Or more a vote of confidence in Ursula von der Leyen?
The key chart
Summary
The SX7E index of leading European banks bounced 38% between 18 May and 5 June 2020, outperforming the broader SXXE index by 15%.
Among the index “heavyweights” (by market cap), the biggest share price gains corresponded with the largest previous YTD share price falls – BNP Paribas, ING, Unicredit and Soc Gen. Trading volumes also rose from recent lows but remained below those seen during March’s sell-off.
The rally took place (1) two months after the broader market, (2) despite a worsening operating environment, and (3) in the absence of the macro building blocks required for a sustained recovery in sector profitability.
It coincided with the announcement of the EC’s proposed €750bn “Next Generation EU” fund and can, therefore, be seen best as a vote of investor confidence in the policy response rather than a fundamental shift in banking sector dynamics (note parallels with the performance of the oil and gas sector).
Looking forward, the limited progress in dealing with the region’s private sector debt overhang still clouds the LT investment perspective. High debt levels explain, in turn, why money, credit and business cycles in the EA were already significantly weaker than in past cycles, why inflation remains well below target, and why rates were expected to stay lower for longer even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit.
Last week’s ECB forecasts indicate that the growth recoveries expected in 2021 and 2022 will not make up for the 8.5% real GDP contraction this year. Weak pre-provision profitability levels represent the key challenge facing EA banks in terms of addressing the associated challenges and suggest that the MT investment perspective also remains negative.
A positive investment case rests, therefore, largely on valuation (ST investment perspective). Banks established new support levels in terms of absolute price at distressed valuation levels (0.2-0.4 PBV). Despite rallying off these levels, share prices of large EA banks typically remain 20-30% lower than at the start of the year and valuations low in a historic context.
Bank valuations remain low/distressed in absolute terms and versus historic trends. Conviction in the current rally and sector outperformance is challenged, however, by the lack of alignment between the three investment perspectives that form the basis of the CMMP analysis investment framework.
In my view, the true value in analysing developments in the financial sector remains less in considering investments in developed market banks and more in understanding the implications of the relationship between the banking sector and the wider economy for corporate strategy, investment decisions and asset allocation.
As before, the key message from the money sector here, is the importance of the EC’s proposal for the “Next Generations EU” fund. Investment returns, including the impact of country and sector effects, will be driven to a large extent by how this debate concludes, as will the future of the entire European project.
Please note that the summary comments above and the graphs below are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
Analysing trends in monetary aggregates in unlikely to top the list of most people’s “things to do” during the Covid-19 lockdown period. Nonetheless, these trends provide investors with important messages from the money sector regarding developments in the wider economy.
The annual growth rate in broad money (M3) jumped to 8.3% in April, the fastest rate of YoY growth since October 2008. Narrow money (M1), comprising overnight deposits and currency in circulation, rose 11.9% (the fastest rate of annual growth since December 2009) and contributed 8.0ppt of the total growth in M3.
Reflecting heightened uncertainty, households (HHs) and corporates (NFCs) are demonstrating strong preferences for liquidity – €9.5trillion is currently sitting in (cash and) overnight deposits. This is despite negative real rates on overnight deposits.
From a counterparts perspective, credit to the private sector grew 4.9% in April and contributed 4.8ppt to the growth in M3, albeit it with increasingly divergent HH and NFC dynamics. The demand for NFC credit is growing at the fastest rate since March 2009, although last month’s “dash for cash” did not continue. In contrast, the demand for HH credit is slowing, driven by a sharp slowdown in consumer credit.
Heightened uncertainty, strong liquidity preference and sharply slowing consumption all represent on-going risks to the “v-shaped” recovery narrative.
Please note that summary comments above and graphs below are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately
Policy makers have introduced extraordinary fiscal and monetary policy measure in response to the crisis that have, in many cases, exceeded the measures introduced in the aftermatch of the GFC. These measures have been appropriate and necessary but cannot hide on-going regional and country vulnerabilities. Despite relatively high debt levels, advanced economies are positioned better than emerging and LIDC economies thanks to their ability to borrow at historically low rates that are likely to remain even after Covid-shutdowns end.
The EA policy response has been impressive in scale but assymetric in delivery and risk. Government debt levels across the EA are forecast to increase by between 4ppt and 24ppt taking the aggregate government debt ratio above 100% GDP. A major complicating factor here, is that the countries with the weakest economies, which includes those that have been hit hardest by the virus, have limited fiscal headroom to do “whatever it takes” to stimulate their economies. The sustainability of government debt levels in these economies is at risk of a more severe and prolonged downturn. The enduring myth that this is “the hour of national economic policy” means that this risk cannot be fully discounted. While the balance of power is shifting towards a common-European solution, execution risks remain.
Investment returns, including the impact of country and sector effects, will be driven by how this debate concludes as will the future of the entire European project.
Responses and vulnerabilities
The level, growth, affordability and structure of debt are key drivers of LT global investment cycles with direct implications for: economic growth; the supply and demand for credit; money, credit and business cycles; policy options; investment risks and asset allocation.
Global debt levels and debt ratios were at all time highs (levels), or very close to them (ratios), when the Covid-19 pandemic hit global economies. At the end of 2019, global debt totalled $191trillion of which $122trillion (64%) was private sector debt and $69trillion (36%) was public sector debt. Private sector debt included $57trillion (46%) of debt from advanced economies excluding the euro area (EA), $23trillion (18%) of EA debt, $15trillion (12%) of debt from emerging economies excluding China and $29trillion (24%) of Chinese debt.
The breakdown of global debt is largely unchanged since previous analysis. The total debt ratio (debt as a % of GDP) was 243% at the end of 2019, very close to its 3Q16 high of 245% GDP. Similarly, the global PSC debt ratio of 156% was also very close to its 3Q18 high of 159% of GDP. Total EM and Chinese debt ratios both hit new highs of 194% GDP and 259% of GDP respectively.
The exception here was the euro area (EA) which remained, “trapped by its debt overhang and out-dated policy rules.” EA total debt and private sector debt ratios both peaked in 3Q15 at 281% and 172% respectively. At the end of 2019 these ratios had fallen to 262% and 165% respectively but remained above the respective global averages of 245% and 156%. As detailed in “Are we there yet?”, high debt levels help to explain why money, credit and business cycles in the EA are significantly weaker than in past cycles, why inflation remains well below target, and why rates have stayed lower for longer than many expected. In spite of this, the collective pre-crisis fiscal policy of the EA nations was (1) about as tight as any period in the past twenty years and (2) was so at a time when the private sector was running persistent net financial surpluses (largely above 3% GDP) since the GFC. A policy reboot in the EA was overdue even before the pandemic hit.
Policy makers have introduced extraordinary fiscal and monetary policy measures in response to the crisis that have, in many cases, exceeded the measures introduced in the aftermath of the GFC. IMF forecasts suggest that the aggregate, global fiscal deficit will total -6.5% of GDP in 2020e versus -4.9% in 2009. The US will be the main driver (-2.37% GDP 2020e versus -1.63% 2009), followed by the EA (-1.01% GDP versus -0.85% GDP), China (-1.0% GDP versus –0.15%), emerging economies (-0.65% GDP versus -1.09% GDP) and the RoW (-1.17% GDP versus -1.20% GDP).
As a result, government debt ratios are expected to reach new highs in 2020e of 96% of GDP a rise of 13ppt over 2019. Advanced economies’ government debt is expected to reach 122% GDP versus 105% in 2019 and 92% in 2009. Emerging markets’ government debt is expected to reach 62% GDP versus 53% in 2019 and 39% in 2009. LIDC government debt is expected to reach 47% GDP versus 43% in 2019 and 27% in 2009.
While these responses have been necessary and appropriate, they have also exposed underlying vulnerabilities relating to the starting position of individual regions and countries with the advanced world being having greater reslience than emerging and LIDC economies (IMF classifications). The effectiveness of fiscal responses is a function of the level of debt, the cost of servicing that debt, economic growth and inflation. While debt levels in emerging and LIDC ecomomies remain relatively low in comparision with advanced economies they have continued to grow rapidly in contrast to the more stable trends in advanced economies (at least up until 2020).
Governments in advanced economies are able to borrow at historically low rates and these rates are forecast to remain low for a long period even after the Covid-induced shutdowns end (IMF, Global Financial Stability Review, April 2020). In contrast, for many frontier and emerging markets (and, at times, some advanced economies), borrowing costs have risen sharply and have become more volatile since the coronavirus began spreading globally (IMF, Fiscal Monitor, April 2020). These contrasting trends are illustrated in the graph above which shows IMF forecasts of LIDC interest to tax revenue ratios increasing from 20% in 2019 to 33% in 2020e. This compares with a ratio of 12% in 2009 and the current ratio of 10% for advanced economies (which is largely unchanged since 2009 despite the increase in government debt levels).
The EA policy response has been impressive in scale but assymetric in delivery and risk. All member states have introduced fiscal measures aimed at supporting health services, replacing lost incomes and protecting corporate sectors. Measures have included tax breaks, public investments and fiscal backstops including public guarantees or credit lines. According to European Commission forecast, the 2020e budget deficit for the EA will total -8.5% of GDP but will vary widely from between -4.8% in Luxembourg to -11.1% in Italy. The ECB notes that, while this projected headline is signficantly larger than during the GFC, it is comparable to the relative decline in GDP growth.
Debt levels across the EA are forecast to increase by between 4ppt (Luxembourg) and 24ppt (Italy), taking the aggregate EA government debt ratio to 103% GDP in 2020e. In its May 2020 Financial Stability Review, the ECB also notes that a number of countries, including Italy, Spain, France, Belgium and Portugal, “face substantial debt repayments needs over the next two years”. The key point here is that while current fiscal measures are important in terms of mitigating against the cost of the downturn and hence providing some defence against debt sustainability concerns, a worse-than-expected recession would give rise to debt sustainability risks in the medium term.
A major complicating factor here is that the countries with the weakest economies, which includes those that have been hit hardest by Covid-19, have limited fiscal headroom to do whatever it takes to stimulate their economies. The largest percentage point increased in government debt ratios are forecast to occur in Italy (24ppt), Greece (20ppt), Spain (20ppt) and France (18ppt) – compared with an increase of 17ppt for the EA as a whole – economies that ended 2019 with above average government debt to GDP ratios (135%, 177%, 95% and 98% GDP respectively).
The sustainability of government debt levels in already highly indebted EA countries would be put at risk by a more severe and prolonged economic downturn. Funding costs are already higher in Greece (2.1ppt), Italy (2.0ppt), Spain (1.2ppt) and Portugal (1.1ppt) than in Germany based on current 10Y bond yields and more volatile – see graph of the spread between Italian and German 10Y bond yields below.
The enduring myth that this is “the hour of national economic policy” means that these risks cannot be discounted. The May 2020 Bundesbank Monthly Report states, for example, that, “fiscal policy is in a position to make an essential contribution to resolving the COVID19 crisis. [But] This is primarily a national task.” This view is also supported by the so-called “frugal four” ie, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Sweden who have been opposed to various “common solutions”, most recently the EC proposal to issue joint debt to fund grants to those countries hit hardest by the crisis.
The EC is supported, however, by the ECB. In a recent interview, Christine Lagarde, the President of the ECB, argues that, “The solution, therefore, is a European programme of rapid and robust fiscal stimulus to restore symmetry between the countries when they exit from the crisis. In other words, more help must be given to those countries that need it most. It is in the interests of all countries to provide such collective support.”
The balance of power is shifting towards a common-European solution recently but execution risks remain. As I write this post (27 May 2020), Ursual von der Leyen, the EC President, has announced plans to borrow €750bn to be distributed partly as grants (€500bn) to hard-pressed member states – the “Next Generation EU” fund. Added to her other plans, this would bring the total EA recovery effort to €1.85trilion.
The scale of this intervention/borrowing is unprecedented and includes plans to establish a yield curve of debt issuance with maturities out to 30 years. Repayments would not start until 2028 and would be completed by 2058. France’s President Macron was among EA leaders who quickly welcomed this proposal and pressure is mounting on the so-called “frugal four” countries – Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden – to soften their opposiion to the use of borrowed money for grants.
Investment returns, including the impact of country and sector effects, will be driven to a large extent by how this debate concludes, as will the future of the entire European project.
Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately
Rates and spread pressures continues to add to bank sector woes
The key chart
Pressure from rates and spreads
Key charts and summary points
The aggregate cost of borrowing for euro area (EA) households (HH) and corporates (NFC) hit new 15-year lows at the end of 1Q2020, intensifying the pressure on banks’ top-lines. Lending spreads (versus 3M Euribor) were also at (HH) or close to (NFC) their 5-year lows.
In the HH sector, above average declines in the cost of borrowing over the past 12 months have occurred in Germany (-52bp), the Netherlands (-50bp), and Italy (-47bp) with new lows in the cost of new HH loans being recorded in these economies and also in Latvia and Slovenia. The rate on outstanding HH loans hit new lows in every EZ economy at the end of 1Q20 with the exception of Estonia, France, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain.
In the NFC sector, above average declines in the cost of borrowing over the past 12 months have occurred in Ireland (-76bp), Spain (-38bp), Italy (-35bp), France (-24bp) and Portugal (-19bp), with new lows being recorded in Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. Once again, the list of EZ economies where the rate on outstanding NFC loans was not at a new low was relatively small – Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta.
I have argued how QE has shifted the balance of power away from lenders and towards borrowers in previous posts.
With the exception of the Irish HH sector the cost of borrowing has fallen more than the MRR and 3M Euribor in every EZ economy since May 2014. The biggest declines in the HH sector have occurred in France (-190bp), Belgium (-164bp) and the Netherlands (-115bp) over this period.
In the NFC sector, the biggest declines have occurred in Italy (-226bp), the Netherlands (-222bp), Belgium (-198bp) and France (178bp).
So while the ECB has been largely successful in achieving its goal of ensuring, “that businesses and people should be able to borrow more and spend less to repay their debts,” this has come at the cost of leaving EA banks poorly positioned in terms of pre-provision profitability to face the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic at the micro level.
At €48.90, the SX7E index is re-testing its €48.70 low (21 April 2020) for good reason. On-going pressure from rates and spreads add to severe macro-headwinds and leave banks, and their investors, highly exposed to rising provisions during 2020.
Please note that these brief summary comments are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
March’s monetary development statistics from the ECB provide early insights from the money sector into the impact of the COVID-19 on the EA economy. Broad money (M3) growth jumped to 7.5%, the fastest YoY growth rate since December 2008. The key messages for the real economy here are threefold: (1) households and corporates are maintaining a high preference for holding liquid assets (€9.3tr) in the face of higher uncertainty and the low opportunity cost of holding money; (2) corporate demand for ST emergency liquidity has jumped sharply with government support playing an important role in ensuring future credit supply; (3) the contrasting slowdown in household credit demand so far reflects weaknesses in consumer credit rather than in mortgage demand. The EA Bank Lending Survey results (also published this week) suggest that these trends are likely to continue/accelerate throughout 2Q20.
Messages from the money sector
The ECB’s “Monetary developments in the euro area” statistics for March 2020 released this morning, provide early insights from the monetary sector regarding the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the EA economy.
Growth in broad money supply (M3) jumped to 7.5% YoY in March 2020 from 5.6% in February. This represents the fastest rate of growth in broad money since December 2008. This growth was driven by the rapid growth in narrow money (M1) which grew 10.3% in March and contributed 7.0ppt of the total 7.5% growth in M3. Narrow money growth, in turn, was driven by demand for overnight deposits which grew 10.9% and represented 6.3ppt of the total growth in M3.
At a time of great uncertainty and with the opportunity cost of holding money very low, households (HHs) and corporates (NFCs) have a strong preference for liquidity – €9.3trillion is currently sitting in (cash) and overnight deposits with March seeing the highest monthly inflows YTD. In December 2008, overnight deposits accounted for 35% of total broad money. Today, they account for 60%. This is despite the fact that overnight rates are only 0.2% for HHs and 0.0% for NFCs compared with inflation of 0.7% (March 2020). As described in “Brutally exposed” and “Are we there yet?”, persistent HH net financial savings at a time of low/negative rates is a clear symptom of the enduring debt overhang on the EA.
From a counterparts perspective, credit to the private sector contributed 4.5ppt of the total 7.5% in broad money albeit with different dynamics between the HH and NFC sectors. On an adjusted basis, credit to the private sector grew 5.0% in March versus 3.7% in February. This is the fastest rate of growth since February 2009 (albeit, still lagging the supply of money, see “Are we there yet?” for why this matters).
NFC lending, which had been slowing since April 2019, rebounded to 5.4% YoY in March 2020 from the recent low of 3.0% in February 2020. The monthly flow of adjusted loans to NFC rose to €118bn compared with monthly flows of only €6bn and €11bn in February and January respectively.
Of this €118bn, the largest segment was ST loans with a maturity of up to 1 year which grew €46bn having fallen in the previous two months. This data is consistent with the results of the EA Bank Lending Survey (April 2020) which noted the “clear upward impact of Covid-19 pandemic on firms’ loan demand, largely driven by emergency liquidity needs.” These trends are expected to continue through 2Q20. Banks indicated that they expect credit standards from NFC lending to ease considerably on “account of the support measures introduced by governments.”
In contrast, HH credit growth slowed to 3.4% from 3.7% in January and February 2020. Mortgages, which account for over three-quarters of EA household lending, grew 4.0% from 4.3% in February and 4.1% in January. However, there was a more noticeable slowdown in consumer credit. This slowed to 3.9% in March from 6.2% in February and is now growing at the slowest rate since November 2016. The bank lending survey noted that, “A continued net tightening of credit standards and a strongly negative net balance for household loan demand are expected by banks in the second quarter of 2020”.
Conclusion
While today’s monetary data contains few surprises, it does provide valuable insights into the impact of COVID-19 on the real economy. Uncertainty remains elevated in both the HH and corporate sectors and liquidity preferences support my earlier hypothesis that the EA is still dealing with an enduring debt overhang – a topic that I will be returning to in an update of sector balances in the EA.
There is a positive sign from the NFC sector. The increase demand for ST emergency funding is obvious, and indications from banks that government support will facilitate an easing of credit standards in 2Q20 is welcome. The signs from the HH sector are less encouraging. The negative impact on consumption can already be seen and, in contrast to the NFC sector, banks expect credit standards to tighten in the near future. Expect further divergence in NFC and HH credit growth over the next quarters.
Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
History often rhymes and occassionally repeats itself
In his 1992 analysis “Maastricht and All That”, the late economist Wynne Godley argued that, “the present situation is screaming aloud for co-ordinated reflation, but there exists neither the institutions nor an agreed framework of thought which will bring about this obviously desirable result.” Yesterday, and almost thirty years later, Fabio Panetta, a member of the ECB’s Executive Board, called for a “strong and symmetric fiscal response that offsets the economic damage from the pandemic.” Echoing Godley, Panetta stressed the risks of the current, asymmetric fiscal responses, argued why a new framework was required and made the threat to the future of the single market very clear.
From a corporate, rather than an investment perspective, one of his most interesting observations was that, “uneven fiscal support implies that a firm’s location, rather than its business model, will be the decisive factor in determining whether it survives the crisis.” A new angle?
What links Godley and Panetta’s observations is the fact that by design, the nation states of the euro area (EA) have given up sovereignty of their national currencies – they have become users rather than issuers of currency – and have, in effect, limited policy options to controlling money supply and balancing budgets. Why does this matter? In previous posts, I have argued that: (1) monetary policy has been only partially successful, at best, but also carries hidden risks; (2) asymmetric rules that are tough on deficits but weak on surpluses are inappropriate in the current situation; and (3) this is the time for co-ordinated, counter-cyclical fiscal policy across the EA.
One of Godley’s criticisms of the Maastricht Treaty was that it created no new institutions other than the ECB and yet, somewhat ironically, it is the ECB that is now leading the arguments for a new and more appropriate policy framework (see also “Fiscal, first and foremost“). Panetta concluded that, “Acting now to create the conditions for a symmetric fiscal response will help all member countries to shorten the duration of the crisis period, protect the economic base on which their future production structures and exports rely, and – perhaps most importantly – uphold the premise of a shared and indivisible European destiny.”
I would concur up until the final point – most importantly acting now will minimise the appalling human costs not only of the pandemic itself but also of the subsequent economic downturn. This should be the top priority for all. EU leaders meet tomorrow (23 April 2020) to debate their response and to consider possible funding models. Their responsibilty is immense.
Please note that summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis (including extended links to Modern Monetary Theory and Balance Sheet Theory) that is available separately.
In previous posts, I have highlighted how the basic macro building blocks that are required for a sustained recovery in European bank sector profitability are missing. In this post, I use recently published ECB supervisory bank statistics, to illustrate why the sector also remains poorly positioned to absord the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic at the micro level.
On the bright side, the capital ratios of “significant institutions” (ie, banks supervised by the ECB) rose to 18.4% at the end of 4Q18, the highest level since the ECB began publishing their supervisory bank statistics in 2Q15. The CET 1 ratio was 14.8% (ranging from 12.2% in Spain to 18.8% in Belgium). Non-performing loans also hit a new low of 3.2% at the end of 4Q19 compared with 7.5% at the end of 2Q15 (but remain relatively high in Italy, Portugal, Cyprus and Greece).
However, profitability remains very weak. The aggregate ROE fell to only 5.2% in 4Q19 compared with 6.2% a year earlier. Banks in Slovenia were the only banks in the ECB sample that delivered aggregate ROEs in excess of 10%. Elsewhere ROEs ranged from lows of 0.1% and 0.9% in Germany and Portugal respectively to 7.6% and 8.6% in the Netherlands and Austria respectively. Above average ROEs in Austria, Spain and Belgium reflect higher underlying profitability and lower leverage whereas ROEs in the Netherlands and France also reflect higher levels of leverage.
In a week, when large US banks have announced weaker profits driven to a large extent by higher provisioning levels, the low “pre-provision” profit cover of only 2.4x in the EA is concerning. Pre-provision profits were less than 2x provision charges in 4Q19 in Portugal (1.5x), Germany (1.8x), Italy (1.8x) and Spain (1.9x).
As the old joke goes, “If you want to go there, I wouldn’t be starting here.” Sadly, in this case, there is no humour, as weak profitability threatens the supply of credit at a time when it is needed most.
Please note that these brief summary comments are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately
At the time of writing (3 April 2020), more than one million people have been infected and more than 53 thousand have lost their lives in the Covid-19 pandemic. The euro area (EA) is one of the epicentres of this global crisis and faces huge human and economic costs.
Introduction
CMMP analysis can add little value to the debate over the human costs and the appropriate medical and social responses to the pandemic. It can add value to the economic and political debate, however, by applying its three core analytical frameworks – global debt dynamics; money credit and business cycles; and financial sector balances.
I begin by challenging three myths from the past two decades that: (1) painful structural reforms post-2000 were the main driver of Germany’s recovery and resurgent competitiveness; (2) existing fiscal frameworks (including the Stability and Growth Pact) are still relevant in 2020; and (3) “this crisis is primarily the hour of national economic policy” (Issing 2020).
Instead, I argue that: (1) the main reason why Germany’s fiscal deficits did not widen substantially after the collapse of the 2000 IT bubble was that ECB policy led to other countries experiencing asset bubbles, lost competitiveness (and a build-up of unsustainable debt); (2) asymmetric fiscal rules that are tough on deficits but weak on surpluses are inappropriate in the current situation; and (3) this is the time to re-establish coordinated, counter-cyclical fiscal policy across the EA.
EA governments have the opportunity to show that it’s not just the ECB that “will do whatever is needed”. More importantly, failure to acknowledge and debunk the myths of the past and to respond to this opportunity appropriately, risks immeasurable harm to the future of the European project.
Myth #1: The role of structural reforms
Twenty years ago, the euro area (EA) experienced a sharp economic slowdown following the collapse of the IT bubble. The Germany economy was hit hard in the process, experiencing three consecutive quarters of negative growth (3Q01-1Q02). The domestic fiscal response was insufficient to counter the massive increase in savings by both the NFC and HH sectors.
In short, Germany had become the second developed economy (after Japan) to experience a balance sheet recession in the post-war period (Koo, 2015). In response, important “Agenda 2010” structural reforms (pensions, labour market) were introduced between 1999 and 2005. This (painful) experience has shaped the enduring narrative about the requirement for similar reforms across Southern Europe.
Unfortunately this narrative is incomplete and underplays the role of ECB policy at the time. In the face of German economic weakness, the ECB cut ST interest rates to 2% in 2003 – lower that they had ever been under the Bundesbank.
This had little impact on Germany where money supply, prices and wages continued to stagnate, as balance sheet recessions theorists predict.
The story was very different elsewhere in Europe. Other countries in the EA lost competitiveness against Germany, experienced unsustainable asset bubbles, and built up unsustainable levels of debt.
This brief historical summary is important because it falsifies the idea that recessions and the lack of competitiveness in Europe’s periphery are the results of “national idleness”. Instead, they occurred because Germany was unable to use fiscal stimulus to address its own severe balance sheet recession and ECB monetary policy was forced to pick up the slack, leading to asset bubbles across the EA and, when these bubbles burst in 2007, balance sheet recessions in periphery countries and ultimately the euro crisis.
Myth #2: Fiscal frameworks are still relevant
In February, before the full impact of the pandemic was becoming understood, I was arguing that the EA was still dealing with the legacy of these debt overhangs. Private sector debt levels were still high too high, money, credit and business cycles were significantly weaker than in past cycles and inflation remained well below target.
In spite of this, the nations of the EA were collectively running a fiscal policy that was about as tight as at any period in the past twenty years. They were doing this at a time when the private sector was running persistent net financial surpluses. This policy mix failed a basic “common sense test” even before the wider impacts of the pandemic were emerging.
A key lesson from the German (and Japanese) experience is that the deflationary gap in economies facing debt overhangs is equal to the amount of private unborrowed savings. Balance sheet recession theorists argue that these “unborrowed savings (at a time of zero interest rates) are responsible for the weakness in the economy, and it is because the economy is so weak that fiscal stimulus is necessary” (Koo, 2015).
Relating the same argument to inflation targets, when inflation and inflation expectations are below target and rates are zero or negative, fiscal policy should lead with an expansionary stance and monetary policy should cooperate by focusing on guaranteeing low interest rates for as long as needed.
Since, I wrote these comments, EA governments have responded with a series of emergency fiscal measures including immediate stimulus via spending and foregone revenues, deferrals of some revenue sources, and other liquidity provisions and guarantees. However, the scale of the responses varies widely and, most importantly, there has been a lack of common fiscal responses, even in the EA.
Before, turning to this issue in myth #3, I will highlight an important argument from my preferred sector balances approach and Wynne Godley’s core identity that states:
Domestic private balance + domestic government balance + foreign balance = zero
Governments in low-debt countries often overlook that they have benefitted massively from membership of the single market and the ability to run large current account surpluses. Germany was able to emerge from its earlier recession by boosting exports to the rest of the EA where economies were responding (too quickly) to ECB rate cuts. Today, Dutch private and public sector deficits are offset by financial deficits run by the RoW.
Put simply, “asymmetric fiscal rules – tough on deficits, weak on surpluses – are quite inappropriate to the [current] macroeconomic situation” (Gentiloni, 2020).
Myth #3: This is the hour of national economic policy
The EA is one of the epicentres of the Covid-19 pandemic and faces huge human and economic costs. Non-essential services in major economies that account for one third of total output have been closed and the IMF estimates that each month’s closure equates to a 3% drop in annual GDP. The IMF concludes that, “a deep European recession this year is a foregone conclusion” and today’s PMI releases support that conclusion.
Policy makers have responded quickly with large monetary and fiscal expansions (including suspensions of previous fiscal rules and limits). Through its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) the ECB plans to buy €750 billion in addition bonds (on top of the previously announced €120bn purchases) and has removed country limits.
Debate now centres on whether a further common and significant response is needed. Options under consideration include ESM credit lines (combined with OMT); so-called “corona bonds”, a EA Treasury, and one-off joint expenditures.
Once again, this debate has exposed divisions between “defensive hawks” and more “ambitious integrators”. The French, Italian and six other EA governments are proposing combining using the ESM with the issuance of corona bonds. The German government has a preference for exhausting other options first, while the Dutch government has not only stated that use of the ESM should be considered only as a last resort, it has also ruled out the option of issuing corona bonds.
The IMF argues that, “the determination of EA leaders to do what it takes to stabilise the Euro should not be understated.” The EU’s economic chief, Paolo Gentiloni, believes that “consensus is growing day by day that we need to face an extraordinary crisis with extraordinary tools.” Nonetheless the corona bond debate threatens to deepen the rift between EA capitals over how far and how fast the EA should harness common fiscal solutions to tackle the pending economic damage.
The future of the European project may rest on how this debate is resolved.
Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
Households (HH) in the euro area (EA) have been running persistent financial surpluses of between 2-3% GDP since the GFC. I considered the implications of these trends for the choice of policy mix in previous posts (see “Policy reboot 2020”). In this post, I examine the implications for the resilience of HH consumption in the face of the Covid-19 crisis.
HH net wealth (HNW), the difference between the value of HH assets and liabilities, is an important determinant of private sector consumption. Given that HH consumption accounts for 54 cents in every EURO of GDP, it is also an important determinant of overall GDP growth in the EA.
Changes in wealth affect consumption in the short run as HH feel richer or poorer and become more or less confident. The level of HNW is also an important driver of long term consumption since, along with income from employment, it determines the amount of economic resources available to HHs.
HNW hit a new high in absolute terms (€52trillion) and as a multiple of disposable income (7.2x) at the end of 3Q19. This included non-financial assets (NFAs) of €34trillion, largely in the form of housing, and financial assets (FAs) of €26trillion, netted off against financial liabilities (FLs) of €8trillion.
The growth in HNW reflects not only the build-up of FAs, but also revaluation gains in these and other NFAs. As discussed in “Fuelling the Fire”, Quantitative Easing has stimulated asset prices and led to increased housing and financial wealth (see graphs above and below).
Revaluation gains of NFAs have been particularly important in Portugal, Greece, Spain, Germany and Austria. However, ECB estimates suggest that while residential property prices remain undervalued in Greece, they were overvalued by 12%, 16% and 18% in Portugal, Germany and Austria respectively even before the impact of Covid-19 as felt.
Potential revaluation losses on NFA will have a negative impact on HNW for obvious reasons, but their impact on future consumption (marginal propensity to consume) is more challenging to determine (and varies between micro and macro levels).
To summarise the very extensive economic analysis in this area, the long-term housing effects on consumption are consistently weaker than those of financial wealth. Indeed, in a recent analysis of larger EA economies, the ECB concluded that, “Spain is the only large EA country for which consistently positive housing wealth effects have been estimated.”
Significant heterogeneity exists in terms of the size and structure of HH financial assets. FAs are 2.2x the size of EA GDP on average, but above average in the Netherlands (3.6x), Belgium (3.0x), Italy (2.5x) and France (2.4x). Higher gearing to the value of financial assets in these economies is offset by the “absolute cushion” of higher per capita FA holdings in the Netherlands (€167k), Belgium (€121k) and France (€86k). However, in aggregate, Italian HHs have higher gearing than average but lower than average holdings of FAs per capita (€72k versus the EA average of €75k). Other Southern European economies also have smaller cushions in terms of FAs per capita – Greece (€25k), Portugal (€42k) and Spain (€50k).
FAs consist mainly of liquid assets (currency and deposits) and pension and life insurance-related assets. These assets account for 70% of total HH FAs with the remainder held in higher risk products including equity, debt and shares in investment funds. The share of higher risk assets has fallen from 40% pre-GFC to 30% currently suggesting that the negative impact of recent market falls may be less than after the GFC. In addition, HHs in Greece (59%), Portugal (44%), Austria (40%), Germany (40%) and Spain (39%) hold higher amount of their financial assets is liquid assets. However, on a per capita basis, the largest liquid holdings are in Belgium (€38k), Austria (€33k), Germany (€31k) and Ireland (€31k).
Conclusion
The stock of HH wealth in the EA has risen to new highs in absolute terms and as a multiple of disposable income and represents an important economic resource in the face of the Covid-19 crisis.
Revaluation gains of both NFA and FA assets have been important drivers of recent HNW growth, but both will turn sharply negative in the current environment. At the macro-level, long term housing effects on consumption difficult to measure but are consistently weaker than those of financial wealth (with the exception of Spain).
HHs in the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and France have relatively high gearing to changes in the value of FAs, although with the exception of Italy this is offset by relatively high per capita holdings on FAs. HHs in Southern European economies typically have lower “cushions” in terms of per capital holdings of financial assets.
Since the GFC, there has been a de-risking of HNW holdings away from debt, equity and shares in investment funds in favour of liquid assets and pension and life insurance related assets. Lower risk assets now account for 70% of HH FAs. In addition, HHs in Greece, Portugal, Austria, Germany and Spain hold relatively high amounts of FAs in liquid assets. This suggests that the MPC from financial effects may be lower than after the GFC.
These conclusions come with the obvious caveat that the impact of changes in wealth on HH consumption differs substantially between countries, between NFAs and FAs and between HHs within the same country.
Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately
On Thursday 12 March 2020, the President of the ECB, Christine Lagarde made a clear call for a policy reboot in the euro area. Unsurprisingly, Madame Lagarde presented a downbeat assessment for economic activity in the region. GDP forecasts were revised down to 0.8% (from 1.1%) for 2020 and to 1.3% (from 1.4%) for 2021 and left unchanged at 1.4%. Inflation forecasts were unchanged at 1.1% for 2020, 1.4% for 2021 and 1.6% for 2022 although downside risks were acknowledged notably from lower oil prices. (These new forecasts do not reflect the potential impact of the Coronavirus fully, due to their timing.)
Prior to the meeting, expectations had included a -0.1% cut in the deposit facility rate to -0.6%, a lending facility and a boost to QE (FT, 2020). The ECB did not deliver on the former. Instead, they announced a package of measures including a further €120bn of bond purchases and more cheap loans for banks. But, and more importantly, the key message was extremely clear – Madame Lagarde highlighted that the appropriate and required response to the current growth shock “should be fiscal, first and foremost.” In the Q&A session, she also noted that the fiscal measures already announced totalled only €27bn ie, a quarter of 1% of the GDP for the EA…adding:
“…hence, we are calling for an ambitious and collective fiscal response.”
Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB. 12 March 2020
The UK delivered in the first half
This was a crucial week for policy makers in Europe. The UK delivered with the “largest sustained fiscal loosening since the pre-election budget of March 1992” combined with a coordinated package of measures from the Bank of England.
“Mais, en attendant…”
As feared, the European response has been more limited and insufficient. Madame Lagarde was correct in her assessment of the required response, but the second half of this crucial week ends ultimately in disappointment. Extra time is required…
Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately