UK – Page 3 – Chris Mallin Macro Perspectives

“Clues from consumer credit III”

Converging messages but different sub plots

The key chart

Monthly consumer credit flows as a multiple (x) of pre-pandemic average flows (Source: FRED; BoE; CMMP)

The key message

The messages from the US, UK and euro area (EA) money sectors are converging around a common theme – downside risks to household (HH) consumption and economic growth.

The consumer credit dynamics behind these messages remain very different, however – sharply slowing demand in the US, surprisingly resilient demand in the UK, and consistently subdued demand in the EA (see key chart above).

The Federal Reserve, Bank of England (BoE) and European Central Bank (ECB) face delicate balancing acts between reducing inflation (their core mandates) and weaker growth. Higher interest rates are supposed to deter borrowing and hence reduce aggregate demand and inflation. At the same time, increased borrowing is one way that households (HHs) can offset the pressures of falling real incomes. How is this playing out so far, in 1Q23?

Demand for consumer credit remains slightly above pre-pandemic levels in both the US and the UK suggesting that risks towards more persistent inflation remain. The very rapid pace of adjustment in US consumer credit demand complicates matters, however, and suggests that Chair Powell may have a more challenging task here than Governor Bailey. In contrast, consistently subdued EA consumer credit demand suggest that the risks to the ECB’s balancing act lie more towards weaker growth/recession. An altogether different challenge for President Lagarde, the subject of my next post…

Clues from consumer credit III

Monthly consumer credit flows tell us a great deal about the relative strength of the US, UK and EA economies and the risks associated with growth. The immediate response of HHs in the US, UK and EA was consistent – they all repaid consumer credit. The subsequent responses were anything but consistent, however (for background see “Clues from consumer credit”, November 2022).

US dynamics

Trends in US monthly consumer credit flows ($bn) (Source: FRED; CMMP)

Between March 2022 and December 2022, monthly flows of US consumer credit were more than double their pre-pandemic average. Back in November 2022, I suggested that the risks to the US growth outlook lay in the sustainability of these flows in the face of rising borrowing costs. In the first two months of 2023, these flows slowed sharply to 1.6x and 1.1x pre-pandemic averages (see chart above). In short, demand for consumer credit is moderating sharply rather than collapsing, at least so far.

UK dynamics

Trends in UK monthly consumer credit flows (£bn) (Source: BoE; CMMP)

UK demand for consumer credit has been surprisingly resilient. Over the past twelve months, monthly flows have remained close to their pre-pandemic average level of £1.2bn. The 3m MVA of monthly flows was 1.1x the pre-pandemic average in both January and February 2023, up from 0.7x in October 2022 (see chart above).

EA dynamics

Trends in EA monthly consumer credit flows (EURbn) (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The theme in the EA has been one of consistently subdued demand for consumer credit. The 3m MVA flow fell to €1.1bn in February 2023, down from €1.2bn in January, only 0.3x the pre-pandemic average flow (see chart above). The key message in the EA has been that consumer credit flows have failed to recover to their pre-pandemic levels, in contrast to trends observed in both the US and the UK.

Conclusion

The Federal Reserve, Bank of England (BoE) and the European Central Bank (ECB) face delicate balancing acts between reducing inflation (their core mandates) and weaker growth. Higher interest rates are supposed to deter borrowing and hence reduce aggregate demand and inflation. At the same time, increased borrowing is one way that households (HHs) can offset the pressures of falling real incomes. How is this playing out in 1Q23?

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Different balancing acts!”

The BoE and ECB face different challenges from divergent consumer credit trends

The key chart

UK and EA consumer credit flows expressed as a multiple of pre-pandemic average flows (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The key message

The Bank of England (BoE) and the ECB face different balancing acts. Both have achieved success in deflating their respective mortgage markets and slowing growth in less-productive FIRE-based lending. Divergent trends in consumer credit demand point to different challenges, however, in terms of balancing household (HH) consumption and inflation (BoE) and HH consumption and growth (ECB).

Increased borrowing is one way that HHs can offset the pressures of falling real incomes. Monthly consumer credit flows in the UK dipped slightly in February 2023 from January’s recent high, but remain 1.2x their pre-pandemic level. In contrast, monthly consumer credit flows in the EA remain well below (0.6x) their respective pre-pandemic level.

Higher interest rates are supposed to deter borrowing and hence reduce aggregate demand and inflation. Resilient UK consumer credit demand suggests that the risks to the BoE’s balancing act lie towards inflation that is more persistent. In contrast, subdued EA consumer credit demand suggests that the risks to the ECB’s balancing act lie towards weaker growth/recession. Neither are easy to manage…

Different balancing acts – the details

UK consumer credit flows

The monthly flow of UK consumer credit decreased to £1.4bn in February 2023, down from the recent high of £1.7bn in January 2023 but above December 2022’s monthly flow of £0.8bn. February’s monthly flow was 1.2x the pre-pandemic flow of £1.2bn. The 3m MVA of UK consumer credit flows remained at £1.3bn, 1.1x the pre-pandemic flow (see chart below).

Trends in UK monthly consumer credit flows (Source: BoE; CMMP)

EA consumer credit flows

The monthly flow of EA consumer credit rebounded to €1.9bn in February, but remained only 0.55x the pre-pandemic average flow of €3.4bn. The 3m MVA flow fell to €1.1bn, from €1.2bn in January, 0.33x the pre-pandemic average flow. They key point here is that, in contrast to trends observed in the UK (and the US), consumer credit flows have failed to recover to their pre-pandemic levels (see chart below).

Trends in EA monthly consumer credit flows (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Conclusion

Trends in consumer credit demand matter because increased borrowing is one way that UK and EA HHs can offset the pressures from falling disposable incomes (along with reduced savings). Consumer credit is also the second most important element of productive COCO-based lending, after corporate debt. It supports productive enterprise since it drives demand for goods and services, hence helping corporates to generate sales, profits and wages.

Higher interest rates are supposed to deter borrowing and hence reduce aggregate demand. Resilient UK consumer credit demand suggests that the risks to the BoE’s balancing act lie towards inflation that is more persistent. In contrast, subdued EA consumer credit demand suggests that the risks to the ECB’s balancing act lie towards weaker growth/recession. Neither are easy…

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Pschitt…”

The sound of deflating UK and EA mortgage markets is getting louder

The key chart

**Monthly UK and EA mortgage flows expressed as a multiple of pre-pandemic average flows** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The key message

“Pschitt” – the sound of deflating UK and EA mortgage markets is getting louder.

Monthly mortgage flows have fallen well-below pre-pandemics levels in both regions (only 0.5x in the UK and 0.3x in the EA). Monthly flows have also recorded three and four consecutive months of below pre-pandemic average levels in the UK and EA respectively (on a 3m MVA basis). The rate of slowdown is particularly sharp in the EA. EA monthly flows have fallen from €25.9bn in June 2022 (2.1x pre-pandemic flows) to only €4.2bn in February 2023 (0.3x pre-pandemic flows).

These trends matter because mortgage demand typically displays a co-incident relationship with real GDP. In this context, February’s mortgage data re-enforces the messages from the UK and EA money sectors – central banks continue to tighten policy as the risks to the economic outlook intensify.

“Pschitt…”

Monthly mortgage flows in the UK and EA have fallen well below pre-pandemic level as air continues to escape from the regions’ RRE markets (see key chart above).

The 3m MVA of UK mortgage flows (£1.8bn) fell to 0.5x the pre-pandemic average flow of £3.9bn in February 2023. This marks three consecutive months of below pre-pandemic flows. The 3m MVA of EA mortgage flows (€4.2bn) fell to only 0.3x the pre-pandemic average flow of €12.5bn. The EA has seen four consecutive months of below pre-pandemic flows.

The rate of slowdown in mortgage lending flows is particularly sharp in the EA. Monthly flows have fallen from €25.9bn in June 2022 (2.1x pre-pandemic flows) to €4.2bn in February 2023 (0.3x pre-pandemic flows). This compares with respective multiples of 1.3x (June 2022) and 0.5x (February 2023) for UK mortgage flows.

Monthly mortgage flows – UK details

**UK monthly mortgage flow dynamics**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

Monthly UK mortgage flows fell to £0.7bn in February 2023, down from £2.0bn in January 2023 (see chart above). In relation to the pre-pandemic period, this is the lowest level of net borrowing since April 2016. February’s flow was only 0.2x the pre-pandemic flow of £3.9bn and well below the recent March 2022 peak of £7.5bn (1.9x pre-pandemic flows.)

The silver lining to these dark clouds was the fact that net approvals for house purchases increased to 43,500 in February from 39,600 in January. This was the first monthly increase in approvals since August 2022 and is important because approvals are an indicator of future borrowing.

Monthly mortgage flows – EA details

**EA monthly mortgage flow dynamics** (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Monthly EA mortgage flows rebounded to €5.1bn in February 2023, up from €2.8bn in January 2023 (see chart above). February’s flow was still only 0.4x the pre-pandemic average flow of €12.6bn and marks five consecutive months of below pre-pandemic average flows since October 2022.

Why the slowdown in mortgage flows matters

Mortgage demand typically displays a co-incident relationship with real GDP. In this context, February’s data re-enforces the messages from the UK and EA money sectors – central banks continue to tighten policy as the risks to the economic outlook intensify.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Behind a nation of non-savers”

The largest fall in UK real living standards since records began

The key chart

**Trends and OBR forecasts for UK households sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

The key message

Hidden behind the headlines of yesterday’s (15 March 2023) UK budget are three important trends:

The shift from large UK household (HH) surpluses (the main counterpart to government deficits) to…
…little or no net HH savings or borrowings…
…and rising financial inequality

Official OBR forecasts suggest that UK living standards will experience the largest two-year fall in real living standards since records began, bringing real HH disposable income (RHDI) per capita back to 2014-15 levels. Drawdowns on HH savings will not fully compensate for falling RHDIs, hitting consumption and growth in the process.

Expect these trends and rising financial inequality to be centre stage in the build up to the next UK general election – even if they were missing from yesterday’s budget coverage.

Behind a nation of non-savers

UK HHs built up large financial surpluses during the COVID-pandemic and the energy crisis. These surpluses were the main counterpart to the UK government’s large fiscal deficit (see chart below).

**The impact of COVID on UK HH and government sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

According to latest OBR forecasts, the HH sector will move from a net lending position in 2022 to balance in 2023, however, as savings are drawn down to support consumption (see key chart above).

What factors are behind a nation of non-savers, and what do they mean for the UK’s economic and political outlook?

**Trends and forecasts for RHDI (% YoY)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

The OBR expects RHDI to fall by 2.6% in 2023, as inflation (4.9%) continues to outstrip nominal earnings growth (3.6%). This follows a fall of 2.5% in 2022 (see chart above).

**Trends and forecasts for RHDI per capita (£ thousands)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

The OBR also forecasts that RHDI per person (a measure of living standards) will fall by 6% between FY22 and FY 24 – the largest two-year fall in real living standards since records began in the 1950s. If correct, RHDI per person would fall to its lowest level since FY2015 (see chart above).

In response, HHs can either save less, borrow more and/or consume less. The OBR’s forecasts focus on the first factor. HH’s saving is expected to fall to zero in 2023 and 2024 to “support consumption in the face of weak real income growth.” As the “cost-of-living crisis” eases, the savings ratio is forecast to recover to around 1%, still well below the post-financial crisis average (see chart below).

**Trends and forecasts for HH savings ratio (% disposable income)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

Lower savings will only partially offset the drop in real incomes, however. This means that private consumption will fall in 2023 by 0.8%. Note that the OBR estimates that this fall would be 1.5ppt higher if the savings ratio remained at 2022 levels. Looking further ahead, the forecasts suggest that consumption growth recovers to an average 1.7% a year out to 1Q28 – better than forecast in November, but still unexciting.

**HH savings ratio by income decile (% disposable income)**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

What is missing here is the outlook for financial inequality. Lower-income HHs have much less flexibility to adjust their spending in response to rising prices and are less likely to have a cushion of savings to protect them. Recall that HHs in the bottom three income deciles save less than 6% of their gross income. This contrasts with HHs in the top two income deciles who save more than 30% of their gross income (see chart above).

Conclusion

Official forecasts suggest that UK living standards will experience the largest two-year fall in real living standards since records began, bringing real HH disposable income (RHDI) per capita back to 2014-15 levels. Drawdowns on HH savings will not fully compensate for falling RHDIs, hitting consumption and growth in the process.

Expect these trends and rising financial inequality to be centre stage in the build up to the next UK general election – even if they were missing from yesterday’s budget coverage.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Still unbalanced and dependent”

OBR forecasts present a brighter outlook, but fundamental challenges remain

The key chart

**Trends and OBR forecasts for UK sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

The key message

The OBR’s latest “Economic and fiscal outlook” (published 15 March 2023) presents a brighter outlook for the UK economic and fiscal outlook – a shorter and shallower downturn, higher medium term output and lower budget deficits and public debt.

Viewed from our preferred sector balances perspective, however, the forecasts indicate that fundamental challenges and economic imbalances remain.

According to the OBR….

While the Chancellor and other fiscal hawks celebrate lower deficits, the UK’s household (HH) sector will move from a large surplus to a balance as savings are drawn down to support consumption during the squeeze on real disposable incomes. (This means no net HH saving or borrowing over a sustained period – really??). Private consumption will still fall in 2023, however (by 0.8%), as lower savings will only partially offset the decline in incomes.

Corporate (NFC) investment will disappoint too. The NFC sector moves from a modest surplus (ie, disinvestment) to balance as investment picks up, but only gradually.

With the private sector running small surpluses (as opposed to the small deficits forecast in November 2022), borrowing from the rest of the world remains sizeable and persistent.

In short, the OBR expects a return to the pre-pandemic world of economic imbalances. The good news, for what it’s worth, is that the private sector is forecast to run a small surplus rather than a deficit as before (and as predicted in November 2022). The bad news is that the UK economy is forecast to remain heavily dependent on net borrowing from abroad. A familiar story…

Six charts that matter

**The impact of COVID on UK domestic sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

Don’t forget the context (see chart above)!

The counterpart to the large government debt built up during the pandemic (-26% GDP, June 2020) was large financial surpluses for UK households (+18% GDP, June 2020) and, to a lesser extent, UK corporations (+7% GDP).

From here, and according to the OBR….

**Trends and OBR forecasts for government net borrowing (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

**Trends and OBR forecasts for HH sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

**Trends and OBR forecasts for NFC sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

**Trends and OBR forecasts for RoW sector balances (% GDP)**
(Source: OBR; CMMP)

In short, the OBR expects a return to the pre-pandemic world of economic imbalances (see chart below).

The good news, for what it’s worth, is that the private sector is forecast to run a small surplus rather than a deficit as before (and as predicted in the previous OBR forecasts).

The bad news is that the UK economy is forecast to remain heavily dependent on net borrowing from abroad. A familiar story…

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“No growth in productive lending”

Does the lack of growth in UK corporate lending since 2008 matter?

The key chart

**Trends in sterling lending to corporates since 2003 (£bn)**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

The key message

The outstanding stock of sterling lending to private sector companies (NFCs) in the UK was £455bn at the end of January 2023. This is £61bn or 12% below the peak of NFC lending back in August 2008.

Does the lack of growth in UK corporate lending since 2008 matter, and if so, why?

NFC lending represents the largest segment of productive “COCO-based lending” i.e. lending that supports both production and income formation. Note that while an increase in NFC lending increases the level of debt in the economy, it also increases the income required to finance it.

Back in July 2015, the UK government argued that the financial services sector, “is critical for supporting the rest of the economy, allocating resources and facilitating long term productive investment.” Fast-forward 90 months, and only 17 pence in every pound lent in the UK supports NFCs is generating sales revenues, wages, profits and economic expansion, however. (This contrasts with 39 cents in every euro lent in the euro area.)

Rather that supporting production and income formation, UK lending has become increasingly skewed towards supporting capital gains largely through higher asset prices (78% of total lending). Mortgages alone account for 53p in every pound lent in the UK, for example.

This is an important part of the context for the Chancellor’s Budget on 15 March 2023. In considering options for stimulating growth in the UK economy, Jeremy Hunt, might ponder the question, “what is the purpose of UK banking?”

Proposals that stimulate investment and encourage a shift back towards more productive forms of bank lending would be welcome.

Please note that the short summary comments and chart above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Steady as she slows – Part V”

An update on the synchronised slowdowns in UK and EA mortgage markets

The key chart

**Monthly mortgage flows as a multiple of pre-pandemic flows**
(Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Synchronised slowdowns

News that UK house prices fell at their sharpest level since 2012 last month (-1.1% YoY) will come as no surprise to those who follow the messages from the money sector and the previous, “Steady as she slows” posts.

**Monthly mortgage flows (£bn) and annual growth rate in outstanding stock (RHS)**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

The Bank of England’s latest data release (1 March 2023) also showed that net borrowing of mortgage debt by individuals fell to £2.5bn in January 2023 from £3.1bn in December 2022 (see chart above). In both cases, these monthly flows were below the pre-pandemic average of £3.9bn (0.7x and 0.8x respectively).

With net approvals, an indicator of future borrowing, also decreasing to 39,600 in January 2023 from 40,500 in December 2022 (see chart below), it is reasonable to assume that this slowdown will continue.

**Trends in UK approvals for house purchase (000s)**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

These trends are part of a synchronised slowdown in monthly mortgage flows in both the UK and the euro area (EA). As noted in earlier posts, the slowdown in the EA is even more marked. Monthly mortgage flows fell to €2.8b in January 2023, from €4.6bn in December 2023. In these cases, the monthly flows were only 0.2x and 0.4x the pre-pandemic average flow respectively. More significantly, in Germany and France, the EA’s two largest mortgage markets, there were net repayments in January 2023.

Given that mortgage demand typically displays a coincident relationship with real GDP, the message from the UK and EA money sectors remains one of rising risks to the economic outlook.

The challenging context for central banks remains…

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Not so synchronised!”

Contrasting messages from the UK and EA money sectors

The key chart

**Trends in monthly consumer credit flows expressed as a multiple of pre-pandemic averages (x)** (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The key message

While the UK and euro area (EA) money sectors are sending consistent messages about the slowdown in mortgage demand, their messages about consumer credit demand are contrasting and diverging.

Monthly consumer credit flows recovered in the UK in January 2023, back to their pre-pandemic levels and to their highest level since June 2022. In contrast, they fell and remain depressed in relation to their pre-pandemic levels in the EA.

This matters for two reasons: (1) increased borrowing is one way that households can offset the pressures from falling real incomes and (2) consumer credit is the second most important element of productive COCO-based lending.

More policy challenges for the ECB…

Not so synchronised

UK consumer credit flows

The monthly flow of UK consumer credit increased to £1.6bn in January 2023, from £0.8bn in December 2022. This was the highest net borrowing since June 2022 and was 1.3x the pre-pandemic flow of £1.2bn. The 3m MVA of consumer credit flows increased to £1.2bn in January, from £1.0bn in December, very slightly above the pre-pandemic flow (see chart below).

**Monthly flows of UK consumer credit (£bn)**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

EA consumer credit flows

In contrast, the monthly flow of EA consumer credit fell to €0.3bn in January, down from €1.5bn in December and only 0.1x the pre-pandemic average flow of €3.4bn. The 3m MVA of consumer credit flows decreased to €1.3bn in January, from €1.7bn in December, 0.4x the pre-pandemic average flow.

Note that consumer credit flows in the EA have failed to recover to their pre-pandemic levels (see chart below).

**Monthly flows of EA consumer credit (EUR bn)**
(Source: ECB; CMMP)

Why this matters

This matters since increased borrowing is one way that UK and EA HHs can offset the pressures from falling disposable incomes (along with reduced savings).

Consumer credit is also the second most important element of productive COCO-based lending, after corporate credit. It supports productive enterprise since it drives demand for goods and services, hence helping corporates to generate sales, profits and wages.

More policy challenges for the ECB…

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“After two decades of fuelling the FIRE…”

…What is the purpose of UK banking?

The key chart

**Trends and breakdown of UK FIRE-based (red and pink) and COCO-based (blue) lending (£bn)**(Source: BoE; CMMP)

After two decades of fuelling FIRE-based lending, is it time to ask, “what is the purpose of UK banking?”

Bank lending falls into two categories: lending that supports capital gains largely through higher asset prices (FIRE-based); and lending that supports production and income formation, i.e. productive enterprise (COCO-based). The former includes mortgage or real estate lending and lending to NBFIs. The latter includes corporate lending and consumer credit.

**Trends in the breakdown of UK sterling lending since 2002 (% total)**
(Source: BoE; CMMP)

Twenty years ago, less productive FIRE-based lending accounted for 67% of M4L, the Bank of England’s headline credit series. Today it accounts for 78%. The contribution of mortgages, the largest component of FIRE-based lending, has risen from 47% to 53% over the period. This means that nearly 80 pence in every pound lent by UK MFIs finances transactions in pre-existing assets (real estate) or in financial assets. Note that mortgages are the only component of M4L to register a record high at the end of 2022.

In contrast, only just over 20 pence in every pound lent in the UK finances productive enterprise. The contribution of lending to corporates, the largest component of productive COCO-based lending has fallen from 20% to 17% over the past two decades. Note that this lending supports sales revenues, wages, profits and economic expansion. Lending that increases debt in the economy BUT critically also increases the income required to finance it. The outstanding stock of sterling loans to UK corporates at the end of 2022 (£445bn) was £61bn or 12% lower than its peak (£516bn) recorded in August 2008.

Lending in any economy involves a balance between these different forms. A key point here is that the shift from COCO-based lending to FIRE-based lending as seen in the UK reflects different borrower motivations and different levels of risks to financial stability. This has negative implications for leverage, growth, financial stability and income inequality.

Classifying lending according to its productive purpose tells us what the purpose of UK banking is today – largely to support capital gains rather than production and (direct) income formation.

The obvious follow-on question is, “what should it be?”

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed research that is available separately.

“Tightening into…”

…Subdued (EA) and slowing (UK) demand for consumer credit

The key chart

Quarterly consumer credit flows as a multiple of pre-pandemic average flows (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The key message

The ECB and Bank of England are expected to deliver 50bp rate increases today (2 February 2023) in the face of relatively subdued (euro area) and slowing (UK) demand for consumer credit.

Both regions have experienced seven consecutive quarters of positive demand for consumer credit since 1Q21 (see key chart above). Euro area (EA) demand has remain relatively subdued, however, and has failed to recover to pre-pandemic levels. Quarterly consumer credit flows, for example, ended 2022 at €5.0bn, only 0.5x the pre-pandemic average of €10.3bn. UK consumer credit demand hit £4.4bn in 2Q22 (1.2x the pre-pandemic average flow of £3.6bn) but slowed to £2.8bn in 4Q22 (0.8x the pre-pandemic average flow).

This matters for two reasons:

First, increased borrowing is one way that EA and UK households can offset the pressures from falling real disposable incomes (along with reduced savings);
Second, consumer credit is the second most important element of productive COCO-based lending, after corporate credit. It supports productive enterprise since it drives demand for goods and services, hence helping corporates to generate sales, profit and wages.

The EA and UK money sectors are both sending clear messages of slowing demand for consumer credit and mortgages. The contrast with the US is interesting – the FED is slowing the pace of rate increases to 25bp despite the fact that US consumer credit flows remain well above their pre-pandemic levels.

Please note that the summary comments and chart above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.