“Rolling over?”

What does the slowdown in UK monetary aggregates mean?

The key chart

Growth (% YoY) in money (M4ex) and lending (M4Lex) over past decade (Source: BoE; CMMP)

The key message

Financial markets are typically sensitive to inflexion points and UK monetary aggregates are “rolling over”. Among the mixed messages, there is the overriding sense of slowing momentum with obvious risks to a sustained recovery and reflation trades.

The expansion in broad money during the pandemic reflected deflationary forces as uncertain households increased their money holdings and delayed consumption. Monthly money flows are moderating now (positive news) but remain elevated in relation to pre-pandemic levels and in relation to euro area dynamics. Growth in consumer credit remains weak in absolute terms (with the exception of niche areas such as the used-car market) again in contrast to EA dynamics. The gap between money growth and credit demand has narrowed from recent highs but remains significant, presenting on-going challenges to policy makers in both regions. The real surprise in July’s UK money supply data, however, was the £1.4bn repayment of mortgage debt, compounded by a slowdown in mortgage approvals.

The overriding message from the rolling over of UK monetary aggregates is one of slowing momentum. So-called “faster indicators” are sending the same message for August too. Uncertainty may be lower than during the height of the pandemic, but any recovery is gradual at best. Sustained recoveries and reflation trades in both the UK and the EA require more substantial foundations.

Rolling over – in charts

UK monetary aggregates are rolling over sending mixed messages to economists, strategists and investors alike (see key chart above). Growth in sterling money (M4ex) slowed to 7.9% YoY in July 2021, down from 8.8% in June 2021 and from February 2021’s recent peak of 15.3%. Growth in sterling net lending (M4Lex) slowed to 1.8% YoY in July 2021, down from 2.4% in June and from its earlier March 2020 peak of 6.6% (the “dash-for-cash”).

Synchronised UK and EA money cycles (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Money cycles in the UK and the EA remain highly synchronised with broad money growth peaking in February 2021 and January 2021 in the UK and EA respectively (see chart above).

M1 as a percentage of EA and UK broad money (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The expansion in UK and euro area (EA) broad money during the pandemic reflected deflationary forces as uncertain households increased their money holdings despite earning negative real returns and delayed consumption. Growth in narrow money (and in overnight deposits within narrow money) is the main driver of broad money growth in both regions. Narrow money accounts for 68% and 72% of broad money (M3) in the UK and EA respectively, the highest market shares in both cases. As can be seen in the chart above, the COVID-19 pandemic accelerated the pre-existing trends towards holding liquid assets. The key point here being that money sitting in overnight deposits contributes to neither economic growth nor inflation.

UK monthly HH money flows (£bn) since January 2019 (Source: BoE; CMMP)

Monthly money flows are moderating but remain elevated in relation to pre-pandemic levels and in relation to euro area dynamics. Monthly flows of HH money holdings since March 2020 have far exceeded pre-COVID levels. The two peaks seen in the chart above show monthly flows at 5.9x (May 2020) and 4.4x (December 2020) pre-COVID levels. The chart also illustrates how these flows have followed the timings of lockdowns closely indicating a combination of forced and precautionary savings.

UK and EA money flows as a multiple of pre-COVID levels (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Uncertainty levels have peaked in both regions but UK monthly flows are still 1.5x pre-pandemic levels. A moderation on HH money flows was the first of three key signals from the money sector identified at the start of this year. As can be seen in the chart above, the UK is lagging the EA in terms of a return to normality in this context. Monthly HH deposit flows in the EA have been at or below pre-COVID levels since April 2021.

Monthly flows (%, LHS) and growth rate (% YoY, RHS) in consumer credit (Source: BoE; CMMP)

Growth in consumer credit remains weak with the exception of niche areas such as the used-car market. UK individuals borrowed no additional consumer credit in July 2021. The Bank of England noted that, “Within this, they borrowed an additional £0.1bn in ‘other’ forms of consumer credit (such as car dealership finance and personal loans), offset by net credit card repayments of £0.1bn.” (Money and Credit, July 2021).

Annual growth rates in UK and EA consumer credit (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The annual growth rate in consumer credit also remained weak, decreasing to -2.7% YoY in July from -2.2% YoY in June. Here again the UK is lagging the EA in terms of a return to normality (key signal #2). The YoY growth rate in consumer credit turned positive in the EA in April 2021 and has average 0.5% since then (see chart above).

Lending growth minus money supply growth in the UK and EA (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The gap between money growth and credit demand has narrowed from recent highs but remains significant, presenting on-going challenges to policy makers (key signal #3). The ideal scenario would see a reduction in the deflationary forces that drove M3 growth during the pandemic combined with a recovery in (productive) lending to the private sector. The peak UK gap (11.4ppt) occurred in February 2021 when money supply increased by 15.3% YoY while lending grew by only 3.9% YoY. The gap narrowed to 6.1ppt in July 2021. Money supply growth slowed to 7.9% YoY but lending has also slowed to 1.8%. As can be seen from the chart above the same dynamics can be observed in both the UK and the EA.

Monthly UK retail lending flows (£bn) and breakdown (Source: BoE; CMMP)

The real surprise in July’s UK money supply data was the £1.4bn repayment of mortgage debt compounded by a slowdown in mortgage approvals. Resilient mortgage demand had been the key feature of UK retail finance during the pandemic, offsetting weakness in consumer credit (see chart above). In July 2021, however, HHs repaid £1.4bn of mortgage debt (red data labels in chart above). This is only the second recorded net repayment in the past decade. It followed record £18bn borrowing in June, which was boosted by the tapering off of the stamp duty holiday. Looking forward, approvals for house purchases, an indicator of future borrowing trends, fell to 75,200, the lowest level since July 2020 but above pre-pandemic levels (see chart below).

UK approvals for house purchases (Source: BoE; CMMP)

Conclusion

Financial markets are typically sensitive to inflexion points. The overriding message from the rolling over of UK monetary aggregates is one of slowing momentum. So-called “faster indicators” are sending the same message for August (see chart below).

Aggregate card spending versus pre-COVID levels (Source: ONS; CMMP)

Uncertainty may be lower than during the height of the pandemic, but any recovery is gradual at best. Sustained recoveries and reflation trades in both the UK and the EA require more substantial foundations.

Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“We cannot waste the opportunity”

This is not the time to ignore Panetta’s warnings

The key chart

What are the key messages behind the headline numbers? (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The key message

The EA may be leading the UK in a steady and synchronised recovery but this is not the time to repeat the post-GFC policy mistakes.

What are the euro area (EA) and UK money sectors telling us about the nature of the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic?

The deflationary forces that drove the acceleration in broad money during the pandemic have peaked. Household (HH) uncertainly is falling, especially in the EA (key signal #1). Monthly flows in consumer credit were positive in May in both regions and the EA registered positive YoY growth in consumer credit for the second month running (key signal #2).The gap between lending growth and money growth is narrowing from recent record highs but both regions remain a long way from normalised money and credit cycles (key signal #3).

The 2Q21 message from the money sector is clear – the EA is leading the UK in a steady and synchronised recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic (so far), but with a challenging policy context looking forward. The comments from ECB Executive Board member, Fabio Panetta, that, “Combined fiscal and monetary support has lifted the economy out of the state of the emergency” appear well founded in this context.

The tentative nature of the recovery to date places even more importance on Panetta’s conclusion that, “We cannot waste the opportunity of having, for the first time in more than a decade, a combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and a global reflationary environment to re-anchor inflation expectations to our target.”

This is not the time to repeat the post-GFC policy mistakes.

2Q21 messages from the money sectors

M3 increasingly driven by M1 or narrow money (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The deflationary forces that drove the acceleration in broad money during the pandemic have peaked. As can be seen in the chart above, narrow money (notes and coins in circulation and overnight deposits, or M1) represents an increasingly large proportion of broad money (M3) in both regions.

In May 2021, M1 accounted for 72% and 68% of M3 in the EA and UK respectively. This compares with 45% and 47% respectively in May 2009 and the GFC period. The key point here is that money sitting idly in overnight deposits contributes to neither growth nor inflation.

Different drivers, different implications (Source: ECB; CMMP)

As noted in previous posts (see “Don’t confuse the message”), it is important not to confuse the messages from the pre-GFC and COVID-19 periods of broad money expansion (see EA chart above). The message from the former period was one of over-confidence (low M1 contribution) and excess credit demand (high PSC contribution). In contrast, the recent message has been one of heightened uncertainty (high M1 contribution) and subdued credit demand (low PSC contribution). In short, recent money growth reflects fiscal and monetary easing in response to weak private sector demand and rising savings (with the added uncertainty regarding the extent to which rising savings are forced or precautionary).

Key signal #1 revisited

Trends in monthly HH deposit flows since January 2019 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

HH uncertainly is falling, especially in the EA (key signal #1). Monthly HH deposit flows are moderating in both regions. During the pandemic, HHs in both regions increased their money holdings despite earning negative returns – a combination of forced and precautionary savings. At their respective peaks, monthly flows were 2.4x (March 2020) and 6.0x (May 2020) their pre-Covid levels in the EA and UK respectively (see chart above).

In the EA, monthly flows were €31bn in May (up from €20bn in April) compared to the €33bn average flows seen during 2019. This was the second consecutive month when monthly flows were below their pre-COVID levels. In the UK, monthly flows were £7bn in May 2021, down from £9bn in April 2021, but still 1.5x their 2019 average of £5bn.

Key signal #2 revisited

Trends in monthly consumer credit flows since January 2020 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)
YoY growth in consumer credit over past five years (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Monthly flows in consumer credit were positive in May in both regions and the EA registered (slightly) positive YoY growth in consumer credit for the second month running (key signal #2).

HHs in the EA and UK borrowed €1.5bn and £0.3bn as consumer credit respectively in May 2021. This is the first time since August 2020 that UK consumers have borrowed more than they paid off. The Bank of England reported that this increase reflected £0.4bn in “other” forms of consumer credit such as card dealership finance and personal loans. In contrast, credit card lending remained weak with a net repayment of £0.1bn.

The EA has registered growth rates of 0.3% and 0.6% YoY in April and May 2021. In the UK, consumer credit fell -3.2% from -5.7% in April and the historic low of -10% in February 2021.

Key signal #3 revisited

Growth in lending minus growth in money suppy since April 2011 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The gap between lending growth and money growth is narrowing from recent record highs but both regions remain a long way from having normalised money and credit cycles (key signal #3).

Recall that in typical cycles, monetary aggregates and their key counterparts (eg credit to the private sector) move together. Money supply indicates how much money is available for use by the private sector. Private sector credit indicates how much the private sector is actually borrowing.

The gap has narrowed to 5.7ppt in the EA and 6.9ppt in the UK from recent, record highs of 8ppt (January 2021) and 11.4ppt (February 2021) respectively. This narrowing reflects a slowdown in both money supply and private sector credit, especially in the NFC sector.

Note that: (1) the effectiveness of monetary policy relies, in part, on certain stable relationships between monetary aggregates and their counterparts; and (2) that the desynchronization of money and credit cycles during the pandemic was unprecedented in both the EA and the UK.

Trends in lending by type since May 2019 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Conclusion

The 2Q21 message from the money sector is clear – the EA is leading the UK in a steady and synchronised recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic (so far), but with a challenging policy context looking forward.

In this context, the comments from ECB Executive Board member, Fabio Panetta, that, “Combined fiscal and monetary support has lifted the economy out of the state of the emergency” appear well founded.

The tentative nature of the recovery to date places even more importance on Panetta’s conclusion that, “We cannot waste the opportunity of having, for the first time in more than a decade, a combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and a global reflationary environment to re-anchor inflation expectations to our target.”

This is not the time to repeat the post-GFC policy mistakes.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.