The key chart
The key message
France’s state auditor, the Cour des Comptes, “sounded the alarm” about the impact of pandemic spending on France’s widening budget deficit and rising government debt levels last week. The auditor also raised concerns about potential risks to the cohesion of the EA. Are these concerns justified or do greater risks lie elsewhere within French debt dynamics?
The auditor is correct to highlight the impact of pandemic spending on the government’s net borrowing. This rose from 78bn in 3Q19 to €220bn in 3Q21. The level of government debt and the debt ratio are close to their record 1Q21 highs. The debt ratio has remained above the EA’s 60% GDP threshold for the past two decades and the divergence in the debt ratios of France and Germany in the post-GFC period represents a “potential risk to the cohesion of the EA”.
The first counter argument, based on national accounting principles, is that the correct level of government net borrowing is the one that balances the economy not the budget. The level of private sector net lending rose from €75bn in 3Q19 to €225bn in 3Q21, driven largely by HH net savings of €134bn. In other words, the net borrowing of the government was a necessary, timely and appropriate response to the scale of the private sector’s net lending/disinvestment.
The second counter argument is that that while the outstanding stock of French government debt may be the fourth highest in the world, France ranks lower in terms of government indebtedness. This argument will be more compelling to those who view debt sustainability (correctly) as a flow concept, but much less compelling to those who prefer the traditional stock-based approach.
From a risk and financial stability perspective, we are more concerned about France’s private sector debt dynamics, particularly in the NFC sector. France has relatively high exposure to the NFC sector, the fifth most indebted NFC sector globally. In spite of this, France has seen the third highest rate of excess NFC credit growth globally over the past three years. Affordability risks in the NFC sector are also elevated in absolute terms and in relation to historic trends. While the level of HH indebtedness in France is low in absolute terms, the risks associated with excess HH credit growth and affordability are elevated in this sector too.
The headlines resulting from the Cour des Comptes’ report support our wider hypothesis that conventional macro thinking is flawed to the extent that it typically ignores private debt while seeing government debt as a problem rather than as a solution.
Sonnez l’alarme?
France’s state auditor, the Cour des Comptes, “sounded the alarm” about the impact of pandemic spending on the widening budget deficit and level of government debt in its 2022 Annual Report published on 16 February 2022. The auditor also argued that the government should revise its deficit reduction plans after April’s presidential election, claiming that current plans risk fuelling divergences within the euro area, especially with more fiscally conservative countries such as Germany.
The supporting evidence
The state auditor is correct to highlight the impact of pandemic spending on the budget deficit. As illustrated in the chart above, the government’s net borrowing rose from €78bn in 3Q19 to €220bn in 3Q21. The current level of net borrowing is also higher than the previous peak net borrowing of €143bn in the aftermath of the GFC. Viewed in isolation, this is a scary chart!
The level of government debt and the debt ratio are also close to their all-time highs (see chart above). The outstanding stock of government debt rose form €2,727bn in 2Q19 to €3,088bn in 2Q21, slightly below the peak 1Q21 level of €3,099bn. The government debt ratio (the blue line above) rose from 113% GDP in 2Q19 to 128% GDP in 2Q21. Again, the debt ratio also peaked at 134% GDP in 1Q21. Note that throughout the past two decades, France’s government debt ratio has exceeded the EA’s threshold of 60% GDP.
The debt ratios of France and Germany have been on different trajectories for most of the post-GFC period. The German government debt ratio peaked at 86% GDP in 4Q12 and declined to a recent low of 64% GDP in 4Q19 (still above the EA’s threshold level). So again, the auditor is correct to highlight this as a “potential” source of risk to the cohesion of the EA.
The counter arguments
The first counter argument here is a simple one – the correct level of government net borrowing is the one that balances the economy not the budget. It is a basic principle of national accounting that the net borrowing of one economic sector (in this case the French government), must be equal to net lending of one or other economic sector(s) (see “Everyone has one”).
The chart above plots the net lending of the private sector and the net borrowing of the public sector together. The level of private sector net lending, or disinvestment (the blue area), rose from €75bn in 3Q19 to €225bn in 3Q21, driven largely by HH net savings of €134bn and FI net savings of €125bn.
In other words, the increase in the government’s net borrowing position essentially matched the increase in the private sector’s net lending position. Rather than a source of alarm, the spending response of the French government was necessary, timely and appropriate.
The second counter-argument is that while, the outstanding stock of French government debt may be the fourth highest in the world, France is ranked lower in terms of government indebtedness (with a debt ratio similar to the UK).
The chart above ranks the top ten BIS reporting countries in terms of outstanding government debt. Total government debt was $3,670bn at the end of 2Q21, representing a 4% share of global government debt after the US (33%), Japan (14%) and the UK (5%). The chart below ranks the top ten BIS reporting countries in terms of the government debt ratio. In this case, France’s ranking drops to #8 globally and #7 in Europe after Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium and the UK.
This second counter-argument will be less persuasive for those who view debt sustainability as a stock concept (the traditional approach). They will point to the fact that France’s government debt ratio is not only above the EA average, but it is also above the (largely arbitrarily chosen) 60% or 90% thresholds. CMMP analysis, which is centred on the sector balances framework, considers both fiscal space and debt sustainability as flow concepts and for reasons mentioned above (and possibly in future posts) is less concerned here.
What about private sector debt dynamics?
From a risk and financial stability perspective, we are more concerned about France’s private sector debt dynamics, particularly in the NFC sector.
France has a relatively high exposure to NFC debt. At the end of 2Q21, NFC debt accounted for 46% of total debt. This is down from 50% at the time of the GFC (see chart above) but remains above the aggregate shares of 32% and 39% for advanced and EA economies respectively. Why does this matter?
France’s NFC sector is the fifth most indebted NFC sector among BIS economies. At the end of 2Q21, the NFC debt ratio was 170% GDP, after Luxembourg (322%), Hong Kong (304%), Sweden (179%) and Ireland (171%). The French NFC debt ratio is well above the 111% GDP and 98% GDP aggregate for all advanced and EA economies respectively and the 90% threshold level above which the BIS considers debt to be a drag on future growth.
In spite of the high level of NFC indebtedness, France has seen the third highest levels of excess NFC credit growth over the past three years (see chart above). The NFC sector’s RGF was 4.8% in 2Q21, after Switzerland (6.7%) and Japan (6.6%). The rate of excess NFC credit growth was well above the EA average of 1.8% and higher than the 3.0% average for all advanced economies. Risks are clearly elevated when excess rates of credit growth combine with high levels of indebtedness, as is the case here (for an explanation of the RGF framework see here.)
The NFC debt service ratio (DSR) is also high in absolute terms and above its respective LT average despite the low absolute cost of NFC borrowing. As at the end of 2Q21, the DSR was 60%, 9ppt above its LT average of 51% (see chart above). France is one of four advanced economies where the DSRs are high in both absolute terms and in relation to LT averages, along with Sweden, Canada, and Norway (see chart below).
While the level of HH indebtedness in France is low in absolute and relative terms, the risks associated with excess HH credit growth and affordability are elevated in this sector too. At the end of 2Q21, the HH debt ratio was 67% GDP, slightly below the 4Q20 peak level of 68%. The HH debt ratio is higher than the 61% EA average but below the 77% advanced average and the BIS threshold level of 85% GDP. Nonetheless, France has the seen the highest rate of excess HH credit growth over the past three years among EA and other advanced economies. The HH’s debt service ratio, while low in absolute terms, is also above its LT average (see “Global debt dynamics – IV” for more details and charts).
Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the French government’s net borrowing and the level of government debt. The widening gap between France’s government debt ratio and those of the so-called “fiscally-conservative” economies is also a potential source of conflict with the EA. Viewed from a sector balances perspective, however, the government’s response was timely, necessary and appropriate. We are also more concerned about the risks associated with private sector debt dynamics, particularly in the highly indebted NFC sector.
More fundamentally, the headlines resulting from the Cour des Comptes’ report support our wider hypothesis that conventional macro thinking is flawed to the extent that it typically ignores private debt while seeing government debt as a problem rather than as a solution.
Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.
