placing added emphasis on the trends in the mix of EA lending during 2022. Three key signals became four…

“It’s a record – (of sorts)”

The outstanding stock of loans that support production and income formation (COCO-based loans) hit a record high of €5,524bn in November 2021. Remarkably, this new high occurred 155 months after the previous high recorded in January 2009 (see chart above).

**Trends in, and breakdown of, EA private sector credit in EUR bn** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The outstanding stock of loans that support capital gains through higher asset prices (FIRE-based loans) also hit a new high of €6,091bn in November 2021, €1,503bn above the level recorded in January 2009 (see chart above). FIRE-based lending currently accounts for 52% of total euro area lending.

**Trends in YoY growth rates in private sector lending in nominal and real terms** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Current lending in the euro area is characterised by relatively subdued volumes and the wrong mix when compared to the pre-GFC period. In November 2006, for example (see graph above), lending to the private sector was growing at 11.2% YoY in nominal terms and 9.2% YoY in real terms. Productive, COCO-based lending accounted for 6.2ppt of this growth, while less-productive FIRE-based lending accounted for 5.0ppt.

**Drivers of recent YoY growth rates in EA private sector lending** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

In contrast, according to the latest data point for November 2021, lending to private sector grew only 3.7% YoY in nominal terms but fell -1.1% in real terms. Less-productive lending accounted for 2.7ppt of the total 3.7% growth (see chart above).

**Longer term drivers of EA private sector lending** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

As discussed in previous posts, QE has simply fuelled the shift away from COCO-based lending towards FIRE-based lending in the euro area. This trend has negative implications for future growth, leverage, financial stability and income inequality. Hence, the ECB’s calls in November last year for measures to mitigate risks from FIRE-based lending were welcome. Germany stands out in this context, given the combination of house price dynamics, the extent of house price overvaluation and the lack of specific macroprudential measures to address these risks.

Conclusion

Throughout 2021, CMMP analysis focused on three key signals from the money sector: monthly HH deposit flows (behaviour proxy); trends in consumer credit (growth proxy); and the level of synchronisation of money and credit cycles (policy proxy). These remain important indicators in 2022 to which I will add a key focus on the mix of lending and the potential impact on any new macroprudential measures. Watch this space…

“Little cheer yet II – the UK”

UK – EA in harmony…

Another short key message

The UK and EA may be in disharmony over COVID vaccinations, but the messages from their respective money sectors remain far more consistent.

Neither last week’s ECB data release nor today’s (29 March 2021) Bank of England money credit statistics for February 2021 provide support for inflation hawks. Three things need to happen for this to change: (1) a moderation in monthly household (HH) deposit flows; (2) a re-synching of money and credit cycles; and (3) a recovery in consumer credit.

What have we learned today from the UK?

UK HHs’ flows into deposit-like accounts remained strong in February with a net flow of £17bn. This is below December 2020’s recent peak of £21bn and January’s £19bn but still 3.7x the average monthly flows seen during 2019. HHs continue to maintain large cash holdings despite the fact that the effective interest rate paid on new time deposits fell to a new series low of 0.34%.
The gap between the growth in money supply (15.2%) and the growth in private sector lending (3.8%) hit a new record of 11.4ppt from 10.6ppt in January. Rather than re-synching, the UK money and credit cycles are moving out-of-synch at an even greater pace.
UK HHs repaid £1.2bn in consumer credit during February, following repayments of £2.7bn in January and £0.9bn in December. This marks five consecutive months of net repayments of consumer credit bringing the YoY growth rate to another new series low of -9.9% in February.

As in the EA last week, there is no change yet in the subdued message from the UK money sector for inflation hawks. HH uncertainty and liquidity preference remain very elevated, money and credit cycles are de-synchronising at a record rate and consumer credit is also declining at a record rate.

What would Vladimir and Estragon have to say?

“Forced to save?”

How does the ECB view the increase in household savings and why does it matter?

The key chart

**To what extent is the increase in HH savings in response to COVID-19 “forced” or “precautionary” and why does it matter?** (Source: ECB; Eurostat; CMMP analysis)

The key message

The overriding message from the European and UK money sectors remains one of heightened uncertainty and deficient credit demand. Narrow money (M1) is playing an ever-increasing role in broad money (M3) growth despite negative real returns on overnights deposit as the household propensity to save reaches unprecedented levels in response to COVID-19.

**A recent chart repeated – M1 is playing an ever-increasing role in broad money growth in the EA and in the UK** (Source: ECB; Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

The key unknown here is the extent to which the increase in savings is “forced” or “precautionary”. This matters because forced savings can be released relatively quickly to support economic activity while precautionary savings are unlikely to move straight into investment or consumption.

In the latest Economic Bulletin, ECB economists estimate the contribution of both factors to the increase in savings during 2020. They conclude that the rise in expected unemployment has led to a significant contribution of precautionary savings but that this alone cannot explain the increase. In contrast, they argue that, “forced savings seem to be the main driver of the recent spike in household savings” (see graph below).

**ECB estimates of the drivers in the HH savings rate during 2020** (Source: ECB Economic Bulletin)

Despite this, they point to considerable uncertainty regarding pent-up demand in the short term. Recent CMMP analysis has highlighted a v-shaped recovery in EA consumer credit with monthly flows recovering to just below their 2019 monthly average.

**Another repeated chart from earlier this month – monthly consumer credit flows in the EA in EUR billions** (Source: ECB; CMMP analysis)

Counterbalancing these ST trends, the EC consumer survey covering the period to August 2020 suggests that in the next twelve months HHs expect to spend less on major purchases than at the beginning of 2020, despite the amount of savings they have accumulated.

It is hard to argue against the ECB’s conclusion that, “over the next year, precautionary motives may still keep households’ propensity to save at levels that are higher than before the COVID-19 crisis.”

Inflation hawks will need to be patient!

Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“D…E…B…T”

Five insights from the latest BIS data

The key chart

**Time for new terms of reference when analysing global debt levels** (Source: BIS; CMMP analysis)

The key message

Last week’s data release from the BIS provides five important insights into the “macro-state-of play” at the end of 1Q20 – the point at which the Covid-19 pandemic intensified globally:

Insight #1: the pandemic coincided with a new peak in global debt ($192tr), with the global debt ratio coming within 0.2ppt of its previous 3Q16 and 1Q18 peaks. Up to this point, the split between private ($122tr) and public ($69tr) was broadly unchanged at 64% and 36% respectively (n.b. I have deal with the subsequent impact of global policy responses on public sector debt levels in previous posts).

Insight #2: the long-term trend of passive deleveraging by the private sector in advanced economies continues with direct implications for: the duration and amplitude of money, credit and business cycles; inflation; policy options; and the level of global interest rates.

Insight #3: China’s catch-up story has replaced the wider emerging market (EM) catch up story. EM debt accounts for 36% of global debt but with China accounting for 68% of EM debt now compared with only 30% twenty years ago – strip out China and EM debt is now a slightly smaller share of global debt than it was five years ago.

Insight #4: the traditional distinction between emerging and developed/advanced economies is less relevant and/or helpful, especially when analysing Asia debt dynamics.

Insight #5: it is more helpful to begin by distinguishing between economies with excess household and/or corporate debt and the RoW and then consider the rate of growth and affordability of debt in that context. More to follow on both…

In the meantime, the key message is the importance of distinguishing between the “event-driven” effects of the Covid pandemic and longer-term “structural-effects” associated with the level, growth and affordability of different types of debt.

Five key charts

**Insight #1: The pandemic coincided with a new peak in global debt** (Source: BIS; CMMP analysis)

**Insight #2: the LT trend of passive deleveraging by the private sector in advanced economies continues** (Source: BIS; CMMP analysis)

**Insight #3: China increasingly dominates the “EM catch-up” story** (Source: BIS; CMMP analysis)

**Insight #4: traditional distinctions between EM and advanced economies are less relevant, especially when analysing Asian debt dynamics** (Source: BIS; CMMP analysis)

**Insight #5: the key chart repeated – new terms of reference are needed as the starting point for analysing global debt** (Source: BIS; CMMP analysis)

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Europe versus the UK”

How do the messages from the money sectors compare?

The key chart

**Broad money growth is accelerating in both regions, but how do the messages behind these trends compare and what do they mean?** (Source: ECB; Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

The key message

Broad money growth is accelerating in both the euro area (EA) and the UK but how do the messages behind these trends compare and what do they mean for investors?

M1 dynamics are the key growth drivers here as EA and UK households and corporates maintain high preferences for holding liquid assets despite negative real returns. Above trend corporate credit and resilient mortgage demand is offsetting weakness in consumer credit in both regions but with more volatile YoY credit dynamics in the UK. The growth gap between the supply of money and the demand for credit has reached new 10-year highs.

The overriding message here is one of uncertainty and deficient credit demand, a more nuanced message than some inflation hawks suggest.

Looking at ST dynamics, uncertainty peaked in May in both regions, HHs have stopped repaying consumer credit and the NFC “dash-for-cash” has also peaked.

From an investment perspective, 2020 is seen best as a year when an extreme event (Covid-19) engulfed weak, pre-existing cyclical trends. The negative impacts of this event have peaked, at least from a monetary perspective. However, adverse (over-arching) LT structural dynamics that have their roots in excess levels of private sector debt remain with negative implications for money, credit and business cycles and future investment returns.

The charts that matter

The key chart above illustrates how growth in broad money (M3) is accelerating in both the EA and UK. In the EA, M3 grew 10.2% in nominal and 9.8% terms YoY in July, the highest rates of growth since May 2008 and July 2007 respectively. In the UK, M3 grew 11.9% in nominal and 10.8% in real terms in July, the highest rates of growth since April 2008 and June 2008 respectively (n.b. I am using M3 here for comparison purposes rather than the Bank of England’s preferred M4ex measure referred to in other posts). These trends have helped to ignite the “inflation versus deflation” debate which, in turn, requires investigation of trends in the components and counterparts of broad money growth.

**M1 is playing an increasing role in M3 in the EA and the UK despite negative real returns from overnight deposits** (Source: ECB; Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

From a components perspective, narrow money (M1) is playing an increasing role in this growth despite negative real returns as EA and UK households (HHs) and corporates (NFCs) maintain high preferences for liquid assets. In the EA, M1 now accounts for 70% of M3 compared with only 42% twenty years ago. In the UK, M1 now accounts for 65% of M3 versus only 48% twenty years ago (see chart above). In both cases, the share of narrow money in broad money is at a historic high – potentially negative news for inflation hawks as HH and NFCs continue to save in the face of high uncertainty levels. The key unknown here is the extent to which these savings are forced or precautionary. Forced savings can be released relatively quickly to support economic activity. In contrast, precautionary savings are unlikely to move straight into investment or consumption.

**Similar NFC, mortgage and consumer credit trends but with more volatile YoY growth dynamics in the UK** (Source: ECB; Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

From a counterparts perspective, above trend NFC credit and resilient HH mortgage demand is offsetting weakness in consumer credit, with the UK demonstrating more volatile YoY growth dynamics than the EA. The graph above illustrates YoY growth trends in NFC credit (green), mortgages (blue) and consumer credit (red) for the EA (dotted lines) and the UK (full lines) over the past 5 years.

NFC credit is growing well above trend in both regions, but below May’s recent peak levels. In the EA, NFC credit grew 7.0% in July versus 7.3% in May. In the UK, NFC credit grew 9.6% in July versus 11.2% in May. Mortgage demand has remained resilient in both regions growing 4.2% in the EA and 2.9% in the UK. Weakness in consumer credit appears to be stabilising (see monthly trends below). In the EA consumer credit grew 0.2% in July unchanged from June, but still a new low YoY growth rate. In the UK, consumer credit declined -3.6% YoY compared with a decline of -3.7% in June.

**Counterparts versus components – new peak gaps in the growth of private sector credit and money supply** (Source: ECB; Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

Diverging trends between the components and counterparts of broad money tell an important story – the gap between the growth in money supply and the growth in credit demand is at new 10-year peak levels. In the EA, the gap between M3 growth (10.2%) and adjusted loans to the PSC growth (4.7%) was 5.5ppt (or minus 5.5ppt in the graph above). This is a 10-year peak and the largest gap since 2001 (not shown above). In the UK, the gap between M4ex growth (12.4%) and M4Lex (5.5%) was 6.9ppt, again a new 10-year peak. In “normal cycles”, money supply and the demand for credit would move together but current trends are indicative of a basic deficiency in credit demand and a second potentially negative piece of news for inflation hawks.

**Uncertainty proxies for EA HHs and NFCs** (Source: ECB; CMMP analysis)

Looking at ST dynamics, “uncertainty” appears to have peaked at the same time (May 2020) in both the EA and the UK but remains very elevated against historic trends. In this context, trends in monthly flows into liquid assets offering negative real returns are used a proxy measure for uncertainty. In July, deposits placed by EA HHs totalled €53bn, below April 2020’s peak of €80bn but still above the 2019 average monthly flow of €33bn. NFC deposits increased by €59bn in July. Again this was below May 2020’s peak flows of €112bn but still well above the 2019 average monthly flow of €13bn (see chart above).

**Uncertainty proxies for UK HHs and NFCs** (Source: Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

In the UK, HH deposit flows totalled £7bn in July, down from the May 2020 peak of £27bn but above the 2019 monthly average flow of £5bn. NFCs deposits in July rose from £8bn in June to £ 12bn in July. These were also below the May 2020 peak of £26bn but well above the £0.8bn 2019 average (see chart above).

**Monthly consumer credit flows in the EA** (Source: ECB; CMMP analysis)

HHs have stopped repaying consumer credit and monthly flows have bounced back to just below (EA) or just above (UK) 2019 monthly average. In July, EA consumer credit totalled €3.2bn and €3bn in June and July respectively. This followed repayments of €-12bn, €-14bn and €-2bn in March, April and May respectively. The last two months’ positive monthly flows compare with the 2019 average of €3.4bn.

**Monthly consumer credit flows in the UK** (Source: Bank of England; CMMP analysis)

After four consecutive months of net repayments, UK consumer credit turned positive in July. The £1.2bn borrowed in July was above the average £1.2bn recorded in 2019. As noted above, the recent weakness in consumer credit means that the average growth rate (-3.6% YoY) is still the weakest since the series began in 1994.

Conclusion

In “August snippets – Part 1”, I highlighted the importance of disciplined investment frameworks and followed this in “August snippets – Part 2” by revisiting the foundations of my CMMP Analysis framework that incorporates three different time perspectives into a single investment thesis. How do July’s trends fit into this framework?

The overriding message here is one of uncertainty and deficient credit demand, a more nuanced message than some inflation hawks suggest. Looking at ST dynamics, uncertainty peaked in May in both regions, HHs have stopped repaying consumer credit and the NFC “dash-for-cash” has also peaked. From an investment perspective, 2020 is seen best as a year when an extreme event (Covid-19) engulfed weak, pre-existing cyclical trends. The negative impacts of this event have peaked, at least from a monetary perspective. However, the negative (over-arching) LT structural dynamics that have their roots in excess levels of private sector debt remain with negative implications for money, credit and business cycles and future investment returns.

If you go down to the woods today…

Please note that summary comments and graphs above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately