China data reinforces three key aspects of global debt dynamics
The key chart
The key message
This week’s news of weaker-than-expected economic growth in China and on-going challenges in the country’s property sector reinforces three key aspects of global debt dynamics:
Conventional macro thinking is flawed to the extent that it typically ignores the risks associated with private debt (while seeing government debt as a problem)
The “EM-debt” story has, for some time, been replaced by the “China-debt” story – strip out China and EM’s share of global debt is largely unchanged since the GFC
The level of any country’s debt needs to be considered in relation to its rate of growth (and its affordability and structure).
In an early 2019 CMMP Analysis report (“Too much, too soon?“), I concluded that:
“The risks associated with excess HH credit growth in China remain elevated and this analysis presents a relatively extreme example of the importance of considering the level of debt together with its rate of growth. History suggests that current trends in China are unsustainable. The most benign outcome is that the rate of growth in HH borrowing slows more rapidly with negative implications for consumption and aggregate demand. In short, China’s increasing HH debt burden represents a key headwind in the transition to a consumption-driven economy.”
Debt dynamics matter, a lot, but conventional approaches to understanding them need updating.
Why does the changing nature of global debt matter?
The key chart
The key message
“Private debt causes crises – public debt (to some extent) ends them.”
Professor Steve Keen, June 2021
While a great deal of attention is focused on the fact that global debt levels hit new highs during 2021, too little attention is given to the important changes that have taken place in the structure of global debt since the GFC.
This matters because conventional macro theory struggles to deal with the implications here, since it typically ignores private debt while seeing government debt as a problem rather than as a solution.
There has been an important shift away from household (HH) debt towards government debt at the aggregate, global level since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Debt dynamics in advanced economies have driven this shift, most notably in the US and the UK. In contrast, the structure of emerging economies’ (EMs) debt remains broadly unchanged, with a structural bias towards private sector debt. These trends matter for a number of reasons:
First, and in contrast conventional theory, we know that government deficits increase the supply of money (not the demand for money), crowd-in investment private spending (as opposed to crowding it out) and depress interest rates (rather than driving them up).
Second, and from this, we also know that while private sector debt typically causes crises, public sector debt typically limits their damage/ends them.
Third, the structure of US and UK debt is now the mirror image of the pre-GFC period, which reduces associated risks since governments face different financial constraints to HHs and NFCs and cannot, as currency issuers, become insolvent. Risks associated with excess credit growth exist more obviously in other advanced economies.
Fourth, EMs face very different risks to advanced economies. These are associated largely with the level of NFC debt, the growth rate in HH debt and the increasing dominance of China in EM debt.
Global debt dynamics – I
Debt dynamics since the GFC
In the “Seven lessons from the money sector in 2021”, I noted that our understanding of global debt dynamics is improved significantly by extending analysis beyond the level of debt to include its structure, growth and affordability.
In this first post of 2022, and the first in a series of five posts reviewing current global debt dynamics, I focus on the implications of the changes that have taken place in the structure of global debt since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).
A great deal of attention has focused on the fact that global debt levels hit new, record highs in 2021 (see chart above). According to BIS statistics released on 6 December 2021, total debt (to the non-financial sector) reached $225tr at the end of 2Q21. NFC debt reached $86tr (38% total), government debt reached $83tr (37% total) and HH debt reached $55tr (25% total).
Note that while it is common to aggregate these three categories of debt together, it is also important to recognise that NFC and HH debt sit on the liabilities side of private sector balance sheets, while government debt sits on the assets side of private sector (and RoW) balance sheets.
Note also, that while debt levels are at record highs, debt ratios (ie, debt as a percentage of GDP) are below their 4Q20 peaks in each category.
Too little attention has focused, however, on the important changes that have taken place to the structure of global debt since the GFC (see chart above). While NFC debt’s share of total debt has remained relatively stable at just under 40%, there has been an important shift away from HH debt to government debt over the period. HH debt’s share of total debt has fallen from 32% to 25% (see chart below). In contrast, government debt’s share of total debt has risen from 29% to 37%.
Debt dynamics in advanced economies have driven this shift, most notably in the US and the UK (see chart below). In advanced economies, the US and the UK the share of HH debt has fallen from 34% to 26%, from 42% to 28% and from 43% to 30% respectively. In contrast, the respective shares of government debt to total debt have risen from 29% to 42%, from 26% to 44% and from 20% to 45% respectively. Similar shifts have also taken place in the EA, albeit in a much more muted fashion. This reflects a much lower (27%) share of HH debt at the time of the GFC in the EA.
The structure of EM debt remains broadly unchanged, however, with a bias towards private sector debt. At the end of 2Q21, the shares of HH, NFC and government debt to total debt in EM were 22%, 50% and 28% respectively.
Note that China’s share of total EM debt has risen from 31% to 64% over the period. In other words, the EM debt story is increasingly a “China debt” story. For reference, China’s share of total global debt has also increased from 5% to 21% over the same period (see chart below). In contrast, EM excluding China’s share of total global debt has remain unchanged.
Why does this matter?
This matters for a number of reasons. First, and in contrast conventional theory, we know that government deficits increase the supply of money (not the demand for money), crowd-in investment private spending (as opposed to crowding it out) and depress interest rates (rather than driving them up).
Professor Steve Keen has written extensively on this subject. He notes that, “rather than deficits meaning that the government has to take money away from the private sector – which is what the mainstream thinks the government does when it sells bonds to cover the deficit – the deficit creates money by increasing the bank deposits of the private sector”. In simple terms, by not studying the accounting involved in government deficits, Keen argues that they (mainstream economists) have wrongly classified them as increasing the demand for money, when in fact they increase the supply of money. I agree.
The implication here is that many arguments regarding global debt are in fact, back-to-front. Government deficits crowd in private spending and investment by increasing the supply of money. They also typically drive down interest rates rather than driving them up.
Second, and from this, we also know that while private sector debt typically causes crises, public sector debt typically limits their damage/ends them. Consider the EA’s fiscal rules that put limits on government debt and deficits but completely ignored private debt and credit and the history of Spanish debt dynamics after the introduction of the euro (see chart below).
After the introduction of the euro, government debt in Spain fell from 70% to 36% in March 2008. In contrast, private sector debt rose from 80% of GDP to 208% of GDP over the same period before peaking at 227% in 2Q10 at the height of the Spanish banking crisis (see chart above). Similar trends were also seen in other advanced economies. The chart below illustrates trends in private sector credit and government debt in the US.
Excess growth in private sector debt up to a crisis point is followed by increases in government debt post-crisis in response to the collapse in demand as credit growth turns negative and the private sector reduces leverage. In short, recent history supports Professor Keen’s hypothesis that private debt causes crisis, while public debt ends them (or limits their damage). This topic and these case studies are developed in more detail in other posts/CMMP research.
Third, the structure of US and UK debt is now the mirror image of the pre-GFC period (see chart above). This reduces associated risks since governments face different financial constraints to HHs and NFCs and cannot, as currency issuers, become insolvent.
Fourth, EMs face very different risks to advanced economies. These are associated largely with the level of NFC debt, the growth rate in HH debt (see chart above) and the increasing dominance of China in EM debt – subjects that I will address in the final post in this series.
Conclusion
Global debt dynamics are a core element of CMMP analysis. While it is natural to focus initially on the new highs in global debt levels, it is also important not to miss the important messages associated with changes in the structure, growth and affordability of global debt.
The shift in the structure of global debt from HH debt to government debt has important implications for the severity of recessions, monetary dynamics, inflation, rates and investment risks. The nature of these implications also vary depending on whether governments are currency issuers (eg, US and UK) or currency users (eg, EA governments). The risks of a return to pre-pandemic policy mixes remain in all areas, however.
In the next post, I will examine dynamics in global private sector debt.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
How the structure of global debt is changing and why this matters
The key chart
The key message
With attention focusing mainly on post-pandemic highs in the level of global debt/debt ratios, it is very easy to ignore key changes in the structure of global debt, and why these changes matter.
There has been a marked shift away from household (HH) debt to government debt, at the global level. While HH (and other types of private debt) typically cause crises, government debt typically ends them/reduces their severity. Government deficits also increase the supply of money and depress rates (contrary to popular opinion)
The structure of US and UK debt is now the mirror image of the pre-GFC period. This reduces associated risks since governments face different financial constraints to the HH and NFC sectors and cannot, as currency issuers, become insolvent
A similar but more muted shift has occurred in the euro area (EA) where the structure of debt also differs significantly across the EA’s largest economies
As currency users, EA governments also face different constraints to governments that remain issuers of their own currency. Flaws in the EU’s fiscal architecture were apparent before the pandemic. With budget hawks already calling for a return to EU fiscal rules, policy risks remain elevated
These trends are advanced economy trends not EM ones. With private sector credit accounting for 72% of EM debt, EMs face very different challenges associated mainly with the level of NFC debt and the rate of growth in HH debt (note also that EM debt is increasingly a “China-debt” story)
Global debt dynamics are a key element of CMMP analysis. It is natural to focus initially on the impact of responses to the pandemic on the level of debt. However, a failure to incorporate analysis of the structure, growth and affordability of debt at the same time can lead to false conclusions regarding investment implications. The post-COVID world is very different from the post-GFC world.
Structure matters too
Much attention has focused on the impact of the public and private sector responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on the level of global debt and global debt ratios across all sectors (see chart above). All recorded new highs at the end of 4Q20. Less attention has focused, however, on the changing structure of global debt particularly in relation to the pre-GFC period. This posts sets out to correct this by highlighting five key structural changes in global debt and explaining their significance.
Five key changes
First, at the global level, there has been a shift away from HH debt to government debt (see chart above). This matters because (1) while private sector debt typically causes crises, public sector debt typically ends them/reduces their severity and (2) contrary to mainstream teaching, government deficits increase rather than decrease the supply of money and drive rates down.
Second, following this shift, the structure of US and UK debt is the mirror image of the pre-GFC structure (see chart above). This reduces associated risks since governments face different financial constraints to the HH and NFC sectors and cannot, if currency issuers, become insolvent.
Third, more muted shifts have occurred in the euro area (EA) where the structure of debt still differs significantly across the EA’s largest economies. HH debt accounted for 27% of total EA debt in 1Q08 versus 42% in the US and the UK (see chart above). This share fell to 21% in 4Q20 versus 27% in the US and 30% in the UK respectively. Government debt has increases from 31% to 39% of EA debt versus 45% in the US and 44% in the UK respectively. At the country level, however, the share of government debt in total debt ranges from 60% in Italy to only 20% in the Netherlands (see chart below).
Fourth, as currency users, EA governments also face different constraints to governments that remain issuers of their own currency. Flaws in the EU’s fiscal architecture were apparent before the pandemic. With budget hawks already calling for a return to EU fiscal rules, policy risks remain elevated.
Fifth, these trends are advanced economy trends not EM ones. With private sector credit accounting for 72% of EM debt, EMs face very different challenges associated mainly with the level of NFC debt and the rate of growth in HH debt (see chart above). Note also that EM debt is also increasingly a “China-debt” story. At the end of 4Q20, China accounted for 67% and 70% of total EM and EM NFC debt respectively (see chart below).
Conclusion
Global debt dynamics are a core element of CMMP analysis. While it is natural to focus initially on the new highs in the global debt levels and debt ratios across all sectors, it is also important not to miss the important messages associated with changes in the structure, growth and affordability of global debt.
The shift in the structure of global debt from HH debt to government debt has important implications for the severity of recessions, monetary dynamics, inflation, rates and investment risks. The nature of these implications also vary depending on whether governments are currency issuers (eg, US and UK) or currency users (eg, EA governments). The risks of a return to pre-pandemic policy mixes remain in all areas, however. Finally, EMs face very different challenges largely associated with the level of NFC debt, the growth rate in HH debt and the increasing dominance of China in EM debt.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
First, the US has the highest outstanding stock of debt in the world but deeper analysis is required to determine whether it has a “debt problem”
Second, in terms of debt ratios (debt/GDP), the US ranks outside the world’s highly indebted economies across the government, household (HH) and corporate (NFC) sectors
Third, the US is also one of only four developed market economies to have both HH and NFC debt ratios below the BIS maximum thresholds
Fourth, the current structure of US debt is the mirror image of the pre-GFC structure following the significant shift away from HH to government debt
Fifth, this changing structure reduces associated risks since the government faces different financial constraints to the HH and NFC sectors and cannot, as a currency issuer, become insolvent
Sixth, the risks associated with the level, growth and affordability of HH debt remain moderate in absolute and relative terms
Seventh, risks are elevated in the NFC sector, however, due to the recent rates of excess credit growth and affordability concerns but these risks are not exclusive to the US.
In short, risks associated with US debt are concentrated rather than systemic. Moreelevated risks exist in other developed and emerging economies where some of the highest rates of excess credit growth are occurring in highly indebted economies and affordability risks are rising despite the low interest rate environment. Investor attention should not be restricted to US debt simply due to its size – more immediate concerns lie elsewhere.
Does the US have a debt problem?
The US has the highest outstanding stock of total, government, HH and NFC debt in the world but deeper analysis is required to determine whether it has a “debt problem”.
The US has outstanding total, government, NFC, and HH debt of $61tr, $27tr, $18tr and $16tr respectively (as at end 3Q20). The US accounts for 29% of global debt alone and almost 50% together with China (see key chart above) and has market shares of 34%, 22% and 32% of global government, NFC and HH debt respectively (see chart above).
To understand the implications here and consider whether the US has a debt problem, CMMP analysis considers the stock of debt in the context of the level of GDP (debt ratios), its structure, its rate of growth and affordability.
In terms of debt ratios (debt/GDP), the US ranks outside the world’s highly indebted economies in all sub-sectors. It is ranked only #18 in terms of total debt ratio for example (see chart above), and #22 and #12 in terms of NFC and HH debt ratios. In the case of government debt (129% GDP), the US is ranked higher, however, at #10 after Japan (235%), Greece (212%), Italy (172%), Portugal (146%), Belgium (137%), France (134%), UK (133%) and Spain (132%).
The US is one of only four developed market economies to have both HH and NFC debt ratios below the BIS maximum thresholds. The BIS considers HH and NFC debt ratios of 85% and 90% GDP to be threshold levels above which debt becomes a constraint on future growth. The BIS provides debt ratios for 22 developed and 21 emerging economies. As can be seen in the scatter diagram above, the US sits in the lower LH quadrant with a HH debt ratio of 78% and a NFC debt ratio of 84%. Germany, Greece and Italy are the only other developed economies to sit within the same quadrant.
The current structure of US debt is the mirror image of the pre-GFC structure following the significant shift away from HH debt to government debt. The share of HH debt peaked at 44% total debt in 2Q07 and fell to 27% by end 3Q20. In contrast, the share of government has risen from 26% to 44% over the same period.
As the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis noted back in 2018, “The fall in household debt was primarily driven by the fall in mortgage debt that followed the housing crash. The surge in public debt, on the other hand, was partly driven by the large fiscal stimulus packages that were deployed to fight the Great Recession.”
The changing structure of US debt reduces associated risks since the government faces different financial constraints and cannot, as a currency issuer, become insolvent. HHs, NFCs and financial institutions are all “currency users” who face obvious constraints on their levels of debt. “Taking on too much debt can, and does, lead to bankruptcy, foreclosure, and even incarceration” (Kelton, 2020). In contrast, the US government, as a currency issuer, cannot become insolvent in its own currency since it can always make payments as they come due in its own currency.
In the seventh lesson from the money sector, I highlighted an article published by David Andolfatto of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (4 December 2020). In line with my preferred financial sector balances approach, Andolfatto questions the “government as a household” analogy and notes that, “to the extent that government debt is held domestically, it constitutes wealth for the private sector.” From here, and more significantly, he argues that:
“…it seems more accurate to view the national debt less as a form of debt and more as a form of money in circulation…The idea of having to pay back money already in circulation makes little sense, in this context. Of course, not having to worry about paying back the national debt does not mean there is nothing to be concerned about. But if the national debt is a form of money, wherein lies the concern?”
“Does the National Debt Matter?” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, December 2020
Sixth, the risks associated with the level, growth and affordability of HH debt remain moderate in absolute and relative terms. High levels of household indebtedness were an important contributing factor to the GFC and subsequent recession. The HH debt ratio rose to a peak of 99% GDP in 1Q08 well above the 85% BIS threshold level. This ratio is 78% GDP today. Not only was the level of HH debt a matter of concern, but the pace of growth was sending clear warning signals too.
CMMP analysis uses a relative growth factor to analyse the rate of growth in debt. This compares the 3-year CAGR of debt with the 3-year CAGR in nominal GDP. As can be seen in the chart above, the RGF for the US HH sector peaked at 7% in 1Q04, fell and then remained negative for 41 consecutive quarters from 2Q10 until the last reporting quarter (3Q20).
In the context of other developed economies, the risks of excess HH credit growth are much lower in the US than in Norway, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, New Zealand and the UK. Each of these economies are experiencing excess HH credit growth (ie, RGF > 1) despite relatively high debt ratios that exceed the BIS threshold level of 85% GDP.
In terms of affordability risk, the debt service ratio for the US HH sectors is low in absolute terms (7.6%) and in relative terms against its own 10Y average of 8.3% and against other developed economies.
Risks are elevated in the NFC sector, however, due to the recent rates of excess credit growth and affordability concerns but these risks are not exclusive to the US. The NFC sector experienced 33 consecutive quarters of a rising debt ratio since 1Q12 and at 84% GDP is very marginally below the recent peak in 2Q20. Note however, that while the current NFC debt ratio is high in the context of the US, it remains below the 90% BIS threshold.
Of more concern is the current 4ppt rate of excess NFC credit growth. As can be seen, the current RGF is close to previous peaks. This is despite fact that the absolute level of NFC debt is higher than at previous peaks in excess growth. The current RGF places the US among a group of seven developed economies experiencing excess NFC credit growth of more than 4ppt. Within this sample, Sweden, France, Canada, Switzerland and Japan are experiencing higher rates of excess growth despite having higher levels of NFC debt that exceed the BIS maximum threshold level of 90%.
Finally, the highest level of concern relates to the affordability of NFC debt. The current NFC debt service ratio of 47% is only marginally below its all-time high and is 8ppt above its 10-year average of 39%. Among developed economies, this places the US NFC sector among the higher risk sectors, albeit it below the NFC sectors in France, Canada and Sweden.
Conclusion
The risks associated with US debt are more concentrated than systemic and relate mainly to the rate of excess NFC credit growth and its affordability.(Further incentive for the Federal Reserve to keep rates lower for longer?) From a global perspective, debt risks are more elevated in other developed and emerging economies. Some of the highest rates of excess credit growth are occurring in highly indebted economies and affordability risks are increasing within and outside this sub-set despite the low interest rate environment.
Investor attention should not be restricted to US debt simply due to its size – more immediate concerns lie eslewhere.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available seperately.
Risks associated with “excess credit growth”, which had been declining in the pre-Covid period, have re-emerged during the pandemic.
Some of the highest rates of excess credit growth are currently occurring in economies where debt levels exceed maximum threshold levels (Singapore, France, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, Canada).
Affordability risks are also increasing within and outside (Sweden, Switzerland, Norway) this sub-set despite the low interest rate environment.
Risks are more elevated in the corporate (NFC) sector than in the household (HH) sector but are not unique to either the developed market (DM) or emerging market (EM) worlds – one more reason to question the relevance of the current DM v EM distinction
Much of the debate relating to global debt focuses exclusively on the level of debt and, to a lesser extent, on the debt ratio (debt as a percentage of GDP). This analysis highlights how the addition of growth and affordability factors provides a more complete picture of the risks associated with current trends and their investment implications.
Introduction
As noted above, much of the recent debate about global debt has been restricted to its level in absolute terms or as a percentage of GDP. The addition of other factors – the rate of growth in debt, its affordability and, in the case of many EMs, its structure – provides a more complete picture, however.
In this post, I add condsideration of the rate of growth in global debt to my previous analysis in “D…E…B…T, Part II.” The approach is based on the simple relative growth factor (RGF) concept which I have used since the early 1990s as a first step in analysing the sustainability of debt dynamics. I also link both to the affordability of debt as measured by debt service ratios (DSRs).
In short, this approach compares the rate of “excess credit growth” with the level of debt penetration in a given economy. The three-year CAGR in debt is compared with the three-year CAGR in nominal GDP to derive a RGF. This is then compared with the level of debt expressed as a percentage of GDP (the debt ratio).
The concept is simple – one would expect relative high levels of excess credit growth in economies where the level of leverage is relatively low and vice versa. Conversely, red flags are raised when excess credit growth continues in economies that exhibit relatively high levels of leverage or when excess credit growth continues beyond previously observed levels.
The key trends
In the pre-COVID period, the risks associated with excess credit growth had been declining in developed (DM) and emerging (EM) economies (see chart above illustrating rolling RGF trends). In response to the pandemic, however, credit demand has risen while nominal GDP has fallen sharply. As a result, the RGF (as at the end of 3Q20) for all economies, DM and EM have risen to 3%, 2% and 4% respectively. As can be seen, these levels are elevated but remain below those seen in previous cycles during the past 15 years.
Private sector credit snapshots
Importantly, out of the top-ten economies experiencing the highest rates of excess private sector credit, six have private sector debt ratios higher than the threshold levels above which debt is considered a constraint to future growth – Singapore, France, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan and Canada. In the graph above, and in similar ones below, the orange bar indicates where debt ratios exceed the threshold level.
Argentina and Chile have the highest private sector RGFs among the sample of LATEMEA economies. The associated risks are higher in the case of Chile than in Argentina given the two economies debt ratios of 169% GDP and 24% GDP respectively. As highlighted below, the risks in Chile relate primarily to excess growth in the NFC sector.
Within this subset, the debt service ratios in absolute terms and in relation to respective 10-year averages are also relatively high in France, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan and Canada despite the low interest rate environment. Outside this subset, affordability risks are relatively high in Sweden, Switzerland and Norway where DSR’s are relatively high in absolute terms and in relation to each economy’s history.
NFC credit snapshots
Similarly, out of the top-ten economies experiencing the highest rates of excess NFC credit, seven have NFC debt ratios above the threshold level (90% GDP) – Singapore, Chile, France, Canada, Japan, South Korea and Switzerland.
Within this second subset, the debt service ratios in absolute terms and in relation to respective 10-year averages are relatively high in France, Canada, Japan and South Korea. Despite lower rates of excess NFC credit growth affordability risks are also relatively high in Sweden, Norway and the US. (Note that the availability of sector DSRs is more restricted than overall private sector DSRs).
HH credit snapshots
In contrast, out of the top-ten economies experiencing the highest rates of excess HH credit, only two have HH debt ratios above the threshold level – Hong Kong and Singapore. This is not surprising given that HH debt ratios are lower than NFC debt levels in general. Of the 42 BIS reporting countries, 11 have HH debt ratios above the 85% GDP HH threshold level whereas 20 have NFC debt ratios above the 90% GDP NFC threshold level.
That said, experience suggests that the current levels of excess HH credit growth in China and Russia indicate elevated risks, especially in the former economy. In “Too much, too soon?“, posted in November 2019, I highlighted the PBOC’s concerns over HH-sector debt risks – “the debt risks in the HH sector and some low income HHs in some regions are relatively prominent and should be paid attention to.” (PBOC, Financial Stability Report 2019). Excess credit growth remains a key feature nonetheless.
Within this third subset, the debt service ratio in absolute terms and in relation to respective 10-year averages is relatively high in South Korea. Again, despite lower rates of excess HH credit growth, affordability risks are also relatively high in Sweden and Norway.
Conclusion
This summary post extends the analysis of the level of global debt and debt ratios to include an assessment of the rate of growth in debt and its affordability. Together, these factors provide a more complete picture of the sustainability of current debt trends.
Risks associated with excess credit growth are re-emerging and will be a feature of the post-COVID environment going forward. The two key risks here are: (1) some of the highest rates of excess credit growth are currently occurring in economies where debt levels exceed threshold levels; and (2) affordability risks are increasing within (and outside) this sub-set despite the low interest rate environment.
To some extent, little of this is new news – I have been flagging the same risks in an Asia context for some time – and the implications are the same. Despite recent market moves, the secular support for rates remaining “lower-for-longer” remains, albeit with more elevated sustainability risks in the NFC sector.
Revisiting the level and structure of global debt six months on
The key chart
The key message
Global debt hit new highs in absolute terms ($211tr) and as a percentage of GDP (277%) at the end of 3Q20, driven largely by government ($79tr) and NFC debt ($81tr).
Public sector and NFC debt ratios both hit new highs above the maximum threshold level that the BIS considers detrimental to future growth.
These trends provide on-going support for the “lower-for-longer” narrative but also raise concerns about sustainability risks in the NFC sector.
The US and China account for nearly 50% of global debt alone and more than 75% with Japan, France, the UK, Germany, Canada and Italy – but only Japan and France are included in the top-ten most indebted global economies.
The post-GFC period of private sector deleveraging/debt stability in advanced economies has ended as the private sector debt ratio increased to 179% GDP.
China’s accumulation of debt has eclipsed the “EM catch-up story”. Chinese debt now accounts for just under 70% of EM debt and EM x China’s share of global debt has remained unchanged over the past decade.
The traditional distinction between advanced/developed markets and emerging markets is increasingly irrelevant/unhelpful, especially when analysing Asian debt dynamics.
New terms of reference are required for analysing global debt trends that distinguish between economies with excess HH and/or corporate debt and the rest of the world. From this more appropriate foundation, further analysis can be made of the growth and affordability of debt…
D…E…B…T, Part II
Global debt hit new highs in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP at the end of 3Q20, driven largely by public sector debt and NFC debt. According to the BIS, total debt rose from $193tr at the end of 1Q20 to a new high of $211tr. Within this:
Government, NFC and HH debt all hit new absolute highs of $79tr, $81tr and $51tr respectively
The global debt ratio increased from 246% GDP in 1Q20 to a new high of 278% GDP
The public sector debt ratio increased from 88% GDP to 104% GDP and the NFC debt ratio increased from 96% GDP to 107% GDP over the same period. In both cases, the debt ratio was a new high and above the maximum threshold level of 90% above which the BIS considers the level of debt to become a constraint on future growth
The HH debt ratio also increased from 61% GDP to 67% but remains below its historic peak of 69% (3Q09) and the respective BIS threshold level of 85% GDP.
These trends provide on-going support for the “lower-for-longer” narrative but also raise concerns about sustainability especially in the NFC sector.
The US and China account for nearly 50% of global debt, but neither is ranked in the top-15 most indebted economies. At the end of 3Q20, total debt reached $61tr (29% global debt) in the US and $42tr in China (20% global debt). In absolute terms, these two economies are followed by Japan $21tr, France $10tr, UK $8tr, Germany $8tr, Canada $6tr and Italy $tr. In other words, the US and China account for almost a half of global debt and together with the other six economies account for over three-quarters of global debt. Note, however, that only two of these eight economies rank among the top-ten most indebted global economies (% GDP).
The post-GFC period of private sector deleveraging/debt stability in advanced economies has ended as the private sector debt ratio rose to 179% GDP, close to its all-time-high. Following the GFC, the private sector debt ratio in advanced economies had fallen from a peak of 181% GDP in 3Q09 to 151% in 1Q15. It had then stabilised at around the 160% of GDP level.
As discussed in “Are we there yet?”, this had direct implications for the duration and amplitude of money, credit and business cycles, inflation, policy options and the level of global interest rates. In subsequent posts, I will examine the implications of these recent trends on the sustainability and affordability of private sector debt in advanced economies.
China’s accumulation of debt has eclipsed the “EM catch-up story”. Fifteen years ago, China’s debt was just under $3tr and accounted for 35% of total EM debt. At the end of 3Q20, China’s debt had increased to $33tr to account for 67% of total EM debt. The so-called EM catch-up story is in effect, the story of China’s debt accumulation. Excluding China, EM’s share of global debt in unchanged (12%) over the past decade.
The traditional distinction between advanced/developed markets and emerging markets is increasingly irrelevant/unhelpful, especially when analysing Asian debt dynamics. The BIS classifies Asian reporting countries into two categories: three “advanced” economies (Japan, Australia and NZ) and eight emerging economies (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand).
The classification of Japan, Australia and New Zealand as advanced economies is logical but masks different exposures to NFC (Japan) and HH (Australian and New Zealand) debt dynamics.
The remaining grouping is more troublesome as it ignores the wide variations in market structure, growth opportunities, risks and secular challenges. I prefer to consider China, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore as unique markets. China is unique in terms of the level, structure and drivers of debt and in terms of the PBOC’s policy responses. Korea and Hong Kong stand out for having NFC and HH debt ratios that exceed BIS maximum thresholds. Hong Kong and Singapore are distinguished by their roles as regional financial centres but have different HH debt dynamics. Malaysia and Thailand can be considered intermediate markets which leaves India and Indonesia as genuine emerging markets among Asian reporting countries (see “Sustainable debt dynamics – Asia private sector credit”).
New terms of reference are required for analysing global debt trends that distinguish between economies with excess HH and/or corporate debt and the rest of the world. In this case, excess refers to levels that are above the BIS thresholds. Among the BIS reporting economies (and excluding Luxembourg) there are:
Eight economies with excess HH and NFC debt levels: Hong Kong, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland, Canada and South Korea
Eleven economies with excess NFC debt levels: Ireland, France, China, Belgium, Singapore, Chile, Finland, Japan, Spain, Portugal, and Austria
Three economies with excess HH debt levels: Australia, New Zealand, the UK
The RoW with HH and NFC debt levels below the BIS thresholds
These classifications provide a more appropriate foundation for further analysis of the other, key features of global debt – its rate of growth and its affordability. These will be addressed in subsequent posts.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.