“Are we there yet?”

Eight key charts and why they matter

The key chart

Time for a policy reboot – does it make sense to run tight fiscal policy (1) at this point in the cycle, and (2) when the private sector is running persistent financial surpluses? (4Q sums, % GDP)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Introduction

In my previous post, “Policy reboot 2020?” I suggested that, “progress towards dealing with the debt overhang in Europe remains gradual and incomplete”. This prompted two follow-up questions:

  • How do I monitor this progress within the Macro Perspectives framework?
  • Why does it matter?

In this post, I present eight graphs that are key to monitoring this progress:

  1. Private sector debt ratios (PSDRs)
  2. Costs of borrowing
  3. Lending spreads versus policy rates
  4. Growth in broad money (M3)
  5. Growth in private sector credit
  6. Money supply vs demand for credit dynamic
  7. Inflation
  8. Private sector net financial balances

Summary and implications

The eight graphs confirm that the EA is still dealing with the legacy of a debt overhang. Private sector debt levels are still too high, money, credit and business cycles are significantly weaker than in past cycles and inflation remains well below target.

In spite of this, the collective fiscal policy of EA nations is (1) about as tight as any period in the past twenty years and (2) is so at a time when the private sector is running persistent net financial surpluses (largely above 3% GDP since the GFC).

An important lesson from Japan’s experience of a balance sheet recession is that the deflationary gap in economies facing debt overhangs is equal to the amount of private unborrowed savings. These savings (at a time of zero rates) are responsible for weakness in the economy, and it is because the economy is so weak that fiscal stimulus is necessary (Koo, R. 2019).

Ironically, the EA is positioned better to ease fiscal policy than the UK (where both the private and public sector are running simultaneous financial deficits) but we are more likely to see fiscal stimulus in the latter (March 2020) than in the former.

It’s time for a policy reboot in the EA for 2020 and beyond.

Eight key charts

Key chart 1: Private sector debt ratios

Too little, too late? Private sector deleveraging in the EA began later and has been more gradual than in the UK and the US (private sector debt as % GDP)
Source: BIS; Haver; CMMP analysis

The first chart illustrates twenty-year trends in private sector debt ratios (PSDR) – private sector debt as a percentage of GDP – for the UK, EA and US. The three vertical, dotted lines mark the point of peak PSDR for each economy. This is the standard starting point for analysing debt overhangs.

Private sector deleveraging began much later and has been more gradual in the EA than in both the US and the UK. The PSDR in the EA is now the highest among these three economies.

  • The US PSDR peaked first at 170% GDP in 3Q08, fell to a post-GFC low of 147% GDP in 3Q15 (co-incidentally the point when the EA PSDR peaked) and is currently 150% GDP
  • The UK PSDR peaked one quarter later (4Q08) at 194% GDP, fell to 160% GDP in 2Q15 and is currently 163%
  • The EA PSDR continued to rise after the GFC before peaking at 172% in 2Q15 and declining slightly to 166% currently

For reference, but not shown here, household (HH) and corporate (NFC) debt ratios (the two sub-sets behind these totals) differ across the three economies. In the EA, the NFC PSDR is 108% (above the BIS’ maximum threshold of 90%) but the HH PSDR is only 58%. In the UK and US these splits are 79%:84% (see “Poised to disappoint”) and 75%:75% respectively. In other words, the risks lie in different places in each economy.

Key chart 2: Cost of borrowing

The cost of borrowing for HH and NFCs has fallen sharply, reflecting relatively weak credit demand (composite costs %, nominal terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The second chart illustrates the ECB’s composite measures for HH and NFC cost of borrowing (in nominal terms). The cost of borrowing typically falls in periods of debt overhang, reflecting weak demand for credit.

Weak credit demand is reflected in the cost of borrowing for EA HHs and NFCs falling sharply.

  • HH and NFC costs of borrowing both peaked in 3Q08 at 5.6% and 6.0% respectively
  • The HH cost of borrowing hit a new low in December 2019 of 1.41%
  • The NFC cost of borrowing hit a low of 1.52% in August 2019 and is currently 1.55%

For reference, costs of borrowing in real terms (shown here) remain low at 0.11% for HH and 0.25% for NFCs but above their October 2018 lows of -0.49% and -0.65% respectively.

Key chart 3: Spreads vs policy rates

Lending spreads at, or close to, post-GFC lows (composite cost minus MRR, ppt)
Source: ECB, Haver, CMMP analysis

The third chart illustrates the spread between composite borrowing rates and the ECB’s main refinancing rate (MRR). These spreads typically narrow during periods of debt overhang.

Spreads between borrowing costs and the ECB’s main policy rate are at, or slightly above, post-GFC lows.

  • HH spreads have declined from 2.97% in May 2009 to a new post-GFC low of 1.41%
  • NFC spreads have declined from 2.76% in May 2014 to 1.55% currently, slightly above their post-GFC low of 1.55%

Key chart 4: Growth in broad money (M3)

Growth in M3 has been steady since 2014 easing, but subdued in relation to past trends (% YoY)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The fourth chart illustrates the twenty-year trend in the growth of broad money (M3). Broad money reflects the interaction between the banking sector and the money-holding/real sector.

Growth rates in broad money have been stable since ECB easing in 2014 but subdued in comparison with previous cycles.

  • In December 2019, M3 grew by 5.0% YoY
  • Narrow money (M1) contributed growth of 5.3% which was offset by negative growth in short term marketable securities

For reference, the share of M1 within M3 has risen from 42% in December 2008 to a new high of 68%, despite the fact that HH overnight deposit rates are -1.25% in real terms.

Key chart 5: Private sector loan growth

Private sector credit growing at the fastest rate in the current cycle, but growth is subdued in relation to past cycles (% YoY)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The fifth chart illustrates YoY growth in private sector credit, the main counterpart to M3.

Private sector credit is growing at the fastest rate in the current cycle but also remains subdued in relation to past cycles and highly concentrated geographically (Germany and France).

  • Private sector credit grew 3.7% YoY in December 2019 (3m MVA) above the average growth rate of 3.5%
  • Germany and France together contributed 2.8% of the 3.7% growth in HH credit and 2.6% of the 3.2% growth in NFC credit in 2019

Key chart 6: Money supply vs credit demand

The gap between the supply of money and the demand for credit has started to widen again, indicating an on-going deficiency in credit demand
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The sixth chart – one of my favourite charts – illustrates the gap between the supply of money (M3) and the demand for credit by the private sector. In typical cycles, monetary aggregates and their counterparts move together. Money supply indicates how much money is available for use by the private sector. Private sector credit indicates how much the private sector is borrowing.

The gap between the growth in the supply of money and the demand for credit indicates on-going deficiency in credit demand in the EA.

  • Since 4Q11, broad money and private sector credit trends have diverged with gaps peaking in 3Q12 and 1Q15
  • The gap narrowed up to September 2018 but has widened out again recently

Key chart 7: Inflation

Inflation persistently below the ECB 2% target during 2019 (% YoY)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The seventh chart ilustrates the twenty-year trend in inflation (HICP) plotted against the ECB’s current inflation target. Again, inflation rates tend to much lower in periods of debt overhang.

Inflation remained below the ECB’s target throughout 2019 and finished the year at 1.3%

  • Inflation ended 2019 at 1.3%, below the ECB’s target of 2%

Key chart 8: Private sector financial balance

The private sector is running a net financial surplus in spite of negative/low rates (4Q sums, % GDP)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The eighth, and final chart, illustrates trends in the private sector’s net financial surplus. In this analysis, 4Q sums are compared with GDP.

Finally, the private sector (in aggregate) is running a financial surplus in spite of negative/very low policy rates – a very strong indication that the economy is still suffering from a debt overhang

  • In aggregate, the EA private sector is running a net financial surplus equivalent to 3.1% of GDP (3Q19) at a time when deposit rates are negative (average -0.9% during 3Q19)

Why does this matter?

…Fiscal rules should be designed to favor counter-cyclical fiscal policies. Nevertheless, despite various amendments to strengthen the counter-cyclical features of the [EA] rules, the outcomes have been mainly pro-cyclical.

IMF, Fiscal rules in the euro area and lessons from other monetary unions, 2019

The EA is still dealing with the legacy of a debt overhang. Private sector debt levels are still too high, money, credit and business cycles are significantly weaker than in past cycles and inflation remains well below target.

Does this make sense #1? Collective fiscal policy is about as tight as at any point in past twenty years (Government net financial deficit, 4Q sum, % GDP)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

In spite of all of this, the nations of the EA are collectively running a fiscal policy that is about as tight as at any period in the past twenty years. They are also doing this at a time when the private sector is running persistent net financial surpluses. Clearly, these developments fail a basic “common sense test”.

Does this make sense #2. The key chart again – what is the logic of running a tight policy when the private sector is running persistent surpluses (largely above 3% GDP)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Its worth noting that fiscal policy rules in the EA, including the Stability and Growth Pact, were created without reference to the private saving and for an economic environment that no longer exists (eg, positive rates, high inflation, government mismanagement etc.).

Are current rules still fit for purpose – government deficit/surplus as % GDP (y axis) plotted against government debt as % GDP (x axis)? Red lines indicate current SGP rules, green line indicates a balanced budget. These rules were designed for a different type of recession and constrain appropriate policy responses today
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Leaving aside, the weak track record of adherence to these rules by member states, the obvious question is whether these rules remain relevant and whether the current policy mix is appropriate?

An important lesson from the experience of Japan’s balance sheet recession is that the deflationary gap in economies facing debt overhangs is equal to the amount of private unborrowed savings. Balance sheet recession theorists, such as Richard Koo, argue that these, “unborrowed savings (at a time of zero interest rates) are responsible for the weakness in the economy, and it is because the economy is so weak that fiscal stimulus is necessary”.

Relating the same argument to inflation targets, when inflation and inflation expectations are below target and rates are zero or negative, fiscal policy should lead with an expansionary stance and monetary policy should cooperate by focusing on guaranteeing low interest rates for as long as needed.

The UK is not as well positioned as the EA to relax fiscal policy – the UK private and public sectors are running simultanous deficits – but we are more likely to see UK fiscal easing first, in the March 2020 budget (4Q sums, % GDP)
Source: ONS; Haver; CMMP analysis

Ironically, the EU is positioned better to relax fiscal policy than the UK (where both the private and public sector are running simultaneous deficits) but we are more likely to see fiscal easing in the latter (March 20202 budget) before the former.

In short, it is time for a policy reboot in the EA for 2020 and beyond.

Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Policy reboot 2020?”

The EA remains trapped by PS debt levels and outdated policy rules

The key chart

Slowing GDP growth confirms the need for a major policy reboot (% YoY)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Summary

Today’s 4Q19 GDP data confirms that the euro area (EA) is growing at its slowest rate since the ECB introduced expansionary measures in June 2014 (0.1% QoQ, 0.9% YoY).

The region remains trapped by its debt overhang and out-dated policy rules – a major policy reboot is long overdue.

The root causes are captured clearly by my Macro Perspectives analysis that incorporates (1) global debt dynamics, (2) money, credit and business cycles, and (3) financial sector balances in a consistent analytical framework.

Progress towards dealing with the debt overhang in Europe remains gradual and incomplete. The EA continues to display the characteristics of a “private sector balance sheet-driven” slowdown rather than a “structural slowdown”. In this context, it is unsurprising that unorthodox monetary policy measures (1) have been only partially successful, at best, and (2) have unintended, negative consequences for growth, leverage, financial stability and income inequality.

Financial sector balances send clear message about the causes of the slowdown (4Q sum, % GDP)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Last month, I introduced my balance sheet framework and applied it to the UK economy. There are two key messages from this framework that are applicable to the current EA situation:

  • When the private sector is running a financial surplus in spite of negative/very low policy and deposit rates (see graph above), this is a strong indication that the economy is still suffering from a debt overhang
  • Fiscal space, like debt sustainability, is at its core a flow concept, not a stock concept (see graph below)

Following from this (and deliberately simplifying a complex policy debate), when growth, inflation and inflation expectations are below target and when interest rates are already zero or negative, fiscal policy should lead with an expansionary stance and monetary policy should cooperate by guaranteeing low interest rates for as long as needed. In short, this is a very different economic context to the one that existed when the current fiscal policy rules were chosen.

Germany’s private and public sectors are running simultaneous net financial surpluses in the face of slowing economic growth – does this make sense for Germany and/or the EA?
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Unfortunately, despite strong and repeated calls for fiscal stimulus by the ECB, fiscal policy is only expected to be moderately supportive in 2020. Rules, designed to address different challenges at different times, are preventing stimulus in counties where policy makers would like to spend more (Italy, Spain) and national policy choices are limiting policy expansion in countries that have room for further stimulus (German, Netherlands). This is compounded by the lack of a central fiscal capacity at the euro area level that could strengthen the ability to deploy fiscal policy, complementing monetary policy, in case of significant euro area-wide downside dynamics (see https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/01/28/sp012820-vitor-gaspar-fiscal-rules-in-europe ).

Are current fiscal rules still fit for purpose – government deficit/surplus as % GDP (y axis) plotted against government debt as % GDP (x axis)? These rules were designed for a different typ of recession and constrain required policy responses today. (Red lines indicate current rules)
Source: ECB; Haver, CMMP analysis

Conclusion

Marco Perspectives frameworks illustrate why a major policy review that begins with differentiating between different types of recessions is required if the EA is to escape from the current debt and policy trap. The ECB has announced a review of monetary policy in the EA, but the need for a wider fiscal policy review/reboot appears more urgent, in my view.

I presented the investment implications of this analysis at “The 5th Global Independent Research Conference” in London earlier this month. Please contact me to dicusss these implications and for access to the detailed analysis behind the summary comments above.

chris@cmmacroperspectives.com

“Follow the Euro-money”

2019’s end-of-year message

The key chart

Leading (real M1), coincident (real HH) and lagging (real NFC) indicators moved further away from the levels associated with recession risks in the euro area during 2019 (% YoY, real terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

The message from 2019

Monetary indicators moved away from the levels associated with recession risks in the euro area (EA) during 2019.

A very brief summary

Nominal growth rates in narrow money (M1), broad money (M3) and private sector credit (PSC) ended the year at, or close to, 12-month highs and well above the levels recorded in 2018. In real terms, M1 grew 6.6% in 2019 versus 5.0% in 2018 (with a 2019 high of 7.6% in October). Given the leading indicator qualities of trends in real M1, this data supports the narrative that recession fears in the EA have been overdone. Household credit (a coincident indicator) grew at 3.7% in nominal terms, the fastest rate in the current cycle and 2.4% in real terms. The main inconsistency in this data was the slowdown in NFC lending over 2019 particularly in the final months (trends in real NFC credit are typically considered lagging indicators).

These positive trends were offset by three counterbalancing trends: (1) while PSC growth ended 2019 close to its high, current growth remains subdued in relation to LT trends; (2) the demand for credit continues to lag the supply of money which indicates that the EA has still to recover fully from the debt overhang; and (3) ECB policies are fuelling growth in less-productive FIRE-based lending (see “The ECB’s missing chart“) with potentially negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability, and income inequality.

The charts that matter

Growth rates in narrow money (M1), broad money (M3) and private sector credit (PSC) ended the year at, or close to, 12-months highs (% YoY, nominal terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis
Leading indicator – real M1 grew 6.6% YoY in 2019 versus 5.0% YoY in 2018 (% YoY in real terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis
Co-incident indicator – real HH credit growth of 2.4% , driven by sustained mortgage demand (% YoY in real terms)
Source: ECB; Haver, CMMP analysis
Lagging indicator – the slowdown in real NFC credit in 4Q19 was inconsistent with other trends (% YoY in real terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis
PSC credit growth ended the year on a high, but remains subdued in relation to LT trends (% YoY 3m MVA in nominal terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis
Deficient demand – private sector credit demand lags the supply of money. The EA has still to recover fully from the debt overhang (% YoY 3m MVA in nominal terms)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis
Fueling the FIRE – ECB policies are supporting growth in less-productive FIRE-based lending with potentially negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability, and income inequality (% total EA loans)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately

“The ECB’s missing chart”

The FSR is suitably cautious, but misses a key chart

The key (missing) chart

Are ECB policies fuelling growth in less productive FIRE-based lending at the expense of productive COCO-based lending (% total loans)? What are the implications for leverage, growth, stability and income inequality?
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Summary

The ECB published its November 2019 Financial Stability Review (FSR) this week with a suitably cautious outlook for financial stability, economic growth, and banking sector profitability in the euro area (EA).

The analysis is as insightful and thorough as usual and supports many of my current views. However, it “falls short” in one key respect – the FSR presents its analysis through the traditional household (HH) versus corporate (NFC) framework, rather than through the increasingly more relevant COCO versus FIRE-based credit framework.

The risk here is that it underplays the hidden risks in QE, namely that the majority of credit in the EA is directed into “unproductive” FIRE-based credit rather than more “productive” COCO-based credit. As such, current policies to support/stimulate credit demand have potentially negative (if unintended) implications for leverage, growth, stability and income inequality.

Key messages from the FSR (Nov 2019)

The FSR states that the “the euro area financial stability outlook remains challenging“. It highlights four key issues:

  1. Signs of asset mispricing suggest potential for future correction
  2. Lingering private and public sector debt sustainability concerns
  3. Growing challenges from cyclical headwinds to bank sector profitability (“75% of EA significant banks have ROE < 8%”)
  4. Increased risk-taking by nonbanks may pose risks to capital market financing

In mitigation, the FSR notes that: (1) euro area banks are adequately capitalised with a 14.2% CET1 ratio; and (2) all Euro Area countries have activated macroprudential measures. Nonetheless, it concludes that “more active use of macroprudential policies could be appropriate to contain vulnerabilities“.

The FSR argues that the economic outlook has deteriorated and that growth is expected to remain subdued for longer, with risks tilted to the downside. It also concludes that “while the banking sector is resilient to near-term risks, challenges from a more subdued profitability outlook remain“. Four headwinds facing banks are cited: eroding interest margins; slightly higher costs of risk; high cost inefficiencies, and plateauing capital positioning.

I have covered many of these factors in recent posts including:

The ECB’s framework

The FSR presents its analysis of the HH and NFC sector separately. The HH sector is discussed in Section 1.3 (Euro area household resilience supported by low interest rates) and the NFC sector in Section 1.4 (Emerging pockets of corporate sector vulnerability).

Robust or subdued? Nominal HH credit growth is much lower than in past cycles (%YoY) and concentrated geographically (France, Germany, Benelux)
Source: ECH; Haver; CMMP analysis

In summary, the FSR describes HH lending as “robust, with continued divergence across countries and types of loans”, HH indebtedness stable (with considerable heterogeneity across EA countries) and risks to HH debt sustainability contained. My comments:

  1. HH credit is growing at the fastest rate in the current cycle (3.4% nominal and 2.6% real YoY growth) but rather than robust, I would describe this growth as relatively subdued especially in relation to historic cycles
  2. As noted in previous posts, and illustrated in the graph above, HH growth is concentrated in Germany, France and the Benelux
  3. In “Debt dynamics in the developed world” I agreed with the conclusion that excess credit growth risks in developed economies were relatively contained (and limited largely to non-EA countries such as Norway, Switzerland, Canada and Sweden, see graph below).
CMMP analysis shows that HH sector growth risks are relatively low (HH RGF versus HH debt ratio)
Source: BIS; Haver; CMMP analysis
…as are HH affordability risks in the Euro Area in contrast to Norway, Canada and Sweden (HH DSR as at end 1Q19 and deviations from LT average)
Source: BIS; Haver; CMMP analysis

In the NFC sector, the FSR highlights the deceleration in corporate profits, along with increases in external financing and slightly elevated corporate indebtedness, but suggests that risks are offset by favourable financing conditions and large liquidity buffers.

NFC debt levels remain above the average for BIS reporting countries and the BIS maximum threshold
Source: BIS; Haver; CMMP analysis
CMMP analysis shows that only Italy, Greece and Germany (among large EA economies) have NFC debt levels below the BIS maximum threshold
Source: BIS; Haver; CMMP analysis

I would suggest that this underestimates risks in this sector:

  1. The NFC debt ratio (% GDP) is currently 105% in the EA, above the 94% average for all BIS reporting countries and the BIS maximum threshold level of 90%
  2. At the country level, only Italy, Germany and Greece have NFC debt ratios below the BIS threshold
  3. My analysis also highlights relative high “growth” and “affordability” risks in the French NFC sector.
France is among the four economies that have seen the fastest rates of “excess NFC credit growth” despite having high levels of NFC (% GDP)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis
…while also displaying relatively high levels of NFC affordability risk (NFC DSR as at end 1Q19 versus deviation from LT average)
Source: BIS; Haver; CMMP analysis

An alternative framework

In September, I presented an alternative framework for analysing global debt dynamics. I argued that, in its broadest sense, lending can be split into two distinct types: lending to support productive enterprise; and lending to finance the sale and purchase of existing assets. The former includes lending to NFCs and HH consumer credit, referred collectively here as “COCO”-based lending (COrporate and COnsumer). The latter includes loans to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and HH mortgage or real estate debt, referred to collectively as “FIRE”-lending (FInancials and Real Estate). 

EA lending is increasingly directed towards less productive FIRE-based lending (% total lending) which now accounts for 55% of total loans
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

In short, COCO-based lending typically supports production and income formation, while FIRE-based lending typically supports capital gains through higher asset prices. Lending in any economy will involve a balance between these different forms, but to repeat the key point from September: a shift from COCO-based lending to FIRE-based lending reflects different borrower motivations and different levels of risks to financial stability.

Only three of the large EA economies have COCO-based lending above (Greece, Austria) or equal to (Italy) FIRE-based lending (% total loans)
Source: ECB; Haver; CMMP analysis

Over the past twenty years, FIRE-based lending has increased from 48% of total loans to 55% as at the end of September 2019. The current level represents the highest share of FIRE-based lending. Only three of the large EA economies have COCO-based lending above or equal to FIRE-based lending: Greece; Austria, and Italy.

Why does this matter?

The hidden risk in QE is that the ECB is “Fuelling the FIRE” with potentially negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality in the Euro Area.  

  1. Leverage: while COCO-based lending increases absolute debt levels, it also increases incomes (albeit with a lag), hence overall debt levels need not rise as a consequence. In contrast, FIRE-based lending increases debt and may increase asset prices but does not increase the purchasing power of the economy as a whole. Hence, it is likely to result in high levels of leverage
  2. Growth: similarly, COCO-based lending supports economic growth both by increasing the value-add from final goods and services (“output”) and an increase in profits and wages (“income”). In contrast, FIRE-based lending typically only affects GDP growth indirectly
  3. Stability: the returns from FIRE-based lending (investment returns, commercial and HH property prices etc) are typically more volatile that returns from COCO-based lending and may affect the solvency of lenders and borrowers. The FSR notes that house prices rose faster than GDP in 1H19 and highlights signs of overvaluation, which now exceeds 7% on average, “but with a high degree of cross-country heterogeneity” (see graphs below)
  4. Inequality: the returns from FIRE-based lending are typically concentrated in higher-income segments of the populations, with any subsequent wealth-effects increasing income inequality.
EA house prices have risen faster than GDP in 1H19 and are estimated to be overvalued by 7%
Source: ECH; Haver; CMMP analysis
Residential property prices are estimated to be overvalued in all large EA economies (and in the UK) with the exceptions of Italy and Ireland
Source: ECH; Haver; CMMP analysis

Conclusion

The FSR’s outlook for financial stability, economic growth and bank sector profitability is in-line with the views expressed in my recent posts (albeit with some differences in emphasis). However, the hidden risks associated with the ECB’s unorthodox monetary policy are potentially understated, in my view.

The alternative framework presented here, that draws the distinction between productive COCO-based lending and unproductive/less-productive FIRE-based lending, provides a clearer perspective of these risks.

The on-going shift in the balance of lending in the Euro Area has negative implications for leverage, economic growth, financial stability and income inequality.

Please note that the summary comments above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.