The key chart
Recent trends in monthly flows (EUR bn) and YoY growth rates in EA monetary aggregates (Source: ECB; CMMP)
The key message
If you wanted to “create panic” about euro area (EA) banks you could focus exclusively on negative YoY growth rates and monthly outflows in narrow money (M1), and then develop a narrative about money destruction and an impending credit crisis. After all, the EA is experiencing the fastest contraction in M1 since the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, and banks have experienced eight consecutive months of negative flows in narrow money too.
Unfortunately, there are a number of problems associated with this “panic narrative”. It ignores simple concepts such as opportunity cost and portfolio rebalancing and mispresents the causal links in money creation.
- The opportunity cost problem: unprecedented tightening by the ECB has led to a rapid increase in the opportunity cost of holding ON deposits, in contrast to most of the past decade. It has triggered a partial reallocation of ON deposits to other ST deposits. M2-M1 (other ST deposits) increased 21% YoY in April 2023 – also the fastest rate since the creation of the EMU.
- The portfolio rebalancing problem: The phasing out of net asset purchases and TLTROs has incentivised the issuance of bank bonds (up €170bn) since September 2022. This has led to portfolio rebalancing away from deposits (down €200bn over the same period) to longer term liabilities that do not form part of monetary aggregates (by definition).
- The causal link problem: the principal way in which bank deposits are created is through commercial banks making loans. Banks are not simply intermediaries that take in deposits and then lend them out (“loanable funds theory”). Instead, banks create money. Growth in private sector credit peaked in September 2022 (7.0% YoY) and has slowed to 3.3% in April 2023, however. This reflects the relatively rapid pass through from higher policy rates to the cost of borrowing, weaker loan demand and tighter credit standards. Slower credit growth implies slower deposit growth (ceteris paribus).
In short, recent EA monetary dynamics are unprecedented in some respects. They are not a cause for panic over EA banks, however. They reflect instead a combination of an increase in the opportunity cost of holding money, portfolio rebalancing, weaker credit demand and tighter credit standards.
This is not to suggest that the message from EA banks is a positive one. On the contrary, it remains one of weaker economic activity and a challenging policy context in which the ECB is expected to continue tightening as economic stresses mount.
An important message, but a very different one to the “bank panic narratives” seen elsewhere…
If you wanted to create panic about EA banks
Focus on narrow money
Growth rates (% YoY) in EA narrow money since 1999 (Source: ECB; CMMP)
Narrow money (M1) in the EA is contracting at the fastest rate since the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 (see chart above). The annual growth rate in M1 turned negative in January 2023 (-0.8%) and has decelerated each month since then: -2.7% YoY in February 2023; -4.2% YoY in March 2023 and -5.2% YoY in April 2023.
Monthly flows (EUR bn) in narrow money since June 2022 (Source: ECB; CMMP)
EA banks have also experienced eight consecutive monthly outflows of narrow money since September 2022, largely due to the outflow of overnight deposits. The outflow in April 2023 was €-75bn, compared with €-135bn in March 2023, and €-140bn in February 2023 (see chart above).
From here, it is tempting to create a “panic narrative” for EA banks. Tempting, but wrong…
Problems with the panic narrative – “opportunity cost”
Growth rate in M3 (% YoY) and contribution from ON deposits and other components (ppt) (Source: ECB; CMMP)
The first problem with the panic narrative is that it ignores the fundamental economic concept of opportunity cost.
Note that for most of the past decade, narrow money has been the main driver of EA broad money growth. The chart above illustrates the growth rate in broad money (M3) and the contributions to growth made by ON deposits (the light blue columns) and all other M3 components (the maroon columns).
The exceptionally large contribution and accumulation of ON deposits in the EA (and elsewhere) over the period reflects (1) the extended period of low interest rates and, more recently, (2) the COVID-19 pandemic. Unorthodox monetary policy reduced the opportunity cost of holding ON deposits dramatically and the pandemic resulted in a sharp rise in both forced and precautionary savings.
Policy tightening by the ECB since June 2022 has been notable for both its scale and pace. The pass through from higher policy rates to the cost of overnight deposits has been very slow/limited and has lagged the pass through to the cost of other forms of ST deposits, however.
In short, the opportunity cost of holding ON deposits has risen rapidly since the start of policy tightening.
Spread between rates on other HH ST deposits and HH ON deposits (ppt) (Source: ECB; CMMP)
The chart above illustrates the spread (or opportunity cost) between HH deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months and deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years – the components of M2-M1 – versus HH ON deposits over the past 20 years.
The opportunity costs of holding notice deposits, and terms deposits with maturities of up to one year and between one and two years hit lows of 32bp, 13bp and 18bp in December 2021, June 2021 and March 2021 respectively. Since then they have risen to 106bp, 194bp and 194bp respectively, levels not seen since early 2013.
Spread between rates on other NFC ST deposits and NFC ON deposits (ppt) (Source: ECB; CMMP)
The chart above illustrates the spread (opportunity cost) between NFC time deposits – again M2-M1- and NFC ON deposits over the past twenty years. In this case the opportunity costs of holding term deposits hit lows of -33bp in November 2021 for maturities up to one year and 4bp for maturities between one and two years. Since, then they have risen to 215bp and 243bp respectively, levels last seen during the GFC.
Growth rates (% YoY) in M1 and M2-M1 since 1999 (Source: ECB; CMMP)
ECB policy has triggered a reallocation of funds from overnight deposits to other ST deposits. The growth rate in M2-M1 rose to 21% YoY in April. This is, in turn, the fastest rate of growth since the creation of the EMU.
Monthly flows (EUR bn) on EA monetary aggregates (Source: ECB; CMMP)
Inflows into other ST liabilities, M2-M1 and, to a lesser extent, M3-M2 have been important but still insufficient to compensate fully for the outflows in overnight deposits (see chart above). Hence, monthly flows of M3 have been negative in six of the past seven months.
Problems with the panic narrative – “portfolio rebalancing”
The second problem with the panic narrative is that it ignores portfolio rebalancing to other financial instruments. Note that money supply is derived from the banks’ ST liabilities and does not include longer-term liabilities since they are not close substitutes for money.
According to the ECB, bank bond issuance has increased by almost €170bn since September 2022. The terms and conditions of TLRTO II were recalibrated at this point resulting in sizeable repayments of funds borrowed under the programme and an increase in (more expensive) bond issuance. Bond issuance was close to total c€200bn decrease in the bank deposits over the period.
In short, M1 dynamics reflect both a substitution of ON deposits with time deposits (opportunity cost) and shifts to bank bonds (portfolio rebalancing) and, to a lesser extent money market fund shares. Funding costs may be rising but there is no evidence of liquidity-driven panic.
Problems with the panic narrative – “causal links in money creation”
The final problem with the panic narrative is that it misrepresents the causal links in money creation. Contrary to what is often taught (“loanable funds theory”), banks are not intermediaries that take in deposits first and then lend them out. Instead banks create money.
“Whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money”
(Bank of England, 2014).
Growth rates in (adjusted) private sector credit (% YoY) since 2003 (Source: ECB; CMMP)
The principal way in which bank deposits are created is through commercial banks making loans. Growth in private sector lending peaked in September 2022 at 7% YoY, however (see graph above). In April 2023, growth has slowed to 3.3% YoY from 3.9% YoY in March 2023 and 4.3% YoY in February 2023. The moderation in bank lending reflects the relatively rapid pass through from policy rates to the cost of borrowing, weaker demand and tighter credit standards.
Growth rates in M3, M1 and private sector credit (% YoY) (Source: ECB; CMMP)
Conclusion – focus on the wider message not the panic narrative
In short, recent EA monetary dynamics are unprecedented in some areas. They are not a cause for panic over EA banks, however. They reflect instead a combination of an increase in the opportunity cost of holding money, portfolio rebalancing, weaker credit demand and tighter credit standards.
This is not to suggest that the message from EA banks is a positive one. On the contrary, it remains one of weaker economic activity and a challenging policy context in which the ECB is expected to continue tightening as economic stresses mount. An important message, but a very different one to the “bank panic narratives” seen elsewhere…
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.