Month: July 2021

“Euro area leads the UK”

Money cycles remain synchronised, but the EA is leading the transition to normality

The key chart

Trends in UK and EA broad money aggregates (Source: BoE; ECB, CMMP)

The key message

The UK and EA money cycles remain highly synchronised but the UK is lagging the EA in terms of the phased, steady return to normality.

Narrow money drove the expansion of broad money in both cases during the pandemic, reflecting the DEFLATIONARY forces of heightened uncertainty, increased savings, reduced consumption and relatively subdued demand for credit.

Among the key signals indicating a return to normality are (1) a moderation in household deposit flows, (2) a recovery in consumer credit, and (3) a resynching of money and credit cycles.

Monthly HH deposit flows/uncertainty levels have peaked in the UK and the EA, but while June 2021’s monthly flows in the EA were slightly below pre-pandemic levels, UK flows (£10bn) remained double the pre-pandemic average. According to CMMP estimates, excess HH savings in the UK have now reached over £150bn at the end of 1H21 (below official forecasts of £160bn).

Monthly consumer credit flows have turned positive in both the UK and the EA. However, while YoY growth rates turned positive in April in the EA they remain negative (-2.2%) in the UK.

The desynchronization of money and credit cycles during the pandemic has created challenges for policy makers and bankers alike. The growth in the supply of money exceeded the growth in private sector credit by record amounts during Phase 2 of the pandemic. The gap between them peaked at 11ppt in the UK (February 2021) and 8ppt in the EA (January 2021). At the end of the 2Q21, the gaps remained at 6.4ppt in the UK and 5.3ppt in the EA. Narrower than before but still very wide in a historic context.

In previous posts, I cautioned about confusing the messages from the money sector and suggested that reflation trades needed refuelling. As we enter 2H21, it remains important to understand the messages from the money sector correctly.

Falling growth rates in broad money reflect a moderation in deflationary forces primarily. Both the UK and EA are transitioning towards a steady recovery phase albeit at a different pace. The level of HH excess savings in the UK suggests a higher gearing towards a recover in HH consumption but, to date, the EA is leading the transition.

EA leads the UK – in charts

Trends in monthly HH deposit flows since January 2019 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Monthly HH deposit flows/uncertainty levels have peaked in the UK and the EA, but while June 2021’s monthly flows in the EA were slightly below pre-pandemic levels, UK flows (£10bn) remained double the pre-pandemic average of £5bn (see chart above). According to CMMP estimates, excess HH savings in the UK have now reached over £150bn at the end of 1H21 (below official forecasts of £160bn).

Trends in monthly consumer credit flows (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Monthly consumer credit flows have turned positive in both the UK and the EA (see chart above). However, while YoY growth rates turned positive in April in the EA they remain negative (-2.2%) in the UK (see chart below).

YoY growth in consumer credit since 2016 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The desynchronization of money and credit cycles during the pandemic has created challenges for policy makers and bankers alike. The growth in the supply of money exceeded the growth in private sector credit by record amounts during Phase 2 of the pandemic. The gap between them peaked at 11ppt in the UK (February 2021) and 8ppt in the EA (January 2021). At the end of the 2Q21, the gaps remained at 6.4ppt in the UK and 5.3ppt in the EA. Narrower than before but still very wide in a historic context (see chart below).

Growth in lending minus growth in money supply since 2011 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Conclusion

In previous posts, I cautioned about confusing the messages from the money sector and suggested that reflation trades needed refuelling. As we enter 2H21, it remains important to understand the messages from the money sector correctly.

Falling growth rates in broad money reflect a moderation in deflationary forces primarily. Both the UK and EA are transitioning towards a steady recovery phase albeit at a different pace. The level of HH excess savings in the UK suggests a higher gearing towards a recover in HH consumption but, to date, the EA is leading the transition.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available seperately.

“Through the phases”

A steady return to normality in the euro area?

The key chart

Monthly HH deposit flows (“uncertainty proxy”) through COVID phases (Source: ECB; CMMP)

The key message

The message from the money sector in 2Q21 is that the euro area (EA) has entered “Phase 3” of the COVID-19 crisis – a phase characterised (so far) by a steady return to normality

Household (HH) deposit flows fell from €176bn in 1Q21 to €82bn in 2Q21 as uncertainly levels peaked and the accumulation of liquid assets slowed below pre-pandemic levels. HH borrowing flows recovered from €57bn in 1Q21 to €77bn in 2Q21, above pre-pandemic levels. Mortgage flows remained the key driver, increasing from €60bn to €72bn over the same period. Consumer credit also recovered, however, from net repayments of -€4bn in 1Q21 to additional borrowing of €2bn in 2Q21.

In a reversal of recent trends, the gap between quarterly flows of HH deposits and borrowing narrowed sharply from €170bn in 1Q21 to €5bn in 2Q21. That said, overall money and credit cycles remain out-of-synch with each other but the extent of the de-synchronisation has narrowed from the January 2021 peak.

Earlier this year, I identified three key signals among the messages from the money sector to look for in 2021: a moderation in monthly HH deposit flows; a recovery in consumer credit; and a re-synching of money and credit cycles. At the end of 2Q21, the first two signals have turned positive and the third is “less-negative.” Normality is starting to return, albeit slowly.

A key lesson from Phase 2 of the pandemic was that the expansion in broad money (M3) was a reflection of DEFLATIONARY not inflationary forces – heighted uncertainty, increased liquidity preference, delayed consumption, subdued demand for credit etc. Little wonder then, that so-called “reflation trades” ran out of steam – put simply, the messages from the money sector were misunderstood.

As we move into 2H21, and if the same deflationary forces continue to moderate, attention may switch back to private sector credit demand. Will it remain subdued, recover or roll over and will money and credit cycles move back into synch with each other?

Steady return to normality – in charts

2Q21 trends

Quarterly HH deposit flows 1Q18-2Q21 (Source: ECB; CMMP)
Quarterly HH borrowing flows 1Q18-2Q21 (Source: ECB; CMMP)
Gaps between quarterly HH lending and HH deposit flows 1Q18-2Q21 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Three signals revisited

Trends in monthly HH deposit flows as multiple of 2019 average (Source: ECB; CMMP)
Monthly consumer credit flows and YoY growth rate (Source: ECB; CMMP)
The gap between money and credit cycles since 1999 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Don’t misread the message – this time it WAS different

Contribution of M1 and PSC to broad money growth since 1999 (Source: ECB; CMMP)

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are abstracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“Structure matters too”

How the structure of global debt is changing and why this matters

The key chart

Share of government and household debt in global debt since December 2008 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

The key message

With attention focusing mainly on post-pandemic highs in the level of global debt/debt ratios, it is very easy to ignore key changes in the structure of global debt, and why these changes matter.

  • There has been a marked shift away from household (HH) debt to government debt, at the global level. While HH (and other types of private debt) typically cause crises, government debt typically ends them/reduces their severity. Government deficits also increase the supply of money and depress rates (contrary to popular opinion)
  • The structure of US and UK debt is now the mirror image of the pre-GFC period. This reduces associated risks since governments face different financial constraints to the HH and NFC sectors and cannot, as currency issuers, become insolvent
  • A similar but more muted shift has occurred in the euro area (EA) where the structure of debt also differs significantly across the EA’s largest economies
  • As currency users, EA governments also face different constraints to governments that remain issuers of their own currency. Flaws in the EU’s fiscal architecture were apparent before the pandemic. With budget hawks already calling for a return to EU fiscal rules, policy risks remain elevated
  • These trends are advanced economy trends not EM ones. With private sector credit accounting for 72% of EM debt, EMs face very different challenges associated mainly with the level of NFC debt and the rate of growth in HH debt (note also that EM debt is increasingly a “China-debt” story)

Global debt dynamics are a key element of CMMP analysis. It is natural to focus initially on the impact of responses to the pandemic on the level of debt. However, a failure to incorporate analysis of the structure, growth and affordability of debt at the same time can lead to false conclusions regarding investment implications. The post-COVID world is very different from the post-GFC world.

Structure matters too

Trends in global debt and the global debt ratio since 2005 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Much attention has focused on the impact of the public and private sector responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on the level of global debt and global debt ratios across all sectors (see chart above). All recorded new highs at the end of 4Q20. Less attention has focused, however, on the changing structure of global debt particularly in relation to the pre-GFC period. This posts sets out to correct this by highlighting five key structural changes in global debt and explaining their significance.

Five key changes

Share of government anf household debt in global debt since December 2008 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

First, at the global level, there has been a shift away from HH debt to government debt (see chart above). This matters because (1) while private sector debt typically causes crises, public sector debt typically ends them/reduces their severity and (2) contrary to mainstream teaching, government deficits increase rather than decrease the supply of money and drive rates down.

Trends in the share of US and UK government and household debt since 2008 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Second, following this shift, the structure of US and UK debt is the mirror image of the pre-GFC structure (see chart above). This reduces associated risks since governments face different financial constraints to the HH and NFC sectors and cannot, if currency issuers, become insolvent.

Trends in shares of EA government, HH and NFC debt since 2008 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Third, more muted shifts have occurred in the euro area (EA) where the structure of debt still differs significantly across the EA’s largest economies. HH debt accounted for 27% of total EA debt in 1Q08 versus 42% in the US and the UK (see chart above). This share fell to 21% in 4Q20 versus 27% in the US and 30% in the UK respectively. Government debt has increases from 31% to 39% of EA debt versus 45% in the US and 44% in the UK respectively. At the country level, however, the share of government debt in total debt ranges from 60% in Italy to only 20% in the Netherlands (see chart below).

Changes in structure of debt across EA’s largest economies (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Fourth, as currency users, EA governments also face different constraints to governments that remain issuers of their own currency. Flaws in the EU’s fiscal architecture were apparent before the pandemic. With budget hawks already calling for a return to EU fiscal rules, policy risks remain elevated.

Trends in shares of EM government, HH and NFC debt since 2008 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Fifth, these trends are advanced economy trends not EM ones. With private sector credit accounting for 72% of EM debt, EMs face very different challenges associated mainly with the level of NFC debt and the rate of growth in HH debt (see chart above). Note also that EM debt is also increasingly a “China-debt” story. At the end of 4Q20, China accounted for 67% and 70% of total EM and EM NFC debt respectively (see chart below).

China’s share of EM total and NFC debt since 2008 (Source: BIS; CMMP)

Conclusion

Global debt dynamics are a core element of CMMP analysis. While it is natural to focus initially on the new highs in the global debt levels and debt ratios across all sectors, it is also important not to miss the important messages associated with changes in the structure, growth and affordability of global debt.

The shift in the structure of global debt from HH debt to government debt has important implications for the severity of recessions, monetary dynamics, inflation, rates and investment risks. The nature of these implications also vary depending on whether governments are currency issuers (eg, US and UK) or currency users (eg, EA governments). The risks of a return to pre-pandemic policy mixes remain in all areas, however. Finally, EMs face very different challenges largely associated with the level of NFC debt, the growth rate in HH debt and the increasing dominance of China in EM debt.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“The UK reflation trade needs refuelling”

Direction versus pace of travel…

The key chart

Trends in weekly card payments versus pre-COVID levels (Source: ONS; CMMP)

The key message

In April 2021, I argued that investment narratives, like endurance athletes, require constant refuelling but that it was too early to expect much “refuelling” in terms of the key signals for 2021. This has been true for the UK where the direction of travel has been positive but the pace of travel has been disappointing in relation to trends observed in the euro area (EA).

Monthly flows in household (HH) money, a useful indicator of household uncertainty, have followed the timing of lockdown restrictions closely. They have fallen from £21bn in December 2020 to £7bn in May 2021 but remain 1.5x the average pre-COVID pandemic monthly flows.

CMMP analysis suggests that “excess savings” built up during the pandemic have reached £144bn (slightly below official estimates) or £137bn if a slightly higher level of precautionary savings are maintained. History reminds us that it takes time for excess savings or unanticipated sources of wealth to return in the form of consumption, however. For the first time since August 2020, UK consumers borrowed more than they paid off in May 2020 (£0.3bn) but the annual growth rate remained weak (-3.2% YoY).

So-called “faster indicators” such as UK spending on debit and credit cards send the same message. Spending continues to recover but remains below pre-pandemic levels. UK HHs are increasing spending on getting to work but spending on “delayable” goods has lost some momentum and remains below pre-COVID levels. This morning (9 July 2020), ONS statistics show GDP growing 0.8% in May 2021, the fourth consecutive month of growth, but below expectations and 3.1% below pre-COVID levels.

The UK reflation trade is in need of more sustained refuelling…

The key message in six charts

Monthly flows of HH money holding since January 2019 (Source: BoE; CMMP)
CMMP estimates of build up of “excess savings” during the COVID-19 pandemic (Source: BoE, CMMP)
Trends in UK consumer credit since January 2020 (Source: BoE; CMMP)
Aggregate weekly card payments in 2021 versus pre-COVID levels (Source: ONS; CMMP)
Card payments versus pre-COVID levels by type of spending (Source: ONS; CMMP)
ONS estimates for monthly GDP, 2018 = 100 (Source: ONS; CMMP)

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.

“We cannot waste the opportunity”

This is not the time to ignore Panetta’s warnings

The key chart

What are the key messages behind the headline numbers? (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The key message

The EA may be leading the UK in a steady and synchronised recovery but this is not the time to repeat the post-GFC policy mistakes.

What are the euro area (EA) and UK money sectors telling us about the nature of the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic?

The deflationary forces that drove the acceleration in broad money during the pandemic have peaked. Household (HH) uncertainly is falling, especially in the EA (key signal #1). Monthly flows in consumer credit were positive in May in both regions and the EA registered positive YoY growth in consumer credit for the second month running (key signal #2).The gap between lending growth and money growth is narrowing from recent record highs but both regions remain a long way from normalised money and credit cycles (key signal #3).

The 2Q21 message from the money sector is clear – the EA is leading the UK in a steady and synchronised recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic (so far), but with a challenging policy context looking forward. The comments from ECB Executive Board member, Fabio Panetta, that, “Combined fiscal and monetary support has lifted the economy out of the state of the emergency” appear well founded in this context.

The tentative nature of the recovery to date places even more importance on Panetta’s conclusion that, “We cannot waste the opportunity of having, for the first time in more than a decade, a combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and a global reflationary environment to re-anchor inflation expectations to our target.”

This is not the time to repeat the post-GFC policy mistakes.

2Q21 messages from the money sectors

M3 increasingly driven by M1 or narrow money (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The deflationary forces that drove the acceleration in broad money during the pandemic have peaked. As can be seen in the chart above, narrow money (notes and coins in circulation and overnight deposits, or M1) represents an increasingly large proportion of broad money (M3) in both regions.

In May 2021, M1 accounted for 72% and 68% of M3 in the EA and UK respectively. This compares with 45% and 47% respectively in May 2009 and the GFC period. The key point here is that money sitting idly in overnight deposits contributes to neither growth nor inflation.

Different drivers, different implications (Source: ECB; CMMP)

As noted in previous posts (see “Don’t confuse the message”), it is important not to confuse the messages from the pre-GFC and COVID-19 periods of broad money expansion (see EA chart above). The message from the former period was one of over-confidence (low M1 contribution) and excess credit demand (high PSC contribution). In contrast, the recent message has been one of heightened uncertainty (high M1 contribution) and subdued credit demand (low PSC contribution). In short, recent money growth reflects fiscal and monetary easing in response to weak private sector demand and rising savings (with the added uncertainty regarding the extent to which rising savings are forced or precautionary).

Key signal #1 revisited

Trends in monthly HH deposit flows since January 2019 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

HH uncertainly is falling, especially in the EA (key signal #1). Monthly HH deposit flows are moderating in both regions. During the pandemic, HHs in both regions increased their money holdings despite earning negative returns – a combination of forced and precautionary savings. At their respective peaks, monthly flows were 2.4x (March 2020) and 6.0x (May 2020) their pre-Covid levels in the EA and UK respectively (see chart above).

In the EA, monthly flows were €31bn in May (up from €20bn in April) compared to the €33bn average flows seen during 2019. This was the second consecutive month when monthly flows were below their pre-COVID levels. In the UK, monthly flows were £7bn in May 2021, down from £9bn in April 2021, but still 1.5x their 2019 average of £5bn.

Key signal #2 revisited

Trends in monthly consumer credit flows since January 2020 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)
YoY growth in consumer credit over past five years (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Monthly flows in consumer credit were positive in May in both regions and the EA registered (slightly) positive YoY growth in consumer credit for the second month running (key signal #2).

HHs in the EA and UK borrowed €1.5bn and £0.3bn as consumer credit respectively in May 2021. This is the first time since August 2020 that UK consumers have borrowed more than they paid off. The Bank of England reported that this increase reflected £0.4bn in “other” forms of consumer credit such as card dealership finance and personal loans. In contrast, credit card lending remained weak with a net repayment of £0.1bn.

The EA has registered growth rates of 0.3% and 0.6% YoY in April and May 2021. In the UK, consumer credit fell -3.2% from -5.7% in April and the historic low of -10% in February 2021.

Key signal #3 revisited

Growth in lending minus growth in money suppy since April 2011 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

The gap between lending growth and money growth is narrowing from recent record highs but both regions remain a long way from having normalised money and credit cycles (key signal #3).

Recall that in typical cycles, monetary aggregates and their key counterparts (eg credit to the private sector) move together. Money supply indicates how much money is available for use by the private sector. Private sector credit indicates how much the private sector is actually borrowing.

The gap has narrowed to 5.7ppt in the EA and 6.9ppt in the UK from recent, record highs of 8ppt (January 2021) and 11.4ppt (February 2021) respectively. This narrowing reflects a slowdown in both money supply and private sector credit, especially in the NFC sector.

Note that: (1) the effectiveness of monetary policy relies, in part, on certain stable relationships between monetary aggregates and their counterparts; and (2) that the desynchronization of money and credit cycles during the pandemic was unprecedented in both the EA and the UK.

Trends in lending by type since May 2019 (Source: BoE; ECB; CMMP)

Conclusion

The 2Q21 message from the money sector is clear – the EA is leading the UK in a steady and synchronised recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic (so far), but with a challenging policy context looking forward.

In this context, the comments from ECB Executive Board member, Fabio Panetta, that, “Combined fiscal and monetary support has lifted the economy out of the state of the emergency” appear well founded.

The tentative nature of the recovery to date places even more importance on Panetta’s conclusion that, “We cannot waste the opportunity of having, for the first time in more than a decade, a combination of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies and a global reflationary environment to re-anchor inflation expectations to our target.”

This is not the time to repeat the post-GFC policy mistakes.

Please note that the summary comments and charts above are extracts from more detailed analysis that is available separately.