“Euro area re-synching – part 2”

The implications for asset allocation

The key chart

The sharp and co-ordinated slowdown in EA money and private sector credit (% YoY, real)
(Source: ECB; CMMP)

The key message

What are the implications of the re-synching of euro area money and credit cycles for asset allocation and what are the current messages from the money sector telling us?

Growth rates in narrow money (M1) and loans to the private sector display relatively robust relationships with the business cycle over time. M1, household (HH) and corporate (NFC) credit also enjoy leading, coincident and lagging relationships with GDP respectively and can be very useful inputs into asset allocation processes, therefore.

The recovery in money and credit cycles in the post-GFC period broadly followed this stylised pattern. Other macro-factors complicated the wider interpretation of these trends, however. Interest rate effects (initially) and the COVID-19 pandemic (more recently) had a more important impact on narrow money growth than cyclical factors, for example. At the same time, extended periods of private sector deleveraging resulted in HH and NFC credit growth lagging GDP growth for much of the past decade.

That said, the overall message has been clear – while money growth has exceeded GDP growth over the past decade, credit growth has lagged it. The consequences for macro policy choices of this extended dynamic was clear, even before the pandemic hit.

With money and credit cycles re-synching now, inflation is the key challenge in interpreting current messages from the money sector.

Optimists might note that the slowdown in monetary growth reflects a sharp moderation in deflationary money flows into overnight deposits, and will be encouraged by the resilient HH and recovering NFC credit demand (in nominal terms).

In contrast, pessimists might prefer the more traditional approach described above. For them, the very sharp and co-ordinated slowdown in money and credit growth in real terms with be a far more alarming message, especially for those positioned for economic recovery.  

Euro area re-synching – part 2

As a macro strategist, economist and global investor, I have always been interested in the relationship between money, credit and business cycles and the implications for asset allocation.

Growth rates in narrow money (M1) and loans to the private sector display relatively robust relationships with the business cycle over time. M1, household (HH) and corporate (NFC) credit also enjoy leading, coincident and lagging relationships with GDP respectively and can be very useful inputs into asset allocation processes, therefore. Note that these relationships tend to be stronger with reference to turning points than to the amplitude of growth.

The recovery in money and credit followed the stylised pattern post-GFC (% YoY, real)
(Source: ECB; CMMP)

The recovery in money and credit cycles followed this stylised pattern in the post-GFC period (see chart above). Real M1 bottomed in July 2011 (-1.4%) and turned positive in May 2012. Real HH credit bottomed next in September in 2012 (-2.3%) and turned positive in December 2014. Finally, real NFC credit bottomed in June 2013 (-4.6%) and turned positive in November 2015. Other macro-factors complicated the wider interpretation of these trends, however.  

Trends (% YoY) in real GDP and real M1 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Interest rate effects (initially) and the COVID-19 pandemic (more recently) had a more important impact on narrow money growth than cyclical factors, for example (see chart above). 

Interest rate and cyclical effects are typically the main factors affecting trends in narrow money, with the latter being more relevant for asset allocation purposes.

While real M1 continued to exhibit leading indicator qualities, strong demand for overnight deposits (within M1), driven by their increasing low opportunity cost, suggest that interest rate effects had a greater impact than cyclical factors over much of the past decade. The COVID-19 pandemic also resulted in dramatic increases in forced and precautionary savings, again largely in the form of overnight deposits. This compounded the challenges of interpreting these dynamics (see “Don’t confuse the message”).

Trends (% YoY) in real GDP and real HH credit (Source: ECB; CMMP)

At the same time, extended periods of private sector deleveraging resulted in HH and NFC credit growth lagging GDP growth for much of the past decade.

The chart above illustrates how real HH credit has enjoyed a broadly coincident relationship with GDP for most of the period. That said, it also shows that the EA HH sector was engaged in an extended period of passive deleveraging between March 2010 and March 2019 with real growth in HH credit lagging real growth in GDP.

Similarly, the chart below illustrates how NFC credit has also enjoyed a broadly lagging relationship with real GDP growth. Again, the analysis and interpretation is challenged by an extended period of NFC deleveraging. Growth in NFC credit lagged behind real GDP growth from December 2009 to May 2016 and to July 2018, in a more sustained fashion.

Trends (% YoY) in real GDP and real NFC credit (Source: ECB; CMMP)

That said, the overall message has been clear – while money growth has exceeded GDP growth over the past decade, credit growth has lagged it. The consequences for macro policy choices of this extended dynamic was clear, even before the pandemic hit.

Monthly HH deposit flows as a multiple of pre-pandemic levels (Source: ECB; CMMP)

With money and credit cycles re-synching now, inflation is the key challenge in interpreting current messages from the money sector. Optimists might note that the slowdown in monetary growth reflects a sharp moderation in deflationary money flows into overnight deposits (see chart above), and will be encouraged by the resilient HH and recovering NFC credit demand, in nominal terms (see chart below).

Growth trends (% YoY, nominal) in HH and NFC credit (Source: ECB; CMMP)

In contrast, pessimists might prefer the more traditional approach described above. For them, the very sharp and co-ordinated slowdown in money and credit growth in real terms (see chart below) will be a far more alarming message, especially for those positioned for economic recovery. 

The alarming and coordinate slowdown in real money and credit growth (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.