Introduction

This is the third in a serious of posts in which I develop a consistent “balance sheet framework” for understanding the relationship between the banking sector and the wider economy and apply it to the UK.

I have chosen to focus on households (HH) in this first, “sector-themed” post, to reflect the dominant role that they play in UK economic activity (FCE / GDP) and UK bank lending (the desire to buy properties).

Three key charts

Summary

HHs play a dominant role in the UK economy and in the demand for credit – 65p in every pound of UK GDP is related directly to HH consumption, and 78p in every pound lent is borrowed by HHs.

UK HHs are also important investors in financial and non-financial assets (largely property), with balance sheets skewed towards financial assets. Financial assets, comprising mainly of pensions, deposits and equities, are just over 3x the size of annual GDP. Financial liabilities are, unsurprisingly, mainly mortgage loans. Net financial worth – financial assets minus financial liabilities – hit a new high in 3Q19 and provides support for future consumption and welfare over the medium term.

The HH sector is typically a net saver/net lender in the UK (and other developed economies) but dramatic two-way shifts since the GFC have left financial surpluses well below historic averages (see first key chart above).

• HHs have been funding consumption by slowing their rate of savings and accumulation of net financial assets
• After a period of deleveraging post GFC, HH debt levels have stabilised (around the maximum BIS threshold level) but debt servicing costs remain low, highlighting HHs’ sensitivity /risk to a normalisation in interest rates
• The two periods of declining net financial surpluses – 4Q92-2Q06 and 2Q10-3Q18 – reflect different combined trends in savings and/or HH borrowing

In the immediate future, trends in disposable income and savings are likely to be key factors driving HH consumption and, therefore, GDP growth in the UK. With real growth in disposable income slowing and the savings rate close to historic lows, the risks to UK growth from this analysis appear tilted to the downside, and at odds with the (now out-dated) OBR forecasts and assumptions.

Why start with HHs?

HHs play a dominant role in the UK economy and in the demand for credit. HHs drive GDP growth via consumption (directly), and through government consumption on their behalf (indirectly). In 3Q19, HH consumption accounted for 65% of UK GDP, plus another 17% if government consumption on behalf of HHs is included. In other words, 65p (or 82p) in every pound of UK GDP is related directly (and indirectly) to HH consumption. For comparison, HH consumption accounts for 54% of GDP across the euro area.

The desire to buy properties is also the main driver of UK private sector credit demand. As of November 2019, total HH lending and HH lending for property purchases accounted for 78% and 69% of total UK private sector credit respectively. As can be seen from the graphs above and below, both factors have been enduring features of the UK economy and banking sectors.

HH balance sheets

UK HH are also important investors in financial and non-financial assets, with balance sheets skewed towards financial assets. At the end of 2018, the aggregate, UK HH balance sheet totalled £12.2 trillion, comprising financial assets of £6.5 trillion (54%) and non-financial assets of £5.6 trillion (46%). The breakdown of total assets had shifted from 65%:35% respectively in 1999 to 50%:50% respectively in 2007 before shifting back towards financial assets after the GFC.

Financial assets are comprised mainly of pension assets, deposits and equities. At the end of 3Q 2019, HH financial assets totaled £7.3 trillion, with pensions (insurance and guarantees) of £4.2 trillion (57% total financial assets), deposits of £1.7 trillion (24%) and equities of £1.1 trillion (15%). The breakdown of HH financial assets has been broadly similar over the past two decades albeit with a shift towards deposits and away from equities. Since 2000, HH financial assets have averaged 3x the size of annual GDP. At the end of 3Q19, this ratio had risen above this average to 3.3x GDP.

HH financial liabilities are dominated by mortgage loans, unsurprisingly. Financial liabilities totaled £2.0 trillion at the end of 3Q2019, with mortgage loans accounting for £1.4 trillion out of the total HH loans of £1.8 trillion. Again the breakdown of HH financial liabilities is little changed over the past two decades. Net financial worth – financial assets minus financial liabilities – hit a new high in 3Q2019 providing adequate MT support for future consumption and welfare.

HH sector financial flows

The analysis above has focused on stocks of financial assets and financial liabilities. I turn now to the flows (of income and savings) that accumulate into these stocks. Note that HH accumulation of net financial assets over the course of a year is only possible when spending is less than income over the same period. Put another way:

HH are net savers when savings – income minus consumption minus taxes – are higher than investment.

Note also, one of the key messages from “Everyone has one”, that if one sector is going to run a budget surplus, at least one other sector must run a budget deficit.

The HH sector is typically a net saver/net lender in the UK (and other developed economies) but dramatic two-way shifts since the GFC have left financial surpluses well below historic averages. Since 1989, the UK’s HH sector has run average financial surpluses equivalent to 3.8% of GDP (from a flow perspective). In response to the GFC, however, HHs increases their net savings from 2.6% of GDP in June 2008 to 6.9% of GDP in June 2010, a substantially negative shift equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. Since June 2012, HH have reduced their net surplus from 5.3% of GDP to a recent low of 0.0% in September 2018 and 1.1% currently. This trend reversal represented a substantially positive shift equivalent to 4.2% of GDP, in effect a mirror image of the trends immediately after the GFC.

HHs have been funding recent consumption by slowing their rate of savings/accumulation of net financial assets. Since early 2010, there have been two periods when UK HHs have reduced their savings significantly. The first occurred between March 2010 and March 2013 when HH savings fell from -41% from £37 billion to £22 billion and the second occurred between March 2015 and March 2017 when HH savings fell -61% from £35 billion to £14 billion. Between March 2010 and March 2017 the HH savings ratio fell from 13% to 4%, a thirty year low.

After a period of deleveraging post GFC, HH debt levels have stabilised (around the BIS maximum threshold level) but debt servicing costs remain low highlighting UK HHs’ sensitivity to changes in interest rates. The HH debt ratio is currently 86% of GDP compared with a high of 102% in March 2019. The BIS considers 85% to be the threshold level above which HH debt becomes a constraint on future growth.

While the debt ratio remains high, the HH debt service ratio of 8.9% is below the LT average of 10.1% and the September 2008 high of 12.3%. In other words, the risks associated with UK HH debt relate to the level of the debt rather than its affordability. They are reflected in (real) demand for credit remain very subdued.

The two periods where the accumulation of net financial assets by the HH sector has slowed dramatically have illustrated different drivers. In the first, between 4Q92 and 2Q06, the HH net surplus fell from 8.6% of GDP to –0.1% GDP (HH became slight net borrowers).

Over this period the HH debt ratio rose from 64% of GDP to 92% of GDP (see above) . At the same time, the HH savings ratio fell from 15% to 7% (see below). HH were increasing their borrowing and reducing their saving at the same time.

In the second, between 2Q10 and 3Q18, the HH net surplus fell from 6.9% of GDP to 0% of GDP. However, the HH debt ratio fell from 98% of GDP to 86% of GDP. In this second case, the main driver was the reduction in the HH savings rate from 13% to 6% (with a 3Q17 low of 4.0% described earlier).

Conclusion

In the immediate future, therefore, trends in disposable income and HH savings are likely to be key factors driving GDP growth. UK HHs appear to have little appetite for taking on more borrowing. With real growth in disposable income slowing and savings rate already at/close to historic lows, the risks to UK growth from this analysis appear tilted to the downside. My analysis and data challenges the assumptions in the last (now out-dated) OBS forecasts for the UK economy. I will return to this issue when the OBR updates its assumptions on UK sector balances in 1Q20.

Please note that the summary comments above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately

The key charts

From this (a simplified model of financial transactions)…

To this (quantitative, objective and logical macro analysis)….

Introduction

This is the second in a series of posts in which I develop a consistent “balance sheet framework” for understanding the relationship between the banking sector and the wider economy. The first post presented a simple mapping of the UK economy and its financial system and highlighted the relatively large size of the UK financial system and the relatively volatile nature of its relationships with the UK economy. In this second post, I focus on:

• the core services provided by the UK financial system
• how these services produce a stock of contracts that can be represented by financial balance sheets that link different economic agents over time
• how these balance sheets form the foundation of a highly quantitative, objective and logical analytical framework.

Summary

The UK financial system’s core services include making payments for goods and services, moving money from tomorrow to today (credit) and moving money from today to tomorrow (savings). The resulting “monetary circuit” facilitates the supply of goods and services and the subsequent consumption by households.

The core services also produce a stock of financial contracts that link different economic agents together over time. A fundamental principle of accounting is that for every financial asset there is an equal and offsetting financial liability. By definition, net financial wealth is therefore equal to the sum of financial assets less the sum of financial liabilities. If we take all the private sector financial assets and liabilities it is also a matter of logic that the sum of all the assets must equal the sum of all the liabilities.

The implication here is that for the private sector to accumulate net financial wealth it must be in the form of claims on another sector. In the case of a simple two sector economy, the net financial assets held by the private sector are exactly equal to the net financial liabilities of the government. The key message here is that in a two-sector economy, it is impossible for the public and private sectors to run surpluses at the same time. Of course, in reality these domestic sectors are also economically linked to foreign governments, firms and households, collectively termed the “rest of the world” (ROW). Hence, the private sector can accumulate net financial assets equal to public sector liabilities, the ROW’s net liabilities or a combination of two.

The three sectors described below – the domestic public sector, the domestic government sector and the ROW – can be treated as having income and savings flows over a given period (typically a quarter or a year). Extending the accounting principles described above any deficits run by one or more sectors must equal surpluses run by other sector(s). This leads to the key identity pioneered by the late Wynne Godley:

Domestic private balance +domestic government balance +foreign balance = zero

I analyse these trends for the key economic agents in the UK economy and their implications in more detail in my next post.

The core financial services

The core services of the UK’s (and any economy’s) financial system include:

• Making payments for goods and services
• Moving money from tomorrow to today (credit)
• Moving money from today to tomorrow (savings)
• (Managing risk – a core service but outside my analysis here)

By way of illustration, the diagram below depicts a series of transactions between six economic agents in a simplified (closed) domestic economy:

• two households (the Smiths and the Khans)
• two non-financial companies (Jane’s consumer durables and John’s commercial vehicles)
• two financial institutions (a bank and a unit trust company/NBFI)

The red arrows in this diagram represent a flow of money between each of the six economic agents. The yellow boxes show what was purchased with these funds (two non-financial assets, an apartment and a van ) and the pale blue boxes highlight the resulting financial assets. In turn:

• Payments of goods and services: the Smiths buy an apartment from the Khans and Jane’s consumer durables buys a transport van from John’s commercial vehicles. The payments might be made directly in cash between the four parties, but are more likely to be made via banks’ payments systems. Note that, modern economies need efficient payment systems to enable agents to pay each other for goods and services. An economy based on a complex division of labour would be unable to thrive without an efficient payments system.
• Moving money from tomorrow to today (credit): the Smiths finance the purchase of the Khan’s apartment via credit from the bank in the form of a mortgage. Jane’s company finances the purchase of the van by raising funds (selling shares) to the unit trust company. The financial system provides credit to both a household (HH) and a corporate (NFC) in this example.
• Moving money from today to tomorrow (savings): the Khans saved the money they received from the Smiths by investing in an equity fund offered by the unit trust company, while John’s company put the proceeds of the sale into a bank account to pay wages and raw materials in the future. The financial system provides different forms of savings products to the HH and NFC in this example.

This simple example is, in effect, an alternative to the well-known economic concept of “the monetary circuit.”

The monetary circuit

The monetary circuit concept argues that the purpose of a monetary economy is to facilitate the supply of goods and services and their subsequent consumption by households. Leave aside, for the moment, that the main reason for borrowing in the UK (and other developed markets) is the desire of HHs to purchase property (see graph above). With regards to production activities the main cause of borrowing is often that NFCs expect the demand for their goods and services to increase and therefore want to pre-finance production. In this scenario, the monetary circuit starts with expected demand which leads NFCs to pre-finance their production. NFCs pay their employees by a transfer of deposits at banks. These employees demand goods and services which (partially or otherwise) validates the NFCs expectations of future demand. The deposits of the firm will be replenished by the spending of households. These flows are illustrated in the simplified monetary circuit framework diagram below.

Foreshadowing a theme that I will return to in later posts, it is worth nothing the scenarios in which the monetary circulation described above fails:

• Holders of deposits decide to uses them to repay outstanding loans
• Holders of deposits are happy to hold rather than spend them (idle deposits)
• Holders may transfer deposits to other forms of savings
• Holders may use taxes to pay taxes

Of course, the decision to hold some form of excess deposits as a buffer against unforeseen circumstances is perfectly rational. Nevertheless with regards the monetary circuit and its main purpose – to facilitate production and consumption – there is a serious problem with hoarding/excess saving which has important implications for macro policy choices. More to follow on this theme in later posts…

Transactions to balance sheets

The three core services described above produce a stock of financial contracts that can be represented by financial balance sheets that, in turn, illustrate how different economic agents are linked together over time.

When the Smiths took out their mortgage from the bank in order to buy the Khan’s apartment, the bank provided them with the funds in exchange for a commitment from the Smiths to make repayments over time. In other words, the mortgage represents an asset for the bank and a liability for the Smiths and illustrates the connection between them. The diagram below illustrates the financial assets (yellow) and liabilities (blue) that result from each of the transactions above.

A fundamental principle of accounting is that for every financial asset there is an equal and off-setting financial liability. Hence, in this illustration, the Smith’s mortgage is a liability that is offset by an asset for the bank. Similarly, John’s commercial vehicles bank account is an asset that is offset by a liability for the bank.

Note, however, that while the assets and liabilities match each other, the associated future flows of money travel in the opposite direction to the flows of money created in the original transactions. The Smiths will have to repay their mortgage and the bank will have to provide funds if John’s commercial vehicles decides to withdraw money from its account. The physical assets shown in the earlier diagram are not included here as, unlike financial assets, they do not create an on-going relationship between the agents.

Note also the unique feature of banks in this relationship. They create deposits via lending not (as is commonly believed) the other way round. Of course, the bank needs to have liabilities to fund the lending but these do not have to be secured in advance of the loan being granted. The unique feature of banking is the fact that banks can simultaneously create loans and deposits and hence alter the quantity of money circulating in the economy. This is not the case for the unit trust company, which can only buy shares in Jane’s consumer durables by first securing an investment.

The key message at this stage is that balance sheets are at the very heart of the economy. The Bank of England has a balance sheet. The UK government has one, and as illustrated above UK banks, HHs and NFCs have balance sheets too. My balance sheet framework has the advantage of being both highly quantitative and objective since it focuses on transactions, debts, balance sheets and core accounting principles. It also allows me to follow the logic of the UK economy by monitoring the transaction records that show what is actually happening:

• The stocks and flows of credits and debits
• Who owes what to whom
• Who the creditors are
• Who the debtors are
• How they came to have these roles

Financial net wealth/worth

In general, at any given point in time, it is unlikely that any individual or economic agent has financial assets and financial liabilities of the same value (see graph above). Since, any balance sheet has to balance, we need to create an equilibrium value by inserting the entry “net financial wealth” into the left hand side of the balance sheet. (This is merely convention and there is an argument that net wealth should be shown on the asset side of the balance sheet with an inverted sign, as it is claim of the owner against the balance sheet).

In the case of the UK, HHs had financial assets of £6.7trillion and financial liabilities of £1.9trillion at the end of 2018. In other words, their net financial worth was £4.7trillion. In contrast, NFCs had financial assets of £2.5trillion and financial liabilities of £5.6 trillion ie, net financial worth of minus £3.1trillion.

Implications for analysis

Returning to basic accounting principles, if we take all the private sector financial assets and liabilities it is a matter of logic that the sum of all the assets must equal the sum of all the liabilities. This means that the net wealth of the private sector would have to be zero if we include only private sector IOUs (assuming that the public sector is not holding any private sector debt.)

The implication here is that for the private sector to accumulate net financial wealth it must be in the form of claims on another sector. In the case of a simplified two sector economy compromising the private sector (HHs and NFCs) and the public sector (all levels of government), the private sector could accumulate “outside wealth” in the form of government currency and/or government ST bills and T bonds. Note that the private sector can only accumulate net financial assets if its spending is less than its income in a given period. In this example, these financial assets are government/public sector liabilities (currency, bills and bonds). The government liabilities arise when it is spending more that it is receives in the form of tax revenues. The resulting deficit accumulates to the stock of government debt which is equal to the private sector’s accumulation of financial wealth over the same period.

In the case of a simple two sector economy, the net financial assets held by the private sector are exactly equal to the net financial liabilities of the government. If a government runs a balanced budget where spending is equal to tax revenue, the private sectors net financial wealth will be zero as a result. If the government runs a budget surplus with spending less than tax receipts, the net financial wealth of the private sector will be negative. The key message here is that in a two-sector economy, it is impossible for the public and private sectors to run surpluses at the same time. (In future posts, I will show that this is exactly what is occurring in Germany in practice)

Of course, in reality these domestic sectors are also economically linked to foreign governments, firms and households, collectively termed the “rest of the world” (ROW). Hence, the domestic private sector is able to accumulate net claims against the ROW even if the domestic government is running a balanced budget. In this case the private sector’s accumulation of net financial assets is equal to the ROW’s issue of net financial liabilities, although in reality it is more likely that the private sector will accumulate net financial wealth combining both domestic and ROW liabilities.  

Flows, stocks and sector balances

From an analysis perspective, the three sectors described here – the domestic public sector, the domestic government sector and the ROW – can be treated as having income and savings flows over a given period (typically a quarter or a year). If a sector spends less that it earns it creates a budget surplus. Conversely, if it spends more than it earns, it creates a budget deficit. A surplus represents a flow of savings that leads to an accumulation of financial assets while a deficit reduces net wealth. If a sector is running a deficit it must either reduce its stock of financial assets or it must issue more IOUs to offset the deficit. If the sector runs out of accumulated financial assets, it has no choice other than to increase its indebtedness over the period it is running the deficit. In contrast, a sector that runs a budget surplus will be accumulating net financial assets. This surplus will take the form of financial claims on at least one other sector. More details of how this works in practice will follow in later posts.

Conclusion – “where the money flows, there too the future goes.”

Having started this post with the observation that every economic agent has a balance sheet it seems appropriate to conclude by returning to basic accounting principles. Following the original economic work of Wynne Godley, we know that if we sum the deficits run by one or more sectors this must equal the surpluses run by other sector(s). Hence, Godley’s key identity:

Domestic private balance + domestic government balance + foreign balance = 0

In my next post, I will analyse these trends for the key economic agents in the UK economy and their implications in more detail.

Please note that the summary comments above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

The key chart

“An ever-present feature of most people’s lives and a critical part of the economy” Bank of England, 2015

Happy New Year

A central theme in CMMP analysis is that the true value in analysing developments in the financial sector lies less in considering investments in developed market banks – they have been lousy LT investments – but more in understanding the wider implications of the relationship between the banking sector and the wider economy for corporate strategy, investment decisions and asset allocation.

To begin 2020, I am publishing a series of posts in which I develop a consistent “balance sheet framework” for understanding this core relationship and apply it to the UK economy. The choice of the UK is deliberate, reflecting both the relatively large size of the UK financial system and the relatively volatile nature of its relationship with the UK economy (see the key chart above).

This first post presents a simple mapping exercise for the UK economy and its financial system.

Summary

Financial assets represent the largest segment of the UK’s £42 trillion national balance sheet, accounting for 75% of total assets at the end of 2018. The UK’s “money sector”, in turn, accounts for 68% of financial assets (compared to 58% in the EA), highlighting the important role of the sector in terms of absolute size. Within the money sector, MFIs remain the dominant players, but “other FIs” are playing an increasingly important role in both the UK and EA economies.

A key distinguishing feature of the UK economy is the relative size (and hence potential impact) of the money sector and the volatile nature of its relationship with the wider economy. The money sector’s financial assets rose from 6x GDP in 2000 to 15x GDP in 2008 and remain 10x GDP currently (3Q19). The unsurprising conclusion here, is that the UK’s financial system is “an ever-present feature of most people’s lives and a critical part of the economy” (Bank of England, 2015).

In my next post, I will develop this analysis by considering the core services provided by finance institutions and how they produce a stock of contracts that can be represented by financial balance sheets that link different economic agents together over time.

Lousy LT investments, but…

At various stages in my career, I have run top-rated bank equity research teams. In the face of LT bank under-performance throughout this experience, I have been struck by (1) the enduring, positive bias from sell-side analysts and (2) the scale and expense of the sell-side and buy-side resources dedicated to individual bank stock-picking.

Over the past 15 years, UK banks have under-performed the FTSE 100 by 75%, US banks have under-performed the S&P 500 by 53% and EA banks have under-performed the SXXE by 58%. Yet, how many sell ratings have been published over this period?

In my view, the same (expensive) resources would be better applied to understanding the implications of the relationship between the banking sector (and even the wider economy and/or the impact of macro developments on banks’ future profitability and cash flows!). Returns here are likely to be more attractive, hence my focus at CMMP.

The UK’s national balance sheet

Financial assets represent the largest segment of the UK’s national balance sheet, accounting for 75% of total assets. At the end of 2018, the UK’s national balance sheet was £42 trillion, largely unchanged in terms of total size since 2016. Financial assets totaled £31 trillion (75% of the total) and non-financial assets – largely land and other fixed assets – totaled £11 trillion (25% of the total).

The share of financial assets rose in the build-up to the GFC to peak at 82% in 2008, but is currently similar to the level seen in 2000. The UK’s financial liabilities totaled £32 trillion at the end of 2018, resulting in a net worth of just over £10 trillion. As an aside, the 3% growth in the UK’s net worth in 2018 was the slowest rate of growth since 2012.

The role of the UK financial system

The financial system, comprising MFIs, other FIs and insurance companies and pension funds (ICPFs), accounts for 68% of the UK’s financial assets compared with 58% in the Euro area (EA). At the end 2018, the financial assets of the UK financial system totaled £21 trillion a 7% CAGR since 1995. Of course, as can be seen in the graph below, this growth occurred up to 2008 (15% GAGR between 1995 and 2008) when the system’s financial assets peaked at almost £24 trillion, 11% higher than at the end of 2018. At the 2008 high point, the financial system or “money sector” accounted for 78% of the UK’s financial assets compared with 58% in 2000.

Monetary financial institutions – the Central Bank, deposit taking FIs and money-market funds – represent the largest sub-sector within UK financial services. At the end of 3Q19, the assets of UK MFIs totaled £12.6 trillion or 53% of total money sector financial assets. The assets of other FIs and ICPFs were £6.3 trillion (27%) and £4.8 trillion (20%) respectively as shown in the diagram below which illustrates the financial assets and liabilities of the domestic sectors in the UK economy. I will be returning to the differences in financial net worth (financial assets minus financial liabilities) across the different economic sectors in subsequent posts.

The rise of “other FIs”

Other FIs are playing an increasing important role in both the UK and EA economies. This sub-sector comprises non-money market funds (investment trusts, unit trusts and other collective investment schemes whose investment fund shares or units are not close substitutes for deposits), other financial intermediaries (eg, security and derivative dealers, finance leasing companies, venture and development capital companies, and export and import financing companies), financial auxiliaries (insurance brokers, investment advisers, fund managers and payment institutions) and captive financial institutions (holding companies and SPVs) and money lenders.

UK other FIs have increased their share of the money sector’s financial assets from 19% in 2000 to 27% at the end of 2Q19. This has been at the expense of ICPFs who have seen their share fall from 32% to 20% over the same period. A similar, if more muted trend, has also occurred in the EA where the share of other FIs has risen from 25% of money sector financial assets in 2000 to 30% at the end of 2Q19. In this case, however, this has been at the expense of EA MFIs who have seen their share fall from 61% to 56% over the same period.

The UK’s key distinguishing feature

A key distinguishing feature of the UK economy is the relative size (and potential impact) of the money sector and the volatile nature of its relationship with the wider economy. In September 2000, the UK’s money sector’s financial assets were 6x larger than GDP. This compares with a multiple of 4x in the EA. By December 2008, the same ratio had risen to 15x GDP in the UK but only 6x in the EA. Since then, the UK’s ratio has fallen back to, a still very large, 10x GDP while the EA’s ratio has risen more steadily to 7x.

In contrast, the relationship between the size of the “real economy’s” financial assets and GDP has been more stable. In 2000, the UK real economy’s financial assets were 4x larger than GDP. At the end of 2008, this ratio was also 4x and is only 5x currently. In the EA, the same ratio rose from 4x in 2000 to 6x in 2008 before falling back to 5x currently.

In other words, the ratio of the size of real economy’s financial assets to GDP is much lower and more stable in both the UK and the EA. However, it is much larger for the money sector and, equally importantly, more volatile in the case of the UK.

Conclusion

The unsurprising conclusion of this first post, is that the UK’s financial system is “an ever-present feature of most people’s lives and a critical part of the economy” (Bank of England, 2015). In my next post, I will develop this analysis by considering the core services provided by finance institutions and how these services produce a stock of contracts that can be represented by financial balance sheets that illustrate how different economic agents are linked together over time.

Please note that the summary comments above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.