Tag: #coco

“FIRE, FIRE II”

The challenge for EA policy makers

The key chart

Change in the stock of COCO-based lending Jan 2009 – June 2021 in EUR bn (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The key message

Policy makers face significant challenges in addressing the implications of rising FIRE-based lending in the euro area.

My previous post highlighted the on-going substitution of productive COCO-based lending for less productive FIRE-based lending in the euro area (EA), noted the lack of COCO-based lending at the aggregate level since January 2009, and examined the implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality.

This post looks behind the aggregate headlines and focuses on three key differences at the country and regional level:

  • First, the share of FIRE-based lending among the EA’s six largest economies/banking markets at the end of 1H21 ranges widely from 65% in the Netherlands to 43% in Italy
  • Second, while the share of FIRE-based lending has increased in each economy, the drivers have been very different
  • Third, the lack of growth in COCO-based lending masks divergent trends between periphery economies (falling stock in Spain and Italy) and core economies (rising stock elsewhere)

Behind each of these differences lie significant variations in the level, structure and growth of debt across the euro area e.g. the Netherlands versus France, Belgium, Spain versus Germany and Italy.

In addressing the negative implications of rising FIRE-based lending in the EA, policy makers must address significant variations that exist at the regional and country level. A “one-size-fits-all” response will not suffice.

FIRE, FIRE II – three key differences, six key charts

Balance of lending – FIRE vs COCO

FIRE-based versus COCO-based lending as at end 1H21 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The balance between FIRE-based and COCO-based lending varies widely across the EA. Among the six largest banking sectors that account for c.90% of total credit, FIRE-based lending ranges from 65% of total private sector credit in the Netherlands to 43% in Italy (see chart above). Across the 19 EA economies, the low end of this range extends down to 39% in Greece and 41% in Slovakia while Ireland (61%) joins the Netherland and Belgium with a relatively high share of FIRE-based lending.

In the Netherlands and Belgium, the two economies with the highest share of FIRE-based lending, the NFC debt ratios of 152% and 166% GDP respectively are well above the BIS threshold of 90%. In both cases, the NFC sectors have been deleveraging with debt ratios falling from peaks of 180% GDP in the Netherlands (1Q15) and 171% GDP in Belgium (2Q16). The HH sector dynamics are very different however, re-enforcing the message that the EA money sectors are far from a homogenous group (see below). In the Netherlands, the HH sector has also been deleveraging since 3Q10 when the debt ratio hit 121% GDP. At the end of 1H21, the ratio had fallen to 105% GDP. In contrast, HH leverage is increasing in Belgium with the debt ratio hitting a new high (albeit a relatively low one) of 66% GDP in 2Q21.

Drivers of change in lending balance

Change in share of FIRE-based lending and share of total lending as at end 1H21 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

While the share of FIRE-based lending has increased in each economy since January 2009 (see chart above), the drivers have been very different (see chart below). Spain saw the largest change in percentage points (11ppt) as the fall in the outstanding stock of COCO-based loans (-€488bn) was greater than the fall in the stock of FIRE-based loans (-€125bn). Italy saw the second largest change (10ppt) driven by a fall in the stock of COCO-based loans (-€153bn) and a rise in the stock of FIRE-based loans (€125bn). In contrast, France’s 6ppt increase from 46% to 52% loans reflected the largest absolute increases in both FIRE-based (€715bn) and COCO-based lending (€715bn).

Changes in COCO- and FIRE-based loans since January 2009 by country (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Core versus periphery

Core vs Periphery – change in COCO-based lending since January 2009 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The lack of growth in COCO-based lending at the aggregate level masks divergent trends at the regional level between periphery economies (falling stock) and core economies (rising stock). The stock of COCO-based loans fell -€79bn in aggregate between January 2009 and June 2021 (NFC-€130bn, consumer credit +€51bn). In the core economies of Germany and France, the stock of COCO-based loans rose by €674bn (€241bn in Germany, €433bn in France). In the periphery economies of Spain and Italy, however, the stock fell by -€641bn (-€488bn in Spain, -€153bn in Italy).

Core vs Periphery – change in FIRE-based lending since January 2009 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Similarly, the stock of FIRE-based lending rose €1,349bn between January 2009 and June 2021. In Germany and France the stock of FIRE-based loans increased €1,224bn (€509bn in Germany, €715bn in France). In Spain and Italy there was no growth as the -€125bn decline in Spanish FIRE-based loans counterbalanced the €125bn increase in Italian FIRE-based loans.

Background debt dynamics

NFC debt ratios (x-axis) versus HH debt ratios (y-axis) and BIS threshold levels (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Behind each of these differences lies significant variations in the level, structure and growth of debt across the euro area that complicate required policy response further. The chart above plots the EA and the six largest markets in terms of NFC and HH debt ratios versus the maximum threshold limits identified by the BIS as the level above which debt becomes detrimental to future growth.

At the aggregate level, the EA is characterised by excess NFC debt ratios (115% GDP versus 90% GDP threshold level). The HH debt ratio of 63% GDP remains below the 85% GDP HH threshold level. The Netherlands is unique here in the sense that both NFC and HH debt ratios are above the respective thresholds. France, Belgium and Spain all have excess NFC debt ratios but very different NFC debt dynamics (rising rapidly in France and Belgium while falling in Spain). In contrast, Germany and Italy have neither excess HH nor excess NFC debt ratios.

Conclusion

The on-going substitution of productive COCO-based lending for less productive FIRE-based lending has negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality in the EA. A policy response is required. Aggregate trends mask significant differences at the country and regional level, however, which complicate policy choices. A “one-size-fits-all” response will not suffice.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“FIRE, FIRE!”

Why the shift towards FIRE-based lending matters

The key chart

Outstanding stock of COCO-based loans since 2003 in EURbn (Source: ECB, CMMP)

The key message

Bank lending to the private sector falls into two distinct types: (1) lending to support productive enterprise (“COCO-based”); and (2) lending to finance the sale and purchase of exiting assets (“FIRE-based”). While the stock of total loans to the euro area (EA) private sector hit a new high at the end of 1H21, the stock of productive COCO-based lending remains below its January 2009 peak. In other words, the (aggregate) growth in lending since January 2009 has come exclusively from FIRE-based lending. This accounts for 52% of all outstanding loans now versus 45% in January 2009.

This shift matters because while COCO-based lending supports both production AND income formation, FIRE-based lending supports capital gains through higher asset prices but does not lead directly to income generation. Neither QE nor COVID-19 caused this shift but both added momentum to it. This trend provides support for Minsky’s hypothesis that, over the course of a long financial cycle, there will be a shift towards riskier and more speculative sectors. The implications extend well beyond the over-valuation of residential property prices. Current dynamics, fuelled in part by current policy, have wider, negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality. Time for another policy reboot?

FIRE, FIRE – what has happened?

Outstanding stock of total loans (EURmn) split between the two forms of lending (Source: ECB, CMMP)

Bank lending to the private sector falls into two distinct types: (1) lending the support productive enterprise; and (2) lending to finance the sale and purchase of exiting assets (see chart above). The former includes lending to corporates (NFCs) and household (HH) consumer credit. Such loans are referred to collectively as “COCO-based” loans (COrporate and COnsumer). The latter includes loans to non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and HH mortgage or real estate. These loans are referred to collective as “FIRE-based” loans (FInancials and Real Estate).

Change in stock of loans (EURbn) by type since January 2009 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

While the stock of total loans to the euro area (EA) private sector hit a new high at the end of 1H21, the stock of COCO-based lending remains below its January 2009. Total PSC rose €1,200bn over the period to €12,071bn (see chart above). Total COCO-based loans fell -€79bn (NFC -€130bn, consumer credit €51bn). Total FIRE-based loans, in contrast, rose €1,349bn (mortgages €1,356bn, financial institutions -€55bn; insurance companies and pension funds €48bn).

Trends in stock of FIRE-based lending (EURbn) and market share of total PSC (Source: ECB; CMMP)

In other words, (aggregate) growth in lending since January 2009 has come exclusively from FIRE-based lending. In June 2021, FIRE-based lending hit a new high of €5,937bn. This is 29% higher than the January 2009 level. Its market share has increased from 45% to 52% over the period.

FIRE, FIRE – why this matters

This matters because COCO-based lending supports both production and income formation. Loans to NFCs are used to finance production, which leads to sales revenues, wages paid, profits realised and economic expansions. So while an increase in NFC debt will increase debt in the economy, it also increases the income required to finance it. Consumer debt also supports productive enterprise since it drives demand for goods and services, helping NFCs to generate sales, profits and wages, It differs from NFC debt to the extent that HHs take on an additional liability since the debt does not generate income.

In contrast, FIRE-based lending supports capital gains through higher asset process but does not lead directly to income generation. Loans to NBFIs are used primarily to finance transactions in financial assets rather than to produce, sell or buy actual output. Such credit may lead to an increase in the price of financial assets but does not lead (directly) to income generation. Mortgage or real estate lending is used to finance transactions in pre-existing assets. It typically generates asset gains as opposed to income (at least directly).

Wider implications

Growth rate (% YoY) in EA house prices (Source: Eurostat; CMMP)

Much recent attention has focused on the impact of the COVID-19 and unorthodox monetary policy on residential property prices (see “Herd immunity”). This analysis shows that the shift towards FIRE-based lending pre-dates both, however, and has much wider and negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality in the EA:

  • Leverage: while COCO-based lending increases absolute debt levels, it also increases incomes (albeit with a lag). Hence, overall debt levels need not rise as a consequence. In contrast, FIRE-based lending increases debt and may increase asset prices but does not increase the purchasing power of the economy as a while. Hence, it is likely to result in higher levels of leverage.
  • Growth: COCO-based lending supports growth both by increasing the value-add from final goods and services (“output”) and an increase in profits and wages (“income”). FIRE-based lending typically only affects GDP growth indirectly.
  • Financial stability: the returns from FIRE-based lending (investment returns, property prices etc) are typically more volatile than returns from COCO-bases lending and may affect the solvency of lenders and borrowers. In the May 2021, Financial Stability Review, the ECB noted that, “a combination of buoyant house price growth and the uncertain macro backdrop kept measures of overvaluation elevated.” Moreover, house price growth during the pandemic has generally been higher for those countries that were already experiencing pronounced overvaluation prior to the pandemic.”
  • Inequality: the returns from FIRE-based lending are typically concentrated in higher-income segments of the populations, with any subsequent wealth effects increasing income inequality.
Stock and market share of COCO- and FIRE-based lending (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Conclusion

Neither QE nor COVID-19 caused the shift away from productive COCO-based lending towards FIRE-based lending. Both did, however, add momentum to a pre-existing trend which has seen no growth in the stock of productive lending over the past 12 years.

This trend provides support for Minsky’s hypothesis that, over the course of a long financial cycle, there will be a shift towards riskier and more speculative sectors. The implications extend well beyond the over-valuation of residential property prices. Current private sector dynamics, fuelled in part by current policy, have negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality. Time for another policy reboot?

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.