Trends in net lending/net borrowing, EURbn, rolling 4Q sum (Source: ECB)
The key message
Comments made by the Governor of the Banque de France in Paris last week (1) confirm that conventional macro thinking continues to (largely) ignore private debt while seeing public debt as a problem, and (2) suggests that reports of the death of out-dated fiscal rules in the euro area (EA) are premature.
What did he say? The Governor rejected arguments that (1) accommodative monetary policy was responsible for the rise in public debt, and (2) that “because of this high public debt, monetary policy is now unable to raise interest rates sufficiently to combat inflation”. He stressed that central bank independence was “notably designed to prevent any risk of fiscal domination.” The rest of the speech focused on why debt must remain a key issue and the future EA fiscal rules.
From a CMMP analysis perspective, there were three extraordinary features of the speech:
First, in discussing the exceptional (fiscal) response to exceptional circumstances, the Governor ignored the similarly exceptional disinvestment by the French private sector;
Second, and linked to this, he suggested that France “could keep the 3% deficit target, which is as a “useful anchor” and even the 60% debt target”;
Finally, he chose not to refer to the elevated risks associated with the level, growth or affordability of risks associated with French private sector debt, particularly in the corporate (NFC) sector..
Why does this matter? The Governor’s speech follows similar arguments presented earlier this year by the French state auditor. In both cases, the level of public sector debt was viewed as a problem but private sector debt was ignored, confirming a fundamental flaw in conventional macro thinking. The support for out-dated and arbitrarily determined fiscal rules also means that the risks of deficit reductions compounding further private sector deleveraging in the future remain.
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose…
Sonnez l’alarme II – the charts that matter
Trends in French public sector net borrowing (EURbn) since 1999 (Source: ECB)Trends in French and German government debt ratios (% GDP) versus fiscal target (Source: BIS) Trends in French private sector net lending (EURbn) since 1999 (Source: ECB)The view from a sector balances perspective (Source: ECB)Breakdown (% total) of French credit to the non-financial sector (Source: BIS)Rolling 3-year CAGR in NFC credit versus 3-year CAGR in nominal GDP (Source: BIS)French NFC sector debt ratio versus BIS maximim threshold limit (Source: BIS)French NFC debt service ratio versus LT average since 1999 (Source: BIS)EA private and public sector balances, EURbn (Source: ECB)
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
Monthly credit and debit card payments in relation to pre-pandemic levels (Source: ONS)
The key message
The latest ONS “real-time” indicators (12 May 2022) confirm the resilience of the UK consumer during 2Q22.
Monthly card spending in April was 2% above pre-pandemic levels, 16ppt higher than in January 2022. Daily card spending rose to 110% pre-pandemic levels in the week to 5 May 2022, with rises across all segments. Spending on so-called “delayable” goods continues to recover but is the only segment where current spending is still below pre-pandemic levels. This matters because spending on delayable goods is the best indicator that the excess savings built up during the pandemic are returning to consumption in a sustainable fashion.
Despite the threat of rising inflation and falling real incomes, UK consumers continue to “bash the plastic”. They are spending more on getting to work and on staples, however, than on items such as clothing and furniture. So positive news, but only up to a point.
A full recovery in spending on delayable goods is required before we can have confidence that the UK consumption recovery is sustainable.
Still bashing the plastic – the charts that matter
The latest ONS “real-time indicators” (12 May 2022) confirm the resilience of the UK consumer through 2Q22, at least so far. Monthly card spending (see chart above) in April was 102% pre-pandemic levels, 16ppt higher than in January 2022 (87%) and 9ppt higher than April 2021 (93%).
Daily aggregate card spending in relation to pre-pandemic levels (Source: ONS)
Daily card spending (rolling seven-day) also increased by 8ppt in the week to 5 May 2022 to reach 110% of pre-pandemic levels (see chart above). Spending rose across all categories, with the largest growth seen in “social” spending. “Work-related”, “staple” and “social spending” are currentl 131%, 120% and 113% pre-pandemic levels (see chart below).
Current card spending by type versus pre-pandemic levels (Source: ONS)
Spending on “delayable” goods such as clothing and furniture is recovering (see chart below), but remains 5% below pre-pandemic levels. This matters because delayable spending is our preferred indicator regarding the extent to which excess savings are returning to the economy in a sustained fashion.
Card spending on delayable goods versus pre-pandemic levels (Source: ONS)
Conclusion
UK consumers continue to “bash the plastic” despite the challenges of rising inflation and falling real incomes. This is positive news. Consumers are spending more on getting to work and on staples, however, than on items such as clothing and furniture. A full recovery in spending on delayable goods is required before we can have confidence that current consumption is sustainable.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
Created challenges for policy makers, banks and investors alike
The key chart
Lending growth (% YoY) minus money growth for the UK and EA since 2012 (Source: BoE; ECB)
The key message
Money and credit cycles have been desynchronised for much of the past decade, creating major challenges for policy makers, banks and investors alike.
Growth in money supply has also exceeded growth in private sector credit in the euro area and for much of the period in the UK. The effectiveness of monetary policy, the dominant macro policy, has diminished dramatically as a result.
The gap between growth in money supply and private sector credit hit a historic high during the COVID-19 pandemic. More recently, however, these growth rates have converged as the build-up of excess savings has slowed and the demand for credit has recovered (at least in nominal terms).
This means that three key signals from the UK and EA money sectors have turned more positive: monthly HH money flows have fallen back below pre-pandemic levels; quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21 and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK; and the gap between money supply and private sector credit growth has narrowed.
Macro challenges remain, but the message from the UK and EA money sectors is less bearish than consensus investment narratives.
A desynchronised decade
Growth rates (% YoY) in EA money and lending (Source: ECB)Growth rates (% YoY) in UK money and lending (Source: BoE)
Money and credit cycles have been desynchronised for much of the past decade. In typical cycles, monetary aggregates and their key counterparties, such as private sector credit, move together. Put simply, money supply indicates how much money is available for use by the private sector. Private sector credit indicates how much the private sector is borrowing. However, the two charts above show the extent to which, and the periods when, UK and EA money and credit cycles have diverged since March 2012.
EA money flow minus credit flow (rolling quarters) since Mar 2012 (Source: ECB)
Growth in money supply has also exceeded growth in private sector credit in the euro area and for much of the period in the UK. The charts above (EA) and below (UK) illustrate trends in the gap between money and credit flows (rolling quarters) for both regions. The build-up of liquidity in both regions is clear to see. Increases in the supply of money have not been matched by equivalent increases in private sector demand for credit.
UK money flow minus credit flow (rolling quarters) since Mar 2012 (Source: BoE)
The effectiveness of monetary policy, the dominant macro policy, has diminished dramatically as a result. Broadly speaking, monetary policy is effective if “central bank accommodation increase money and credit for the private sector to use” (Koo, 2015). Not only has credit growth lagged money supply growth, it has also been predominantly the “wrong type of credit” ie, less productive FIRE-based lending. As noted in previous posts, this has hidden risks in terms of leverage, future growth, financial stability and income inequality.
Loan growth (% YoY) minus money growth (Source: BoE; ECB)
The gaps between growth in money supply and private sector credit hit historic highs during the COVID-19 pandemic (see chart above). In the UK, loan growth exceeded money growth between August 2018 and December 2019. During the pandemic, however, the gap between money growth (15.4%) and credit growth (3.9%) widened to 11.5ppt in February 2021. In the EA, money growth (4.9%) exceeded credit growth (3.7%) by 1.2ppt at the end of 2019. The gap peaked at 8ppt in January 2021 – money growth of 12.5% versus credit growth of 4.5%.
More recent YoY growth trends in UK and EA money and lending (Source: BoE; ECB)
More recently, these growth rates have converged as the build-up of excess savings has slowed and credit demand has recovered (at least in nominal terms). At the end of 1Q22, money growth had slowed to 5.5% YoY in the UK while credit growth had risen to 3.7% YoY, a narrowing of the gap to only 1.8ppt. Similarly, in the EA, money growth at the end of 1Q22 had slowed to 6.3% YoY while credit growth was 4.7% YoY, a gap of 1.6ppt (see chart above).
Conclusion
What does this mean? Three key signals from the UK and EA money sectors have turned more positive: monthly HH money flows have fallen back below pre-pandemic levels; quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21 and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK; and the gap between money supply and private sector credit growth has narrowed.
Macro challenges remain, but the message from the UK and EA money sectors is less bearish than consensus investment narratives.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
We might expect HHs to repay consumer credit again
The key chart
Quarterly flows in UK (£bn) and EA (EURbn) consumer credit (Source: BoE, ECB)
The key message
If confidence is collapsing, we might reasonably expect households to be repaying consumer credit again. Are they…?
During the COVID-19 pandemic, households (HHs) in the UK and the euro area (EA) repaid consumer credit in four of the five quarters between 1Q20 and 1Q21 (see key chart above). The message from the money sector over this period was that HHs were increasing savings and delaying consumption.
Quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21, however, and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK in 1Q22. Year-on-year growth rates have also recovered to their highest levels since February 2020 and March 2020 in the UK and the EA respectively. Before we get too excited, it is important to note that growth in consumer credit is negative in real terms (and EA HHs repaid €0.4bn of consumer credit in March 2022). So-called “faster indicators” also indicate that HHs in the UK are still delaying their spending on “delayable” good such as clothing and furniture indicating that the sustainability of consumption remains unproven still.
In short, the trends in two of the three key signals from the money sector remain positive, (if not that exciting). HHs in the UK and the EA have stopped hoarding cash and demand for consumer credit has remained positive. The recovery in the UK appears more advanced than in the EA, although current UK spending is concentrated towards work-related and staple items rather than delayable items.
The key message here is that while HH consumption patterns remain relatively subdued they are inconsistent with more extreme investment narratives.
Messages from the money sector were less optimistic than consensus investment narratives in 2H21 and less pessimistic than the current investment narrative now.
A positive for a macro-strategist currently “long cash”?
If confidence is collapsing – part 2
If confidence is collapsing, we might reasonably expect HH to be repaying consumer credit again. During the COVID-19 pandemic, HHs in the UK and the EA repaid consumer credit in four of the five quarters between 1Q20 and 1Q21 (see key chart above). Between 1Q18 and 4Q19, quarterly consumer credit flows averaged £3.6bn and €10.3bn in the UK and EA respectively. At the height of the pandemic (2Q20), UK and EA households repaid £13.2bn and €12.9bn respectively. The message from the money sector over this period was that HHs were increasing savings and delaying consumption.
Quarterly flows in UK (£bn) and EA (EURbn) consumer credit (Source: BoE, ECB)
Quarterly consumer credit flows have been positive since 2Q21, however, and have returned to pre-pandemic levels in the UK in 1Q22 (see chart above). UK consumer credit flows totalled £3.6bn in 1Q22, up from £3.3bn in 4Q21 and exactly in line with the average pre-pandemic quarterly flows. EA consumer credit flows totalled €4.4bn, down from €6.5bn in 4Q21. In contrast to the UK, current EA flows remain well below the pre-pandemic average flows of €10.3bn and EA HHs repaid €0.4bn of consumer credit in March 2022. Recall that in lesson #5 in “Seven lessons from the money sector in 2020”, I argued that,
“the UK is likely to demonstrate a higher gearing to a return to normality than the EA.”
YoY growth rates in consumer credit in the UK and EA (Source: BoE; ECB)
Year-on-year growth rates have also recovered to their highest levels since February 2020 and March 2020 in the UK and the EA respectively. In March 2022, UK and EA consumer credit grew 5.2% YoY and 2.5% YoY respectively (see chart above). Note again the relatively high gearing of the UK to a recovery in consumer credit demand. Before we get too excited, however, it is important to note that YoY growth in consumer credit is negative in real terms in both regions.
Credit and debit card payments on durable goods compared with pre-pandemic levels (Source: ONS)
So-called “faster indicators” also indicate that HHs in the UK are still delaying their spending on “delayable” good such as clothing and furniture indicating that the sustainability of consumption remains unproven still. According to the latest ONS data, credit and debit card spending remains 12% below its pre-pandemic level and 51% below its 2021 high (see graph above). This makes delayable spending the weakest segment in current UK spending (see graph below). Overall card spending is just above pre-pandemic highs, reflecting relatively strong “work-related” and “staples” spending. The latter two segments are 24% and 13% above pre-pandemic levels respectively.
Credit and debit card spending versus pre-pandemic levels broken down by type (Source: ONS)
Conclusion
In short, the trends in two of the three key signals from the money sector remain positive, (if not that exciting). HHs in the UK and the EA have stopped hoarding cash and demand for consumer credit has remained positive. The recovery in the UK appears more advanced than in the EA, although current UK spending is concentrated towards work-related and staple items rather than delayable items.
The key message here is that while HH consumption patterns remain relatively subdued they are inconsistent with the more extreme investment narratives that have gained popularity recently. Messages from the money sector were less optimistic than consensus investment narratives in 2H21 and less pessimistic than the current investment narrative now. A positive for a macro-strategist currently “long cash”?
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed research that is available separately.
Why have HH money flows fallen back below pre-pandemic levels?
The key chart
Monthly HH deposit flows as a multiple of average pre-pandemic levels. (Source: BoE; ECB)
The key message
If confidence is collapsing, why have household (HH) money flows in the UK and the euro area (EA) fallen back below pre-pandemic levels?
During the COVID-19 pandemic, HHs increased their holdings of liquid assets such as overnight deposits, despite earning negative real returns on those assets. In other words, the expansion of broad money over the period was a reflection of deflationary rather than inflationary forces, challenging the monetarist explanation for the current rise in inflation.
In both the UK and EA, monthly HH money flows have fallen back below pre-pandemic levels during 1Q22. These trends support the argument that forced savings, rather than precautionary savings, were the main driver of the spike in HH savings during the pandemic. This is important because forced savings can be released relatively quickly to support economic activity. Nonetheless, it would also be reasonable to assume that the level of precautionary savings would still be above pre-pandemic levels given the uncertainties caused by the Ukraine war, rising inflation and cost-of-living pressures. So far, at least, this does not seem to be the case…
…is the consensus narrative in relation to consumer confidence becoming too bearish?
If confidence is collapsing
If confidence is collapsing, why have household (HH) money flows in the UK and the euro area (EA) fallen back below pre-pandemic levels? Recall that these flows offer important insights into HH behaviour and were one of three key signals that CMMP analysis focused on throughout 2021 in order to interpret macro trends more effectively. The other signals were trends in consumer credit demand (growth outlook) and the synchronisation of money and credit cycles (policy context). I will turn to these signals in subsequent posts.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, HHs increased their holdings of liquid assets such as overnight deposits despite earning negative real returns (see key chart above). In the UK, monthly money flows peaked at £27bn in May 2020 and again at £21bn in December 2020, 5.8x and 4.5x average pre-pandemic levels of £4.6bn respectively. In the EA, monthly HH deposit flows peaked at €78bn in April 2020, 2.4x the average pre-pandemic level.
Narrow money (M1) as a %age of broad money (M3) (Source: BoE; ECB)
This meant that the expansion of broad money over the period was a reflection of deflationary rather than inflationary forces. Narrow money (M1), which comprises notes and coins in circulation and overnight deposits, has been increasingly important component/driver of broad money. In March 2022, M1 represented 68% and 73% of M3 in the UK and EA respectively (see chart above). This compares with respective shares of only 46% and 49% in March 2009. This matters for the simple reason that it challenges the monetarist explanation of rising inflation.
Money sitting idly in overnight deposits with banks contributes to neither growth nor inflation.
UK monthly HH money flows (£bn) and multiple of pre-pandemic level (x) (Source: BoE)
In both the UK and EA, monthly HH money flows have fallen back below pre-pandemic levels during 1Q22. In the UK, monthly flows in February and March 2022 were £4.1bn and £4.6bn respectively (see chart above). These compare with the average pre-pandemic flow of £4.7bn. In the EA, March 2022’s monthly flow of €16bn, was half the average pre-pandemic flow of €33bn (see chart below).
EA monthly HH money flows (EURObn) and multiple of pre-pandemic level (x) (Source: BoE)
These trends support the argument that forced savings, rather than precautionary savings, were the main driver of the spike in HH savings during the pandemic. This is important because forced savings can be released relatively quickly to support economic activity. Nonetheless, it would also be reasonable to assume that the level of precautionary savings would still be above pre-pandemic levels given the uncertainties caused by the Ukraine war, rising inflation and cost-of-living pressures.
So far, at least, this does not seem to be the case…is the consensus narrative too bearish?
Please note that the summary comments above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
